Escalating tensions between Washington and Tehran threaten to undermine diplomatic efforts to uphold the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by the two countries on June 17, 2026, which sought to halt military escalation as a prelude to peace talks, according to France 24.
Recently, Washington resumed its airstrikes on Iran after Tehran attacked three vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, US President Donald Trump declared that the memorandum of understanding was no longer in effect. He subsequently revoked the exemption allowing Iran to sell its oil and reinstated the naval blockade along Iran’s eastern coastline.
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said that “Trump’s decision has, in one way or another, undermined the memorandum of understanding.”
Who is responsible?
"The situation is extremely complicated," Iranian political analyst Hassan Hanizadeh told the Iranian news outlet Fararu, which is close to the moderate conservative camp. He added, "Trump's behavior is neither rational nor predictable. He abruptly changes his stance at various stages. In such an atmosphere, it is extremely difficult to build trust, as any negotiation is accompanied by serious doubts."
Hani Zadeh warned that "escalating tensions are in no country's interest in the region. That is why countries such as Oman and Qatar are trying to play a mediating role to reduce tensions and keep negotiations alive. Even so, the situation could still move toward a military confrontation. The goodwill required to reach a lasting agreement does not appear to exist in Washington."
In his view, "the recent chain of developments shows that certain currents and factions within the United States continue to advocate a policy of maximum pressure and increased threats against Iran, making any political dialogue even more difficult."
By contrast, the hardline US-based Soufan Center and Ankara-based IRAM center place responsibility for the renewed escalation on Iran, arguing that Tehran remains determined to preserve the strategic leverage it gained during the 34-Day War. Maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz, they contend, offers Iran greater strategic influence and benefits than engaging with Washington in exchange for promises of economic gains.
Speaking to Raseef22, Komail Al-Boushouka, a researcher specializing in Iranian studies at the Al-Hiwar ‘Dialogue’ research center, said that "the failure of the memorandum of understanding was not surprising. The disagreement between the two sides goes beyond procedural or tactical issues and stems from a clash of strategic visions. The United States seeks to impose permanent restrictions on Iran's nuclear program, curb its missile capabilities, and reduce Tehran's regional influence, whereas the Iranian leadership views these issues as fundamental pillars of the country’s security and instruments of deterrence."
Al-Boushouka added, "Although there are currents and factions within Iran's state institutions that support continuing negotiations to ease economic and political pressure, the country's security and military institutions — chief among them the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — view any major concessions with caution, believing they could weaken Iran's deterrence capabilities and alter the internal balance of power. As a result, the trust gap has remained wide, and the memorandum of understanding failed to address the core disputes, sending both sides back to a policy of pressure and escalation."
An unequal stalemate
According to the Soufan Center, the US-Iran memorandum of understanding failed to satisfy either side's competing strategic objectives. Consequently, it did not produce the anticipated path toward a lasting agreement or eliminate the possibility of a return to full-scale war, as Washington lacks clear or acceptable options for shifting the strategic balance and compelling Tehran to settle.
Washington's response therefore reflects Trump's frustration that the memorandum failed to achieve its primary short-term objective: reopening the Strait of Hormuz, a step regarded as essential for easing the political and economic pressure generated by his decision to launch Operation Epic Fury. Meanwhile, the ongoing struggle over control of the Strait signals that the core dispute remains far from resolved.
If Iran is unable to comply with the terms of the memorandum, which would grant Tehran financial benefits in exchange for reopening the Strait, there is little hope of reaching the far more complex nuclear agreement. According to the Soufan Center, the two sides have not discussed the nuclear issue since signing the memorandum.
According to Chatham House policy institute, the memorandum amounted to mutual concessions by both countries, but neither side secured enough to claim a decisive victory.
Sanam Vakil, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, said that “Washington secured a pathway towards reopening Hormuz, calming energy markets, and reducing the risk of further regional escalation,” while Tehran “gained a pause in the fighting and the prospect of renewed oil exports, sanctions relief, and protection from further attacks” — an outcome that can be “best understood as an unequal draw.”
Accordingly, Washington “enters the talks with military superiority,” while Tehran retains the ability to “refuse some American demands,” with both sides using diplomacy to buy time. Yet the imbalance that brought the war to an end will continue to shape the dynamics of both the conflict and future negotiations.
