The Fourth of August Explosion: Six Years Without Truth or Justice

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BEIRUT, LEBANON - AUGUST 05 2020: Aerial view of Beirut Port completely destroyed as the inspection of the scene continue after a fire at a warehouse with explosives led to massive blasts in Beirut

 

Memory after memory, the headlines of the massacre remain the same: "Truth," "Justice," and "Accountability."

6:07 PM, Beirut exploded at exactly this time. A huge explosion, a violent storm, colorful clouds, consumed by the sounds of screaming and rescue vehicles, and one repeated question: "Shou Saar" - what happened?

At approximately 5:45 p.m. on August 4, 2020, a fire broke out in Warehouse No. 12 at the port. Thick smoke billowed from the site, where teams from the Beirut Fire Department arrived and began attempting to bring the fire under control. The flames intensified, as did the sounds of heavy, successive explosions caused by the ignition of fireworks that had been stockpiled in the warehouse. Then came the moment of doom, when the entire capital exploded.

 The explosion was caused by the ignition of approximately 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate, which had been stockpiled in Warehouse No. 12 since 2014, without supervision, inspection, or even the most basic safety measures. Stored alongside it were other volatile materials that made an explosion all but inevitable: 24 tons of fireworks stored since at least 2011, and 34 kilometers of ignition fuses, stored since before 2000. Oils, tires, clothing, fuels, and medicines have all turned the warehouse into something resembling an explosive marketplace.

 

Six Years Without Truth or Justice

Six years have passed since the Beirut port explosion, and yet the families of the victims have not had the truth they are seeking. They were not given an account of what actually happened on the evening of August 4, or in the events leading up to it. Justice has not been served for the victims, and those responsible for this massacre have not been held accountable. In fact, some of them have even received career “promotions” or partisan and electoral endorsementsExamining the course of the investigation into the crime reveals that these investigations were subjected to various forms of intimidation, a tactic mastered by Lebanon’s political system. In addition to the direct killings, the obstruction of the investigation into one of the largest non-nuclear explosions in modern history constitutes a second crime.

4 August 2020 was the day that changed Beirut forever. A mass killing took place in the port and surrounding residential neighborhoods, taking the lives of 240 people and injuring 7,000 others, many of whom still bear unhealed scars. The explosion damaged 50,000 housing units and displaced about 300,000 people from their neighborhoods. Notably, one building remained standing despite being shattered, protecting the other half of the city from the explosion and saving half a million lives.

State Negligence

The materials stored in Warehouse No. 12 demonstrate that the Lebanese state bears primary responsibility for allowing the conditions that led to the explosion. Complete official negligence turned this warehouse into a ticking time bomb, regardless of the immediate causes of the fire and the subsequent explosion. In this context, the judicial investigator in the case revealed in 2021 that there were three possible scenarios for the explosion:

  1. A welding accident; sparks from workers repairing the warehouse doors ignited the fire. This hypothesis was later rejected after field tests on the welding equipment, conducted under the judicial investigator's supervision.

  2. Deliberate sabotage inside the warehouse; a theory the investigation has not yet resolved, partly because the surveillance cameras were not functioning at the time.

  3. A military strike on the port; ruled out by technical reports from the Lebanese Army, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other agencies, following soil sample analysis from the blast site.

Until the judiciary releases its findings on this matter, it remains clear that negligence occurred and that the Lebanese state bears clear responsibility in this regard. Subsequent reports revealed that the Lebanese state, represented by its three presidential authorities and security agencies, was aware of the tons of ammonium nitrate stored at the port at least weeks before the explosion happened. However, none of these entities took the initiative to defuse the bomb in Warehouse No. 12, which strongly supports the conclusion that senior state officials failed to act despite repeated warnings. Therefore, it was in the political leadership’s interest, at the very least, to control the investigation into the crime or even to oversee it.

