“Justice”, “Dignity”, and “Democracy” were the defining slogans of the 2011 Syrian Revolution. They resounded worldwide and can still be found painted on walls and under cities’ rubble, as stark witnesses to a long nightmare of repression and despotism.
They tried to bury these rallying chants, not only under the sound of bombs and gunfire, but through a multifaceted repressive apparatus, suppressive laws, extraordinary courts, and five decades of authoritarian rule that constricted freedom of expression before it could even be born.
Despite this, the Syrian revolution produced multiple forms of political expression. Amateur journalism emerged first, then evolved into organized, well-governed media platforms. Alongside it came other forms of expression, such as banners and murals, including the Kafr Nabl banners, revolutionary songs, caricatures, photos, and stories that contributed to voicing the demands, ambitions, and hopes of people across Syria.
Following the fall of the Assad regime, freedom of expression—its forms, protections, and constitutional and legal implications—will play a central role in shaping Syria’s future, especially considering that de facto forces across the country have disproportionately restricted and criminalized free expression over the past decade, each citing their own rationale.
During Syria's unstable transitional phase, how the authorities handle free expression will help shape Syria and determine the roles of existing and emerging groups, organizations, and communities? How have the current Syrian authorities handled this issue? What are the outcomes of their approach? Will old practices persist, or will new protections take root?
Quick overview: freedom of expression in practice after the regime’s fall
The fall of the Assad regime brought overwhelming joy to most Syrians and renewed hopes of building a democratic, pluralistic, and inclusive country.
In the first months, numerous public, political, and civic activities took place, along with protests and dialogue concerning the state’s form, Syrian unity, establishing democratic governance, and promoting the political participation of marginalized communities. Activists, both political and civic, worked to advance the revolution’s principles, but soon encountered obstacles, resulting in fluctuations in the civic and political movements.
Many actions clearly demonstrate an overall tendency by authorities and parts of society to limit public freedoms and expression.
At the level of civic action
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor remains an executive actor that controls civil organizations. Under the 1958 Associations Law and subsequent amendments, it has broad powers, including the authority to dissolve organizations, change boards, and merge associations.
Even licensed associations face obstacles: each activity often requires separate authorization from social affairs directors and local councils, amid interferences from the authorities’ political apparatus that grow more intense and widespread the further one moves from the center to the periphery.
For instance, last February, Syrian authorities canceled a workshop on “accountability mechanisms and transitional justice” organized by the Syrian Center for Legal Studies, led by Anwar al-Bounni.
The general state of civic space warrants close attention. This includes the amount of internal disparities caused by the regression of certain civic principles within some organizations and the authorities' overall bias.
The private sector also plays a negative role in restricting civic space: renting a training facility or conference hall at a venue may be challenging if the hosting organization lacks official licensing or event approval. Private venues also often refuse bookings to avoid any political risk or legal repercussions.
The authorities’ overall actions and behavior do not bode well, as they rely on outdated bureaucratic tools and archaic laws to restrict, curb, and steer civic activity, preventing civil society from fulfilling its proper roles.
Movements, protests, and demonstrations
After the regime fell, Syria witnessed numerous protests and demonstrations addressing critical issues such as state governance, women's participation, and the aggression on Gaza. Families of the missing organized protests demanding justice and disclosure of their loved ones' fate. Other protests expressed solidarity with the victims of the coastal massacres amid calls to hold perpetrators accountable. A sit-in was also held outside parliament, calling for a ceasefire in Suwayda, while other protests were held against Israel’s aggression on Syria.
The protests of the first three months cannot be seen as a sign of the authorities’ willingness to allow space, but rather a sign of their inability to control spaces that may not yet be clearly defined. Social tensions around protests quickly surfaced, amid a lack of acceptance of other groups or tools for dialogue. Most protests were met with altercations, insults, or physical confrontations with those opposing participation, condemnation of the massacres, and/or the ceasefire.
On March 9th, 2025, protestors gathering in al-Marjeh Square in central Damascus in solidarity with the victims of the coastal massacres were beaten by General Security officers and the new ‘shabiha’ (pro-government gangs), even though the protest was licensed.
Similarly, a silent sit-in outside parliament in Damascus on July 18 was attacked with batons and bladed weapons , 2025, by the new ‘shabiha’ while the General Security’s parliament guard stood by without intervening or offering protection.
In both cases, video evidence clearly shows the perpetrators, yet authorities took no action.
This suggests the authorities are deliberately using “citizens” to counter popular movements and demonstrations under the concept of “one street versus another,” thus avoiding direct involvement in the crackdown.
Some cities and universities also saw sectarian protests, demonstrations, and gatherings insulting minorities and threatening to repress them using hateful, divisive sectarian rhetoric in the absence of any accountability measures by authorities.
The spread of hate speech
Not only does prevalent hate speech reflect societal and sectarian divisions, but it also serves as an effective political tool that systematically fuels conflict and opposing agendas.
This article will not delve into the spread of hate speech on social media, as the subject warrants a separate and extensive analysis. It will, however, briefly touch upon its impact on freedom of conscience and expression, as well as on political and societal participation..
It is crucial to examine the way the current authorities handle hate speech across various fields:
- Religious platforms are used as tools to spread hate based on a sectarian or nationalist basis without any oversight or deterrence.
- Authorities let inciters go unpunished based on sectarian affiliation—while all parties use hate speech, authorities prosecute perpetrators according to their background and that of the victims.
- The judiciary rarely enforces accountability, and protective laws are practically nonexistent.
- Officials in sensitive positions often resort to hate speech.
- Official or semi-official media contribute to incitement and hate speech.
The spread of hate speech at both official and grassroots levels makes it impossible to hold different opinions, hindering political rivalry and keeping it confined to the popular and military spheres.
