Iranian Exposure: Alliance Test and Russian Pragmatism in Syria
As 2025 draws to an end, the geopolitical landscape of West Asia appears radically different from its start. Six months have passedsince the “Twelve-Day War” in June, a conflict that reshaped the military balance and served as a harsh "structural stress test" for what was once termed the "Eastern Alliance." Looking back from the vantage point of December, the Russian-Iranian partnership appears less like a strategic axis and more like a trap of “asymmetric dependency,” in which Moscow extracts utility while Tehran bears the costs.
The war in June was the first shock, exposing that the strategic partnership treaty signed in January was devoid of deterrent content. As international journalist and analyst Fatemeh Aman notes in her assessment, the conflict revealed that Iran’s “Look East” policy was not a strategy for sovereignty, but a mechanism for “survival through dependency.” Moscow, preoccupied with its own war economy and shadow fleets, offered no protection when Israeli strikes crippled Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
However, the erosion of Iran’s position in late 2025 was not solely military. It coincided with a deepening internal “environmental-security nexus.” By September, the water crisis in Sistan-Baluchestan province had morphed into a political emergency, exacerbated by tensions with the Taliban over the Helmand River and the forced deportation of Afghan refugees. This internal fragility, where environmental mismanagement meets diplomatic isolation, confirmed that Tehran is structurally isolated, fighting on multiple fronts with no genuine external umbrella.
The most telling indicator of this new reality, however, came from Damascus. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow on October 15, 2025, marked a pivotal turning point. Unlike Tehran, which seeks protection, the new Syrian leadership went to the Kremlin to negotiate and redefine terms, discussing the future of Tartus and Hmeimim bases and, strikingly, demanding the handoverof Bashar al-Assad for trial. Moscow’s pragmatic engagement with al-Sharaa—the man who replaced its former client—while leaving Tehran exposed in June, encapsulates the brutal pragmatism of Russian foreign policy.
The Transformation of the Russian-Iranian Relationship After 2022
The relationship between Russia and Iran underwent a series of complex transformations, remaining constrained by delicate balances until 2022. The escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022 marked the decisive turning point, prompting a major reordering of Moscow’s geopolitical priorities amid increasing isolation and sanctions.
Iran subsequently emerged as a pivotal, tactical partner. It provided Moscow with crucial military support, including low-cost drones, and facilitated commercial trade channels to circumvent Western sanctions.
However, Iran’s importance to Russia did not end there. Tehran came to be factored into Moscow’s strategy as a primary geographical corridor for the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), serving as a land gateway to the Gulf and warm waters, and as a regional actor in the Middle East. With the convergence of these interests, what can be described as a “constrained strategic alignment” emerged: a partnership defined not by security commitment, but by managing temporary necessities and utilizing available resources within a turbulent international environment. Conversely, Iran became the party most dependent on expanding its military partnership with Moscow, especially in light of the sharp decline in the “axis of resistance’s” deterrence capacity.
The structural changes implemented by Iran between late July and early August 2025 represent a direct response to the shock of the brief June War and reflect a deep awareness of the truce's fragility and the potential for renewed confrontation with Israel. The establishment of the National Defense Council and the redistribution of key security positions to more experienced figures alongside technological upgrades and intensified domestic repression collectively signal the regime’s preparation for a potentially more turbulent phase, both internally and externally.
Despite these security imperatives, Tehran did not receive a response from Moscow that matched its defensive aspirations. On the contrary, Russia adopted a calculated stance that avoided military commitments that could complicate its relations with regional parties or draw it into direct conflict with the United States or Israel.
This is explained by Russia’s view of the Iranian nuclear program, not as a shared security concern with Tehran, but as a bargaining chip with the West, used in line with the requirements of its relationship with Washington. From this perspective, the post-2022 period marked a qualitative deepening in Russian-Iranian relations, albeit constrained by a low ceiling of commitments. It is precisely here that the significance of the strategic partnership treaty signed in January emerges, not as a culmination of the alliance, but as an accurate reflection of the structural constraints governing the relations between Moscow and Tehran.
Strategic Partnership Without Deterrent Content
In early 2025, during Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s visit to Moscow, a “comprehensive strategic partnership treaty” was announced. Extending for 20 years and encompassing 47 clauses across defense, economy, intelligence, and culture, the treaty appeared to mark the peak of the expanding cooperation that followed the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War.
However, a careful reading of the treaty reveals fundamental limitations that curtail its deterrent capabilities. Despite affirming enhanced security cooperation, intelligence exchange, and coordination against terrorism and organized crime, it lacked any provision committing to joint defense or the provision of direct military assistance in the event of an external attack. Instead, the treaty’s security commitments are confined to a mutual pledge not to support any state that attacks the other party. This formulation involves considerable flexibility and ambiguity, leaving a diplomatic margin that allows both Moscow and Tehran to avoid entanglement in conflicts that might exceed their strategic calculations.
The significance of this absence becomes clearer when compared with Russia’s 2024 mutual defense agreement with North Korea, which explicitly stipulates mutual military assistance in the event of aggression against either party. From this perspective, the Russian-Iranian treaty cannot be interpreted as a comprehensive defense alliance, but rather as an extended strategic coordination, subject to situational interests rather than fixed structural commitments.
The nature of the relationship between the two countries confirms this pattern of calculations. The Russian-Iranian partnership rests primarily on the convergence of circumstantial interests in confronting Western pressure, rather than a unified strategic vision of threats or a common security destiny. Although political discourse between Moscow, Tehran, Beijing, and Pyongyang frequently converges around building a multipolar world and limiting American hegemony, these powers adopt a flexible model of relations that prioritizes strategic autonomy and multiple channels over strict collective commitments.