Judicial Obstruction 

After the tragedy, the Higher Judicial Council launched an investigation into the port explosion, and Judge Fadi Sawwan was assigned to lead the inquiry. Sawwan did not remain in this position for long. He filed charges against Ministers Ali Hassan Khalil and Ghazi Zuaiter, members of the Amal Movement led by Speaker of the House of Representatives Nabih Berri. In response, they filed motions to have him recused from the case, and Sawwan was removed. The authorities intended this measure to send a disciplinary message to judges that there are red lines they cannot cross. Judge Tarek Bitar was then appointed in February 2021; he followed the same path as his predecessor and even expanded his charges against political officials and security officers. That marked the beginning of a campaign to obstruct the investigation. The primary means of obstruction involved the two defendants, Khalil and Zaiter, filing dozens of legal proceedings against Bitar: recusal motions, requests to halt proceedings, and lawsuits against the state challenging judges' actions. Former ministers Youssef Fenianos and Nohad Machnouk, as well as former Prime Minister Hassan Diab, all of whom have since been charged, joined the effort as well.

This tactic has a name in law: “abuse of right,” the use of a legitimate legal procedure not for its intended purpose, but to obstruct and paralyze the investigation. Yet the various judicial bodies reviewing these cases rejected the obstructionists' claims each time, and Bitar remained at the helm of the investigation, even as the proceedings led to his suspension for several consecutive months.

Political obstruction 

The governance system played its favorite card in an attempt to overthrow the investigation: sectarian division. This was reflected in the Hezbollah and Amal Movement’s claim that the judge’s actions were directed against them, which, according to Lebanese rhetoric and logic, targets the Shia community. Thus, a widespread political and media campaign was launched against the investigation and the judge, accusing him of politicizing the investigation and handling the case arbitrarily. The campaign to demonize Bitar then escalated, portraying him as a foreign agent and claiming that his goal was to serve the interests of foreign embassies seeking to punish Hezbollah. This resulted in pressure being exerted on the association of the victims’ families to divide them and turn public opinion against the judge. Indeed, that's what happened: a group of victims' families, aligned with Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, split from the main association and launched a separate group calling for Bitar’s dismissal; these families, too, have their own legitimate grievances. This campaign coincided with the political authorities’ refusal to grant the judicial investigator permission to prosecute two of the most powerful officers in the security services. The Supreme Defense Council, chaired by President Michel Aoun at that time, refused to permit Bitar to prosecute the Director General of State Security, Major General Tony Saliba. The Minister of the Interior at that time, Bassam al-Mawlawi, refused to permit him to prosecute the Director General of General Security, Major General Abbas Ibrahim. 

Threats Against the Judiciary

The system revealed another side of itself. Those implicated in the port investigation escalated their campaign against the judge, moving from legal obstruction to direct intimidation. According to an account first circulated by LBCI correspondent Edmond Sassine on September 21, 2021, and later corroborated in part by Reuters reporting, Wafiq Safa, head of Hezbollah's Liaison and Coordination Unit and the party's highest-ranking official on domestic security and political affairs, visited the Palace of Justice that day, where he met with the Public Prosecutor. He then reportedly delivered, through an intermediary, a direct message to Judge Bitar: "We're still coming for you. We'll go all the way with you through legal channels, and if that doesn't work, we'll take you down." Multiple sources later confirmed that Bitar referenced this warning in an official letter to the Public Prosecutor, though the precise chain of how the message reached him has been reported differently across accounts. The threat did not exist in a vacuum. Hezbollah has been accused of several political assassinations targeting its opponents, both in the 1980s and over the past two decades; a history that culminated most notably in the assassination of researcher and publisher Lokman Slim on February 4, 2021. However, Hezbollah denies it, and no one has been charged yet.