According to the Quincy Institute, there are “two competing interpretations” of the memorandum. From Tehran's perspective, “all commercial traffic during the 60-day interim period must be coordinated with Iran” as the parties negotiate permanent maritime arrangements. Washington, however, interprets an "open" Strait to mean that ships “may transit either Iranian or Omani shipping lanes without coordinating with Iran” — a difference that Tehran sees as a strategic disagreement rather than a technical one.
For this reason, "Iranian officials fear the United States is using the MOU to erode Iran's control over the Strait by rejecting any requirement for coordination” with Tehran. At the same time, “Tehran has shown no genuine willingness to fulfill its commitments regarding the nuclear and missile files, among other issues," according to security and military analyst Riad Kahwaji.
Speaking to Raseef22, Kahwaji said, "Iran's primary objective in the memorandum was to secure sanctions relief and regain access to its frozen assets," adding that "the Strait of Hormuz crisis is fundamentally intended to make this issue overshadow all other files, so that international attention focuses exclusively on it."
According to Kahwaji, Iran is banking on several considerations in this strategy:
- First, Tehran believes the United States is exhausted and grappling with domestic pressure because of the elections, economic conditions, and other factors, making it unwilling to engage in a large-scale war. Instead, it expects any US response to remain highly limited.
- Second, Iran believes there is widespread fatigue across the region and that the Gulf states represent a point of vulnerability for the United States. Consequently, Tehran believes that targeting those states could weaken Washington's resolve to sustain any military confrontation. This, he argues, is the rationale behind provoking the current crisis.
- Third, the US side is aware of Iran's calculations and recognizes the vulnerabilities on which Tehran is betting. Nevertheless, Washington will not accept an unfavorable agreement that fails to resolve the nuclear and missile issues on its terms. Nor can it allow the Strait of Hormuz to remain under Iranian control.
What comes next?
“The memorandum of understanding with Iran was a test that Tehran failed,” Trump said. Meanwhile, the Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat argues that the memorandum was fragile from the outset because it postponed the most difficult issues rather than resolving them. It granted Iran economic gains and eased some pressure on the country, but left the nuclear program and ultimate control over the Strait to future negotiations.
As a result, the two sides interpreted the text in fundamentally different ways. Tehran viewed it as recognition of its role in managing the movement of ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz, while Washington regarded it as an Iranian commitment to facilitate passage through the Strait without restrictions or threats.
Tehran’s attempt to establish a mechanism granting it authority to issue transit permits and regulate shipping traffic through an Iranian body overseeing the Strait was also rejected by Washington and shipping companies, viewed as an attempt to impose an Iranian fait accompli in an international waterway.
Thus, the problem was not merely an incidental violation of the memorandum but a disagreement over its very purpose. According to the Saudi newspaper, Washington sought to turn the de-escalation into the beginning of broader Iranian concessions, while influential factions in Tehran treated it as an opportunity to restore military capabilities, strengthen maritime deterrence, and turn control of the Strait into a permanent strategic gain.
However, despite the intensity and geographical spread of the latest wave of military activity, it remains a continuation of the pattern of limited conflict that was evident before the ceasefire, according to the Ankara-based think tank IRAM. Washington has maintained its restrained approach to military engagement while managing the crisis centered on the Strait of Hormuz. The nature of the targeted areas also suggests that Washington’s objective is to curb Iran’s pursuit of complete strategic initiative in the Strait while restoring deterrence.
Accordingly, the US military intervention can be seen as a policy of limited deterrence based on the controlled use of force rather than a comprehensive strategy of invasion or regime change. Likewise, Iran’s military response should be understood as a calculated and limited retaliatory strategy intended to send a deterrent message to both domestic and international audiences, rather than to broaden the conflict, reflecting a desire to avoid full-scale war. According to IRAM, the approach adopted by both sides points to a new balance that can be described as a “fragile ceasefire.”
During this period, limited military engagement overlaps with diplomatic contacts, according to IRAM. Amwaj.Media shares this assessment, predicting that both Washington and Tehran can be expected to “game out” one another in an effort to strengthen their negotiating positions and identify each other’s vulnerabilities.
Nevertheless, the current crisis carries the risk of once again dragging the two countries into a large-scale conflict, IRAM warns. The sustainability of this fragile balance will therefore depend largely on both sides’ willingness to maintain the current strategy of limited engagement.
