On November 11, 2025, Iraq held its sixth parliamentary election since 2005. The vote followed the normal four-year electoral cycle and was carried out under a new electoral law passed in 2023. With 12 million ballots cast, the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) reported a 56% turnout among registered voters—marking one of the highest participation rates since 2010. Yet this figure masks deeper political contradictions.
The official turnout figure is based on registered biometric cardholders, not the estimated 30 million eligible adults. When recalculated against the broader population, actual turnout falls closer to 40%. This discrepancy highlights the tension between procedural success and substantive legitimacy.
Electoral Framework and Political Setup
The 2025 elections were held under a revised version of Iraq’s electoral law. In 2021, Iraq adopted a system of 83 small, multi-member districts, which allowed more independent and protest-born candidates to win. That law was repealed in 2023 and replaced with a proportional representation system based on 18 large provincial constituencies, using the Sainte-Laguë method (divisor 1.7). This change overwhelmingly favored traditional parties and re-centralized power within large blocs. In practice, this shift favored large, well-organized traditional parties and coalitions, raised the entry barrier for independents and small lists, and recentralized candidate selection and vote-mobilization inside the established political class.
Most Tishreen groups called for a boycott of this election, arguing that the electoral law changes (back to large districts) were designed by the ruling parties to eliminate independents. One prominent protest coalition issued a statement urging citizens not to legitimize a “corrupt system.” This undoubtedly influenced turnout in the protest heartlands – as noted, Dhi Qar and Najaf had among the lowest turnout. Many of the “October martyrs’” families refused to vote in honor of those killed by security forces in 2019.
This shift shaped the 2025 landscape. Protest-born parties like Al-Badeel, Imtidad, and Ishraqat Kanoon were marginalized or absorbed into larger alliances. Only a few dozen true independents ran nationwide. Moqtada al-Sadr, whose movement had won 73 seats in 2021, boycotted the 2025 elections entirely. The absence of Sadr and the electoral reengineering both contributed to a highly controlled environment favoring ruling coalitions.
Turnout Patterns and Voter Demographics
Iraq’s November 11, 2025, parliamentary elections saw a significant increase in voter turnout and a reshaping of political power balances. The 2025 turnout improvements came largely from older or traditional voters (tribal Sunnis, committed Kurds, organized Shia bases) – the youth largely remained on the sidelines, or engaged only minimally. The national turnout stood at 56.11% of registered voters (12,003,143 voters out of 21,404,291 registered), according to IHEC. However, as noted above, real participation, counting all eligible voters, drops to 40%.
Turnout varied sharply by region and sectarian composition:
Kurdish provinces had the highest turnout: Duhok reached 77%, Erbil 66%, and Sulaymaniyah 60%. These were seen as strongholds for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), both of which mobilized voters aggressively.
Sunni-majority areas like Nineveh, Salah al-Din, and Anbar saw participation rates between 60%–66%, a notable increase from 2021.
Shia-majority provinces—especially in the south—had much lower turnout: Maysan and Dhi Qar hovered in the low 40s, Najaf and Karbala just below 50%, and Baghdad (including Sadr City) fell to 48.7%.
Observers noted youth disengagement in Shia-majority areas. Many polling stations in working-class neighborhoods, particularly in Baghdad and the south, were sparsely attended. The Sadrist boycott, combined with lingering disillusionment from the 2019 protest movement, contributed to the low enthusiasm.
Vote Buying, Coercion, and the Role of Money
Local monitoring missions, including the Tammuz Network and Shams Coalition, documented widespread vote-buying and card trading. Authorities arrested at least 46 people and seized over 1,800 biometric voter cards. Party operatives distributed cash, food parcels, and promises of jobs in exchange for votes.
Patronage played a central role. The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, aligned with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, offered promises of salary increases and public works projects. In Basra, the Tasmeem Alliance offered preferential hiring in oil companies. Tribal sheikhs in rural areas acted as intermediaries, receiving payments from party headquarters and distributing them to clan members.
Campaign finance lacked transparency. Businessmen with ties to militias or foreign actors funded candidate lists in exchange for future contracts and influence. In Sunni provinces, Gulf-connected investors supported blocs like Azm and National Identity. In Shia areas, construction tycoons backed Sudani’s list and the Badr Organization.