Use of Civil Peace as Leverage

Safa's threats failed to obstruct Judge Tarek Bitar's work. Hezbollah and the Amal Movement then organized a protest demanding Bitar's removal, held just a few hundred meters from the Palace of Justice where his office is located. The protest descended into an armed clash in the Tayouneh area on October 14, 2021, leaving seven dead — an incident both sides blame on the other, and whose exact cause remains officially unresolved to this day. This security incident occurred during a protest organized by Hezbollah and the Amal Movement on 14 October 2021, calling for Bitar’s removal. The demonstration set out from the predominantly Shia neighborhood of Shiyah in Beirut. When it reached the outskirts of the predominantly Christian neighborhood of Ain al-Rummaneh, a confrontation escalated into gunfire. Weapons spread among the demonstrators, followed by sniper fire and rocket attacks. This resulted in seven fatalities. The Lebanese Army swiftly intervened and responded to the sources of fire, saving the country from a small-scale civil war. This is particularly significant given that the Shiyah and Ain al-Rummaneh line held special symbolic importance during the Lebanese Civil War as it was one of the lines of contact between “East Beirut” and “West Beirut”.

Executive Interference in Judicial Independence

The efforts to obstruct the investigation into the port explosion did not end there. After the “Civil Peace” card expired, the authorities played a new one. In 2022, former Justice Minister Henry Khoury spearheaded an initiative to appoint a replacement judge for Investigating Judge Tarek Bitar. This was a blatant violation of judicial independence, representing direct interference by the executive authority in its work. It was an obvious political attempt to influence the course of the investigation into the port explosion. In response, the Association of Families of the Martyrs and Injured of the Port Explosion protested. The Minister of Justice, who was affiliated with the Free Patriotic Movement led by Gebran Bassil (who was then President Michel Aoun’s son-in-law), deemed it most appropriate to accuse the families of being traitors. He accused several of the group’s leaders of receiving funds from embassies and acting in the interests of foreign countries. These accusations were designed to tarnish the reputations of these individuals and turn public opinion against them. However, this scheme was exposed when popular demonstrations in support of the families and victims surrounded the Ministry of Justice, which is located next to the Palace of Justice, and demanded that the minister back down.

Between 2021 and 2024, the political authorities in Lebanon suppressed the families of the victims directly. They arrested some and summoned others for questioning in an ongoing attempt to curb their demands and defuse the popular momentum surrounding the case. At times, the protests evolved from showing solidarity with the victims to showing solidarity with their repressed families, and then with the judge who was the target of intimidation campaigns. The fingerprints of one authority are evident throughout all of the events.

Obstruction by the Public Prosecutor

Thelatest attempt to obstruct the port investigation came from the public prosecutor, Ghassan Oueidat, himself. In January 2023, the judicial investigator filed charges against Oueidat and Court of Appeal prosecutor Ghassan Khoury. Oueidat retaliated by bringing charges against Bitar for the crime of 'usurpation of power' and imposing a travel ban on him. He then continued his offensive against Bitar, seizing control of the case file and releasing all detainees held in connection with it, despite having previously recused himself from the case due to a familial relationship with one of the defendants, Minister Ghazi Zuaiter.

Among those released was Mohammad Ziad Al-Ouf, the head of port security and safety, who was immediately flown to the United States, where he is a citizen. This coincided with press reports stating that Al-Ouf’s release was demanded by the United States, meaning that the very individuals harmed by the investigation were those executing foreign agendas and embassy orders.

 

Political Developments (2024–2025)

The political circumstances in Lebanon shifted in early 2025 when Joseph Aoun was elected President of the Republic, ending a presidential vacuum that had lasted for over two years and one month. During this period, the country was governed by the last government formed by President Michel Aoun and headed by Najib Mikati. Aoun’s election followed Israeli aggression and military and security strikes against Hezbollah in 2024, which undermined the group’s influence and ability to control events in Lebanon.

This political shift eased the pressure on the judiciary, resulting in a series of judicial decisions that reversed the effects of the obstruction. The first of these was Oueidat's retirement in 2024. Tarek Bitar thus returned to his position as judicial investigator with full authority and without practical obstruction as Public Prosecutor. Jamal al-Hajjar, Oueidat’s successor, resumed cooperating with Bitar. Bitar then issued a series of new measures, including scheduling hearings for defendants, politicians, security officers and judges. This culminated in his announcement on 30 March that the case investigations had concluded. He then referred the case to the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Court of Cassation for their observations before taking it back in order to issue the indictment and refer it to the Judicial Council.

