The Houthi offensive along Yemen’s western coast produced two rapid gains: the capture of Mocha on 10 September, followed by the reported seizure of Perim Island the next day after government-aligned forces withdrew. Together, these advances give the Houthis positions overlooking the Yemeni approach to Bab el-Mandeb. Yet commercial shipping continues to pass through the strait, at least for now.
Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdulsalam has said that navigation and trade through the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb remain safe and uninterrupted for all except Saudi vessels. This apparent contradiction captures the strategic value of the Houthi advance. The movement does not need to close the chokepoint to benefit from it. What matters is its ability to threaten disruption and preserve that threat as leverage, whether against Saudi Arabia or in the wider confrontation between Iran and the United States.
What the Houthi Capture of Mocha and Perim Island Changes
The advance also reflects the erosion of Yemen's anti-Houthi defenses. Months of political and military fragmentation sapped government-aligned forces, while the Houthis exploited divisions within the opposing coalition. Their gains along the coast, from Mocha to Dhubab, Perim and the Hanish Islands, have shifted the military balance and created a more durable source of pressure on regional maritime security.
The value of these territorial gains lies less in creating a new maritime capability than in strengthening an existing one. The Houthis could already threaten Red Sea shipping from positions farther north along the coast. Holding Mocha, Dhubab and especially Perim moves them closer to the approaches to Bab el-Mandeb and could improve their ability to sustain surveillance and coastal operations. More importantly, these positions give them a tangible bargaining asset. The significance, therefore, is not that the Houthis can suddenly control the strait, but that they are better positioned to threaten the conditions under which ships pass through it.
Saudi Arabia, Iran and the US: Two Logics Behind the Houthi Advance
The Houthi position around Bab el-Mandeb reflects two overlapping calculations: the bilateral struggle with Saudi Arabia and the wider confrontation between Tehran and Washington.
Locally, the movement has created a dilemma for Riyadh. By combining positions near the strait with attacks on Saudi infrastructure, the Houthis can threaten the Kingdom’s ability to rely on alternative routes when maritime corridors are disrupted. Saudi Arabia has historically used its East-West pipeline and the Red Sea port of Yanbu to reduce its exposure to threats around the Strait of Hormuz. Those alternatives become less reassuring when the Houthis hold positions near Bab el-Mandeb.
The Saudi response already shows the value of this bargaining power. After the Houthi advance toward Bab el-Mandeb, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman asked President Donald Trump for direct US strikes. Washington declined, seeking to avoid opening another combat theater while remaining focused on Iran and Hormuz, but agreed to provide intelligence and targeting support. The episode matters because the Houthis have altered Riyadh's and Washington's calculations without having to close the waterway.
A total maritime closure could, however, erode much of that advantage. Riyadh has a strong incentive to avoid another open-ended war, while the Houthis have an incentive to turn battlefield gains into political and economic concessions. Keeping general commercial traffic moving while retaining the ability to threaten selected targets allows them to impose pressure without immediately creating the conditions for a broad international military response. The objective is not necessarily to stop traffic, but to preserve the ability to make traffic more costly and less predictable.
The regional calculation is broader. The Houthi position also gives Iran another potential source of pressure on maritime commerce as the Strait of Hormuz remains central to the wider confrontation. Yet Tehran does not need to direct every Houthi move. The strategic value is simpler: positions around Bab el-Mandeb give an Iran-aligned movement another chokepoint that can impose costs on the United States, Saudi Arabia, and international shipping if the conflict expands.
Three Scenarios for Bab el-Mandeb: Leverage, Deal or Closure
Against this backdrop, three trajectories stand out.
Scenario 1: Houthis Keep Red Sea Shipping Moving, Under Pressure
The Houthis consolidate the coastal plain and sustain their position on Perim, while keeping general traffic moving and confining interdiction to Saudi-linked vessels under the blockade declared in July. Pressure would remain below the threshold of a full maritime closure, while the wider conflict could continue to expose Saudi energy infrastructure to disruption. The recent drone attack launched from Iraq, which damaged pumping stations on the East-West pipeline and forced Saudi Arabia to suspend the line for more than a week, illustrates how attacks on infrastructure can impose substantial costs without closing a major maritime chokepoint. The pipeline had been carrying around 4-5 million barrels per day, and Brent briefly spiked to around $110 after the attack. This path preserves the Houthis’ maritime leverage while avoiding the political and military consequences of a full closure.
Scenario 2: A Saudi-Houthi Deal
A second trajectory would see Riyadh and the Houthis convert their new military balance into a limited understanding. Saudi Arabia would seek to reduce the threat to its territory and energy infrastructure, while the Houthis would use their control of the western coast to press for the removal of restrictions on Sanaa airport and Hodeidah, as well as a reduction in Saudi support for Yemeni government forces. Neither side would need to abandon its broader objectives. The logic would instead be one of mutual restraint. Riyadh would seek to contain a threat that remains difficult to eliminate, while the Houthis would seek to consolidate their gains without provoking a military response capable of reversing them.
Scenario 3: Closure of Bab el-Mandeb and Regional Escalation
A full closure would require more than a simple Houthi decision to use the territory they have captured. It would represent a shift from selective coercion to deliberate maritime denial, with the consequences extending well beyond Yemen. The trigger could be a major escalation between Iran and the United States around Hormuz, a sharp deterioration in the Saudi-Houthi conflict, or an attack producing mass casualties among commercial crews.
US officials have reportedly said that hundreds of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are operating in Yemen alongside the Houthis. Separately, Yemeni government military sources told Reuters that they believed senior Quds Force commander Abdolreza Shahlaei was directing the coastal campaign, a claim Iranian sources could not confirm, and Tehran denies more broadly directing Houthi military operations. Such a presence could give Tehran a channel to coordinate escalation, while the Houthi position around Bab el-Mandeb gives Iran another potential pressure point alongside Hormuz.
Why Keeping Bab el-Mandeb Open Serves the Houthis
The Houthi advance has clarified the bargaining position more than it has settled the military balance. Riyadh now faces a movement better placed to threaten its infrastructure and maritime interests, while Washington must account for pressure on a second strategic energy corridor. But the Houthis face a limit of their own: they can make passage dangerous more readily than they can control the consequences.
Keeping Bab el-Mandeb open may therefore be more useful than closing it. What remains uncertain is whether a bargain can be reached before regional escalation consumes that leverage. Seizing the gate creates a bargaining position; closing it may destroy the bargain.