In this context, Al-Boushouka says that Washington views military pressure as a means of forcing a return to diplomacy on terms more favorable to the United States, while the Iranian leadership sees diplomacy as a tool for managing the crisis and buying time rather than as a final solution to the dispute.
Analysts also believe Trump is likely to avoid a full-scale war, an occupation, or direct regime change in Iran, instead favoring concentrated pressure aimed at achieving three objectives: reopening the Strait, extracting nuclear concessions, and demonstrating that he has regained the initiative ahead of the midterm elections.
For that reason, he has publicly kept the possibility of a negotiated settlement alive despite the resumption of military operations. However, Asharq Al-Awsat argues that pursuing all three objectives simultaneously could produce a low-intensity conflict in which cycles of bombing and negotiation alternate instead of leading to a swift resolution, potentially turning the 60-day deadline from a pressure tactic into yet another chapter in a “war with no clear end.”
Kahwaji points out that the current escalation, framed around “control of the Strait of Hormuz,” is above all a battle over leverage. If the United States gains control of the Strait, it deprives Iran of one of its most important bargaining chips, forcing Tehran to relinquish other sources of leverage.
If Iran secures control of the Strait, however, it will have won the wager in this strategic equation. Even so, Washington’s objective remains reaching an agreement — but on American terms, in a way that clearly demonstrates it achieved its goals: preventing Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz and resolving the nuclear issue in a manner acceptable to the United States.
“At present, events are moving in an escalatory direction that could lead either to a full-scale war or to different forms of military confrontation,” Kahwaji says. He adds, “We may also witness further developments within Iran itself, through attempts to exploit the blockade and the bombardment to stir domestic unrest among the Iranian public, alongside a new approach focused on targeting Iran’s internal vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, the door to negotiations remains open on both sides whenever circumstances allow.”
“Neither war nor peace”
Fears of renewed war have prompted regional mediators to intensify efforts to negotiate arrangements that could restore both sides’ commitment to de-escalation, according to the Soufan Center. They are working to develop a formula that would renew adherence to the memorandum of understanding while reconciling the competing interpretations of the agreement that ended hostilities.
Even so, the Center considers it unlikely that US-Iran talks will resume unless the disputes over the Strait of Hormuz are resolved. It notes that neither side appears eager to return to a major conflict, despite Iranian leaders’ stated willingness to bear the consequences of escalation. Instead, both sides prefer a state of stalemate of “neither war nor peace” over either dangerous political capitulation or a return to full-scale war.
For his part, Al-Boushouka argues that military escalation and diplomacy are not necessarily contradictory tracks but often proceed in parallel. Many international crises involve military pressure alongside political engagement, as each side seeks to improve its negotiating position before returning to the bargaining table.
Washington recognizes that military action, even if it achieves operational gains or weakens Iran’s military capabilities, cannot by itself produce a lasting solution to the Iranian issue. A decisive military outcome would require a fundamental transformation of Iran’s political system — a scenario that would necessitate a large-scale military intervention and the seizure of the country’s political and military centers of power, all of which carry enormous costs and risks.
At the same time, Tehran understands that a prolonged open confrontation would impose growing economic and security burdens. According to Al-Boushouka, this is why the diplomatic channel remains open even during periods of escalation: both sides recognize that a political settlement, however complex, is ultimately less costly than sliding into a prolonged and open-ended military confrontation.
In his view, the short-term outlook points toward a continuation of the policy of military pressure, with the prospects for diplomatic solutions diminishing for the time being. He expects further rounds of military escalation, but without a large-scale ground intervention, since such a move could transform the confrontation into a full-scale war with severe military, economic, and political costs for both sides.
Over the medium term, if diplomatic efforts fail, which is the most probable scenario, the conflict could enter a new phase of military escalation, including continued strikes on Iranian military facilities and infrastructure, particularly in southern Iran, such as the Ahvaz and Baluchestan regions, as well as military sites around Tehran.
Military operations could also evolve toward establishing military control over certain areas or sites of strategic significance, such as some Iranian islands in the Arabian Gulf, with the aim of increasing pressure on Tehran and compelling it to make political concessions.
This report was published in collaboration with Raseef22.