For decades, civil organizations in Syria have suffered from systematic oppression by the Ba'ath regime. In 2011, with the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, this repression reached a bloody and brutal level and continued, at least in areas under its control, until its fall, with varying contexts elsewhere.
Systematic restrictions on civilian space by the Assad regime destroyed civilian structures. Authorities did not allow civil organizations to emerge and develop, including their governance tools and internal structures. Hence, organizations have not succeeded in effectively reaching communities or forming representative community organizations. Rather, their work was transformed into service provision closer to profit-oriented entities, a shift reinforced by donor dynamics.
The situation of trade unions was no better. The Ba'ath regime turned them into instruments of intelligence and control, far removed from their organizational roles. Members were appointed through token elections based on loyalty and thuggery, “Tashbieh.”· preventing any genuine exercise of rights or experience in union struggle. The absence of organizational activity affected political life more broadly, as these spaces witnessed no real political engagement under extreme repression, alongside security restrictions on certain political movements and parties.
The Syrian Revolution and Fragmented Civic Spaces
Following the Syrian revolution in 2011, the Assad regime intensified its repression, leaving the aforementioned civil society structures weak and riddled with structural and organizational problems. The almost complete absence of community access hindered their ability to play a successful and effective role in the revolution. As the revolution continued and some areas fell out of the regime's control, civilian spaces emerged that varied in form and role depending on the local context. These spaces ranged from north-eastern Syria, controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces, to north-western Syria, controlled by the National Army and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. This created a disparity in access, and we began to talk about Syrian civilian spaces rather than a single civilian space. Each space had its own context for development, engagement mechanism, and even its own international donors.
The unions in northwest Syria were liberated (i.e., decentralized), and civil organizations focused on service and relief work. This was in accordance with the presence of military factional influence stemming from Turkish control over the national army and, ostensibly, the management of civil and administrative files (licensing and approvals) for local councils that were mostly appointed and funded by the Turks. In the northeast of Syria, supervision was severe under the self-administration, backed by the SDF, with discrimination against Arab organizations. This geographical disconnection increased the likelihood of a 'value' break during the development of civil society, leading to division based on attitudes towards authority that appear to rest on sectarian foundations.
The subjective circumstances of the civil structures and those in charge of them had a negative effect. Those in charge of the structures lacked experience working in free contexts inside Syria. This led to institutional confusion and a shift in the goals of civil space institutions from struggle to profitable investment, with reliance on external financing.
Civil space in the transitional phase
Despite the many challenges in political life, civic spaces and activism experienced an unprecedented openness, which could be described as the liberation of political life. Spaces opened unexpectedly, and people were eager to play a part in liberating and rebuilding their country after 14 years of war. However, as mentioned above, due to a lack of prior political experience, people are acting in an unorganised manner and lack a vision and mission. Expansion by organizations based on phased plans lacks strategy and integration across the various civil entities, creating gaps in intervention and response processes to urgent issues during the transitional phase of Syria. Raw activism distracts from civic roles and weakens their ability to have a positive influence and bring about change.
Shifts, Retreats, and Fragmentations
The fall of the regime also led to a shift in “principles” within organizations, as a result of the bigger change the country is enduring. Many retreated from principles they had previously upheld. One example is the Madaniya Network and its position paper issued on December 15, 2025. This paper was completed on July 10, 2025, but the Madaniya Network was unable to publish it because some of its member organizations refused to criticize the current regime. The withdrawal from the "political right of civil society," on which a Madaniya Network was established and which aims to give Syrian civil society its turn to advance the political and transitional process, was considered a horizontal retreat within the civil space.
The Madaniya Network is just one example of the many organizations in Syrian civil society. On 8 December, organizations and activists found themselves in a new reality that they had to comprehend, adapt to, and work within. Priorities changed, demands shifted and Syria's position in the region and globally suddenly changed. Activists found themselves with greater responsibilities as they began to build and form the new Syria. The transitional government is also new to power and is governing by trial and error, while inheriting failed and bankrupt institutions.