This dynamic is reinforced by the fact that China, despite its discourse opposing American hegemony, has demonstrated no willingness to support Tehran militarily during the crisis, deepening Iran’s sense of isolation even within this fragile alignment. Linked to this is the escalation of U.S. legislation aimed at restricting Iran’s ability to export oil, embodied in the U.S. Congress’s approval in April 2024 of two key laws: the “Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act,” which targets foreign ports processing Iranian oil, particularly Chinese ports, and the “Iran-China Energy Sanctions Act,” which sanctions Chinese financial institutions facilitating transactions linked to Iranian oil. These laws came into effect on October 20, 2024, constituting a new tool of pressure to limit Iran’s oil revenues. It is worth noting that China remains Iran’s primary oil importer, importing about 1.1 million barrels per day in 2023, accounting for roughly 10% of China’s total imports and nearly 90% of Iran’s oil exports.
By contrast, the U.S.-Israeli relationship represents what can be described as a “commitment alliance,” despite the absence of a formal mutual defense treaty. Washington provides Israel with near-unconditional military support, consistent annual aid, advanced intelligence sharing, and sustained political and diplomatic protection in international forums. This level of commitment has been demonstrated repeatedly across critical moments, regardless of whether Democrats or Republicans hold power in Washington.
Therefore, it can be said that the 2025 treaty, despite the institutional signals of rapprochement it conveys, does not constitute an effective defense alliance, nor does it produce a Russian deterrent umbrella capable of restraining Iran’s adversaries or altering the regional threat equation. While this agreement strengthens political and technical cooperation, it has, with calculated awareness, maintained a safe distance during periods of escalation, making Tehran today a meticulously calculated partner within Moscow’s strategic balance rather than a direct extension of Russia’s security sphere.
This Russian caution can be understood through Stephen Walt’s “Balance of Threat” theory, where states align not necessarily against larger powers, but against parties they perceive as a direct threat to their security. Since Moscow does not view attacks on Iran as an existential threat to itself, it avoids binding defense commitments and instead favors flexible partnerships that allow it to expand influence without bearing the costs of confrontation.
Alliance of Influence, Not Protection
The Twelve-Day War exposed the limits of Russian-Iranian coordination at a moment of true testing. The absence of Russian support for Iran was not a transient decision but a direct reflection of a complex geopolitical equation where Russia seeks to carefully balance multiple regional roles instead of fully committing to one ally.
Since its military deployment in Syria in 2015, Russia pursued a permanent strategic presence that guarantees it flexible regional maneuvering. Syria at the time represented a symbolic turning point in recasting Russia’s image as an active great power, after having been portrayed as a declining regional power following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The military intervention allowedthe Kremlin to test its military capabilities through a limited yet effective intervention, while simultaneously presenting itself as a more “disciplined” alternative to Western interventions that produced prolonged chaos and instability, as in Iraq and Libya. For this reason, Syria became not just a sphere of influence but a cornerstone of Russia’s international narrative, positioning Moscow as a necessary player in shaping the Middle Eastern regional order.
This presence enabled Russia to build balanced relationships with various regional powers, from Tehran to Tel Aviv. On one hand, Moscow developed advanced military cooperation with Iran, supporting Tehran’s deterrent capabilities. On the other hand, it deliberately avoided confrontation with Israel, as confirmed by Mark N. Katz, who indicates a “secret” but well-known deconfliction agreement between Russia and Israel, under which Russian forces in Syria wouldn’t interfere with Israeli strikes on Iranian and Hezbollah targets, despite their physical proximity. This pattern confirms that Russia’s relationship with Iran functions as a “necessity alliance” that imposes limited security commitments, balances temporary interests, and does not prevent it from moving closer to Iran’s regional adversaries. It also implicitly agreed to a “deconfliction” mechanism, allowing Israeli aircraft to target Iranian positions in Syria as long as Russian forces were not endangered or the stability of the theater was threatened.
This balance was not merely a result of tactical understanding but also rooted in deeper demographic and cultural considerations. Israel is home to roughly 1.5 million Russian speakers, who are perceived in Moscow as a social and cultural extension of itself. Holding Israeli citizenship but maintaining close ties with the Russian state, they are seen as “soft ambassadors” promoting bilateral partnership in culture, economy, and political mediation. Therefore, it was unlikely that Moscow would sacrifice these assets through explicit military support for Iran during direct escalation with Israel and the US, particularly amid a rapidly shifting regional landscape.
With the fall of the Assad regime to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Russian-Iranian influence in Syria waned, while Ankara and Tel Aviv moved to reconfigure the balance of power there. This shift represented a dual setback for Tehran and Moscow, reducing their ability to move freely in the Syrian arena, which had previously been a critical arena of symbolic deterrence.
In light of this decline, the gap in interests between Russia and Iran widened. While Tehran sought an ally to provide it with an urgent deterrent umbrella, Moscow remained confined to a more cautious calculus. Russia’s support during the Gulf Cooperation Council-Russia Strategic Dialogue Ministerial Meeting on July 10, 2023, of the UAE’s proposal to mediate a regional dispute with Iran over three Persian Gulf islands, is a clear example of the balance that Moscow seeks, which places its interests with Gulf countries and other nations in broader calculations than merely aligning with Iran.
Perhaps one of the most significant reasons for Russia’s reluctance to provide direct support to Iran is that it may not consider Iran’s nuclear program, or even the future of the regime in Tehran, as part of its direct national security. Iran, despite its geopolitical importance, remains for Moscow a regional partner situated outside Russia's core sphere of influence. Consequently, the Russian approach toward Tehran is structured around expanding influence and leverage, rather than providing protection or entering into joint defense commitments.