The path to truth, justice and accountability

The investigation into the Beirut port explosion reveals the structural flaws in Lebanon's judicial system. This investigation reveals five aspects of the obstruction of access to the truth, the achievement of justice, and the completion of accountability:

  1. Direct obstruction of the defendants in the case, which amounted to more than 60 legal actions repeated and successive obstruction measures.

  2. Direct political pressure on judges, which could push some of them to step down or comply and be disciplined in compliance with political demands.

  3. Instrumentalization of sectarian divisions, which is a tool that the components of the system are accustomed to arming themselves with at fundamental political crossroads, and even in legislative life or government formation stations and other decisions that official councils can issue.

  4. Security-related intimidation and threats of violence, which could try to put the judiciary in the position of being responsible for the bloodshed, or even threaten to shed blood to curb the work of judges.

  5. Structural dependence of the judiciary on the executive branch, which is essentially a product of the political system, as the appointment of the head of the judiciary comes by decision of the executive authority.

This imbalance has prompted human rights and civil society organizations to call for a series of judicial reforms and the enactment of legislation to protect the judicial system, starting with a law guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, which would remove judicial appointments from the control of the executive authority and protect judges and judicial cases from the abuse of power.

List of Defendants 

The list of defendants compiled by the judicial investigator in the port explosion case reveals that the suspects in this crime hold a variety of positions in politics, security, and administration. Classifying them by their roles can help illustrate this:

Politicians: former Prime Minister Hassan Diab and former ministers: Nouhad Mashnouk, Youssef Fenianos, Ali Hassan Khalil, Ghazi Zuaiter.

Security: former Director General of Public Security Abbas Ibrahim, former Director General of State Security Tony Saliba, and officers in the Army, Public Security, and State Security: Edmond Fadel, Marwan Eid, Ghassan Gharz al-Din, Jawdat Oueidat, Camille Daher, Joseph al-Naddaf, Charbel Fawaz, Daoud Fayyad, Antoine Salloum, Najm Al-Ahmadiyya, Muhammad Hassan Muqallid, and Manah Sawaya.

Judges: Ghassan Oueidat, Ghassan Khoury, Carla Shawah, and Jad Maalouf.

Customs officials: Gracia Al-Qazi, Badri Daher, Shafiq Marei, Asaad Al-Tufaili, Raymond Khoury, Girgis Al-Mudawar, Hani Al-Hajj Shehadeh, Musa Hazima, Ghassan Ghassani, Mikhael Al-Murr, Khaled Al-Khatib, Elias Shaheen, Nima Al-Barax, and Adel Francis.

Officials in the port administration and the Ministry of Works: Hassan Quraitem, Muhammad Ziad Al-Auf, Abdul Hafeez Al-Qaisi, Sami Hussein, Samer Raad, Wajdi Al-Qarqafi, Johnny Girgis, Nayla Al-Hajj, Mustafa Farshoukh, Michel Nahoul, Adel Nassar, Muhammad Al-Mawla, Hanna Fares, Rabie Sorour, Muhammad Qasabiya, Marwan Kaaki, and Beirut Port Management and Investment.

Those responsible for the welding workshop: contractor Salim Shibli and his company, and workers Raed Al-Ahmad, Khader Al-Ahmad, and Ahmed Al-Rajab.

Those responsible for the ship Rhosus and the ammonium nitrate shipment: Igor Grechushkin, Vladimir Vernopol, Boris Prokoshev, Jorge Manuel Merra, and Mustafa Baghdadi (deceased), in addition to the companies Savaro and Savaro U. Key, Savaro Limited, Banco Internacional de Mozambique, and Fabrica de Explosivos. All of them are defendants in the case, and no convictions have been issued against them yet.

The list of defendants shows that they are of different Lebanese political colors, from different Lebanese sects. But they were all members of one system that knew about the ammonium nitrate stored in the port, so it turned Warehouse No. 12 into a time bomb that blew up Beirut and killed its people.

 

Translated by: Mohamed El Sadat.