As a result, civil society has experienced confusion, mistakes, and divisions, which have weakened its position, particularly during the pressure, clashes, and instability of the past year. This has wasted the opportunity to establish an effective civil influence.
Fight of Remaining and Succeeding
Civil society continues to work on multiple issues related to the transition phase, though it faces challenges. In the legislative context, some civil society organizations monitored the Legislative Council elections held on 5 October 2025 and trained local representatives to observe the process. They also conducted studies and research on the electoral process and the provisional electoral law. This work is neither new nor linked to the fall of the regime; rather, it is an accumulation of work carried out by Syrian organizations over many years
In the constitutional context, organizations participated in constitutional dialogues that produced constitutional papers and recommendations related to the Constitutional Declaration issued on 13/3/2025 and to recommendations for the permanent constitution, which called for more rights and freedoms. Civil organizations advocated for the transitional justice file; many exerted pressure on the authorities in response to the legislative decree (Decree No. 20 dated 17/5/2025) issued by the interim president, which linked transitional justice only to Assad's violations. Working also to organize the families of missing persons, such as the "Truth Tents in Syria," and advocating for issues of enforced disappearance, reparation, and spatial justice.
In light of the continuing violations by the current authorities in several areas, such as the Syrian coast and Suweida, human rights organizations continued documentation, publishing periodic reports on these violations, and pressuring to stop them. In addition to its work on many files that require urgent intervention and pressure from civil society, handling these files is not easy in the work environment inside Syria. The objective difficulties are numerous, beginning with the constitutional and legal environment, which we sometimes find contradictory.
Structural and Administrative Constraints on Civic Space
The Syrian Constitutional Declaration, issued on 13/3/2025, includes articles that formally stimulate civic space. Article (14) affirms political participation and guarantees the work of associations and unions, while Article (12) commits the state to protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and incorporates international human rights treaties ratified by the Syrian Arab Republic into the Declaration.
Alongside these provisions, the Declaration also contains vague articles that allow authorities to restrict rights and freedoms without clear limitations. Article (23) on “Limitations” permits restrictions for reasons such as national security, territorial integrity, public order, public health, or morals. This article is particularly dangerous due to its ambiguity and the legislator’s failure to regulate the conditions under which rights may be restricted, or to specify non-derogable rights, such as the right to life.
During the transitional phase, restrictive non-exceptional laws remain in force, including the Associations Law issued in 1958 by the unitary state (Syria and Egypt) and its subsequent amendments. This law grants the executive authority direct guardianship over licensed associations and organizations. Article (24)(b) authorizes the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor to merge associations with similar objectives through a reasoned decision specifying the manner and effects of the merger, as introduced by Legislative Decree No. 224 of 21/9/1969.
Articles (26)(2) and (3) further entrench executive control by empowering the competent administrative authority to appoint members of an association’s board of directors from among Ministry employees, determine their powers and compensation, set the minimum and maximum number of board members, and limit the duration and renewal of board membership. These provisions institutionalize administrative guardianship over civil society structures.
In practice, the division of roles between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, represented by the General Secretariat for Political Affairs, established in March 2025, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor remains unclear. Approval mechanisms vary significantly between governorates, Social Affairs Directorates, and even individual employees.
According to a lawyer working on licensing organizations in Damascus, procedures for obtaining project and activity approvals differ between the Damascus and Rif Dimashq Social Affairs Directorates. Activities must strictly align with the objectives for which the association was originally licensed. In one case involving agricultural training in the Damascus countryside, approvals were fragmented among the Director of Social Affairs in Damascus, the Damascus Agriculture Directorate, the Damascus Countryside Agriculture Directorate, and the Ministry of Agriculture. Approvals were required for training activities, contracting trainers, and developing training materials, resulting in a prolonged and complex bureaucratic process.
In Homs, a civil society official explained that the General Secretariat for Political Affairs operates from the Ba'ath Party headquarters and is effectively divided into two sections. The first oversees public events and campaigns and requires approval for any event held in the city. The second supervises dialogue sessions and trainings, which also require prior approval. Approval procedures are inconsistent, sometimes verbal and sometimes bureaucratic, passing through the Social Affairs Directorate, the Governorate, and the Secretariat.