Systematic hate speech practices or deliberate indifference by authorities directly impacts political life by undermining genuine political opposition that proposes programs that go against the authorities’ agenda. This will also heighten fears around forming political parties, engaging in public affairs, or even participating in community policing. It will also undermine society’s involvement in oversight, at both local and national levels, which will inevitably reproduce despotism.
Political parties, currents, and alliances: new phase, old tools
Following the regime's fall, opposition parties against the previous regime continued their struggle to improve or fundamentally alter the situation, each guided by its own outlook.
They formed new political alliances broadly similar to those of the Assad era, built mainly on slogans rather than a shared ideology or joint strategic vision, limiting their ability to understand and address the reality on the ground.
These slogans carried some weight at the start of the revolution, when they aligned with popular demands, despite the lack of explicit programs or visions for Syria's future.
However, political parties have failed to adapt to change and continue to rely on slogans that no longer reflect Syrians’ aspirations.
This affects the roles they’re meant to perform across various sectors. Political parties and alliances can expand their engagement with society if they develop clear, targeted programs aligned with Syrians’ demands, rather than slogans representing abstract principles.
Despite the challenges, there remains room for political activity. Since the regime's fall, several unregulated conferences have been held by various parties and alliances in Syria. This highlights the need for a modern law governing political parties that addresses the procedures for party formation, ensures internal diversity, and regulates both domestic and foreign funding.
Scenarios for maintaining the status quo or introducing change
Syria’s future appears limited to a handful of scenarios, many of which are tied—at least in part—to freedom of expression and participation. The most likely potential scenarios are:
Scenario 1: Further restriction of freedoms
Authorities may impose additional restrictions on public freedoms as a direct consequence of their unwillingness to engage with communities, political currents, and other national and democratic forces. This will inevitably produce a new form of dictatorship, using tools similar to those of the previous regime. The transitional phase would become a means of reinforcing isolation and confiscating decision-making power.
Several domestic factors and indicators could lead to this scenario: the authorities’ extremist ideological framework, internal conflicts, and resulting instability, and a widespread belief that their experience in Idlib was more “successful” than in other regions. In Idlib, the administrative model of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) directly relied on private companies and civil society organizations. Replicating this model elsewhere carries significant risks, particularly the privatization of the public sector.
This scenario rests on realistic indicators: the concentration of power in the president's hands during the transitional phase, the decisions and decrees issued so far, the brief duration of the national dialogue—lasting only a few hours—and HTS dominance over strategic issues, ministries, and state operations.
The authorities favoring this course could drive Syria to the brink, intensifying internal conflicts and inviting deeper foreign intervention to address the crises caused by the authorities’ exclusionary actions.
Scenario 2: Opening up and implementing a participatory approach
At first glance, this may appear more hopeful than realistic, relying more on external rather than domestic indicators.
The authorities’ willingness to engage communities, intellectuals, and civil society would directly stem less from conviction than from their desire to stay in power. International support for stability based on Resolution 2254, combined with urgent economic decline, could lead the authorities to lose popular support. This could develop into public opposition rooted in economic hardship amid a civic, and political movement demanding reform.
To move in this direction, authorities must ensure a genuine national dialogue, foster community engagement, revive political life, democratize syndicates, and amend the constitutional declaration to guarantee separation of powers. They would also need to restructure the army and security forces beyond sectarian lines, address marginalized areas with urgency, hold perpetrators accountable regardless of background, promote inclusive transitional justice, enact laws protecting freedoms, and build institutions free from favoritism and corruption.
This requires other political actors and civil democratic forces to play their part by providing oversight, avoiding a retreat into temporary service roles, engaging more with communities, maintaining developmental balance, and organizing communities and local roles effectively. Such steps would increase the chances of Syria's survival.
Scenario 3: Change imposed through external force
This scenario is based on the growing international pressure on authorities to adopt participatory governance in order to create stability and attract investment. However, the current authorities' obstinacy and monopoly over decision-making will likely intensify this pressure. Over time, this pressure may evolve from calls for reform to demands for radical change, regardless of Syrian interests or preferences.
A detailed analysis of this scenario is beyond the scope of this article because it largely depends on international interference and interests. Such dynamics are fluctuating and unclear, as evidenced by the inconsistent responses of international actors to massacres and ongoing violations in Syria.
Present Regression, Future Uncertainty
Since the fall of the Assad regime, the space for freedoms has been constantly shrinking. The authorities’ approach to political parties, civic activism, and demonstrations has reinforced this decline. The monopoly over state institutions, unions, and online spaces that have become a breeding ground for hate speech, amid massacres and violations, further limits public freedoms. Additionally, there are no proper measures to include all stakeholders, or hold government supporters or new ’shabiha’ loyalists accountable for their crimes and for using online platforms to incite hate and division.
This regression coincides with the failures of democratic political parties, which rely on outdated slogans and methods that haven't genuinely impacted communities. If they remain inflexible and old-fashioned, they will struggle to create a credible opposition particularly as some other civic groups splinter, abandon their principles, and side with sects or authorities.
If freedom of expression continues to decline, political participation will weaken, thus paving the way for a new dictatorship. Behaviors that suppress or violate freedoms—and their immediate and long-term political consequences—will be monitored and interpreted as key indicators of the state of free expression.
As a result, Syrians are losing opportunities and tools to improve or pursue meaningful change. Syria is running out of time to modernize and move toward a developed future. The space for action today sets the basis for the shape and scope of future actions and defines the character and form of political battles to come.
Will Syrians witness a democratic awakening, or is the country doomed to chronic instability?
The prevailing context calls for pessimism, amid an uncertain, bleak future that may well tip the country into abyss.
Translated by Tala Noujeim