Beyond approvals, the Secretariat’s role extends to sending individuals to attend activities and photograph sessions, collecting data on participants, and intervening in training materials by questioning terminology and requesting modifications. The core problem lies in the requirement for prior approval by an entity with vague and expansive powers.
This control is reinforced by circulars issued by the Homs Directorate of Social Affairs and Labor. Circular No. 448 (3/12/2025) obliges organizations to notify the Directorate when job vacancies arise, mandates Directorate participation in interviews, and cancels vacancies in cases of non-compliance, under the responsibility of the board of directors. Circular No. 419, issued on the same date, requires organizations to submit minutes of board meetings with attachments, outgoing and incoming correspondence, and disbursement orders. Additional circulars issued on the same day treat organizations and associations as subordinate administrative units of the Directorate.
Although the General Secretariat for Political Affairs formally falls under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is theoretically tasked with supervising political activities, in practice, it has expanded to oversee nearly all civilian activities. Its powers vary between governorates but consistently exceed any clearly defined legal mandate, reinforcing both symbolic and practical continuities with pre-transition governance structures.
Suppression of Political and Civic Activity
At the end of November, a gathering by Syrian politician Aslan Abdul Karim was cancelled only hours before it was scheduled to take place in Salamiyah, in the Hama countryside. The symposium, organized by the Civil Work Authority in Salamiyah, focused on the importance of political work and political organization. The General Secretariat for Political Affairs in Hama cancelled the event on the pretext that it lacked a license. The Civil Work Authority subsequently issued an explanatory and protest statement.
Similarly, an unlicensed political forum in the Rif Damascus area was ordered to close and was told to obtain a license and secure approvals from the General Secretariat for Political Affairs. Political activity in the Damascus countryside was suspended, beginning in Jaramana and Sahnaya, before expanding to Daraya, Al-Kiswah, Al-Hamah, Douma, Saydnaya and Jdeidet Artus. These activities consisted of meetings in which activists discussed political options, and all such meetings were ordered to stop immediately.
This pressure has also reduced the role of the Syrian private sector and its contribution to civic space, whether direct or indirect. Without approval from the Ministry of Social Affairs and the General Secretariat for Political Affairs, renting private halls has become nearly impossible due to fear of legal repercussions. As one hall owner in the Hama countryside stated:
“I cannot host the event without a license; they may seal the facility with red wax.”
What Can Be Done to Preserve and Expand Civic Space?
Expanding Syrian civic space requires a struggle-based approach that combines overcoming unjust restrictions with making use of available spaces. This can be achieved through two parallel strategies. The first is legislative, involving the drafting of a modern associations law that balances the needs of the field with legitimate oversight. The second track is participatory and organizational, extending beyond elites to rebuild local communities on national foundations.
This requires comprehensive civil oversight of state performance to combat corruption and discrimination, and to shape a broad democratic movement that unites civil and political forces. This could serve as a lever to improve public freedoms and push the country towards a genuine democratic transition.
Rather than remaining dependent on authoritarian approvals, Syrian civil society must seize its space by imposing a fait accompli and exploiting legal loopholes. The negative impact of donors must also be addressed, as many contribute to the narrowing of civic space by requiring official licences, thereby granting false legitimacy to repressive laws and obstructing efforts to amend them. This necessitates reviewing funding conditions to safeguard the independence of associations.
The Syrian civic space is facing a structural crisis driven by unfair donor requirements that reinforce the authority's dominance and weaken legislative reform movements. Protecting public space cannot be reduced to project implementation alone; it requires establishing a participatory community incubator that imposes a new reality of struggle. Donors must take responsibility by easing procedural restrictions and re-evaluating partnerships based on civic principles rather than narrow affiliations. This will ensure the independence of civic action and advance democratic transformation.
Translated by Mohamad El Sadat.
· Tashbieh: is a behavior became popular in Syria; as people do thuggery to those whom critic and oppose the authority.