Special Voting and Coercive Mobilization
The special voting phase, held two days before the general vote, targeted approximately 1.31 million individuals—mainly security forces (including 128K Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) for the first time), detainees, and hospital patients. IHEC reported a nationwide participation rate of 82.42% in Iraq, and over 98% in the Kurdistan Region.
These numbers raised concerns among observers. Several local and international reports indicated that military and police commanders pressured personnel to vote, often for specific parties. Some voters were ordered to photograph their ballots. Others reported that refusal to vote could lead to blocked leave, stalled promotions, or unwanted transfers. While special voting helped boost overall turnout, it did so through coercion rather than genuine engagement.
Observation Missions and Electoral Irregularities
International missions from the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the European Union praised IHEC for its technical performance. The biometric verification process reduced double voting, and no serious cybersecurity breaches were reported.
However, local monitoring networks provided a more critical assessment. The Tammuz Organization, Shams Coalition, and other observers documented:
Polling stations opening late.
Campaign materials inside restricted areas.
Voters escorted by party enforcers.
Pre-election violence in Kirkuk, including a pre-dawn shootout that killed two police officers.
Threats and attacks against candidates in Diyala and Muthanna.
Observers also reported that parties had pre-collected voter cards and used them to cast ballots on behalf of supporters—undermining the integrity of biometric safeguards. They called for stronger penalties against electoral fraud and more transparency in campaign financing.
Iran’s Role in Coalition Politics
Iran is heavily involved in shaping the post-election landscape. Tehran’s envoy, Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani, held multiple meetings with leaders of the Shia Coordination Framework before the vote. Iranian officials celebrated the 56% turnout as a rebuke to Sadr’s boycott and framed the election as a validation of Iraq’s political system.
Tehran’s goal is clear: unify the Shia bloc under a leadership amenable to Iranian interests. Prime Minister Sudani, though not a militia figure, has maintained warm ties with Iran throughout his tenure; however, Tehran is alarmed by his good ties with the U.S. and recently sent messages that don’t favor Sudani. Also, factions within the Coordination Framework—including Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law bloc and Hadi al-Amiri’s Badr Organization—remain potential rivals.
Qaani’s presence in Baghdad was widely interpreted as an effort to broker a consensus candidate for prime minister. Whether that remains Sudani or shifts to another figure will depend on how the post-election negotiations unfold. What remains clear is that Tehran’s influence over Iraq’s Shia politics continues to operate through both formal and informal channels.
Sunni and Kurdish Politics: Fragmentation and Fatigue
Sunni political forces entered the election divided. Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi’s Taqaddum list remained dominant, winning approximately 45 seats. Rival blocs such as Azm (led by Khamis al-Khanjar) and the Sovereignty Alliance secured fewer seats. Despite past efforts to unify the Sunni agenda, personal rivalries and shifting alliances undermined collective leverage.
In the Kurdistan Region, the KDP performed strongly—garnering around 30 seats—while the PUK trailed with about 18. The New Generation Movement lost ground, winning only 3 seats compared to 9 in 2021. A new opposition list, Halwest, made modest gains. Voter mobilization was high in Erbil and Duhok but lower in Sulaymaniyah.
Both the Sunni and Kurdish political fields remain fragmented, limiting their ability to shape federal policies. While tribal and party networks remain resilient, their legitimacy among youth and urban voters continues to erode.
The Future of Sudani and the Premiership
Despite his coalition’s strong showing, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani faces uncertainty over a second term. His Reconstruction and Development list won the most seats (around 46), but no bloc commands a majority. The Shia Coordination Framework remains fractured, with several members likely to push for alternative candidates — mainly al-Maliki —while others support Sudani.
Past precedent suggests that caretaker prime ministers often lose their posts in post-election bargaining. Sudani’s own party, Al-Furatayn, is small and lacks the institutional weight to anchor a government without broader support. His fate will depend on his ability to broker alliances with both Shia and Kurdish factions while retaining Iran’s approval.
Youth, Protest Movements, and Public Disillusionment
The post-2019 protest movement known as Tishreen largely sat out the 2025 election. Many youth leaders and civil society groups viewed the process as captured by elites. Activists criticized the Sainte-Laguë law for excluding independents and argued that electoral competition had become an extension of patronage politics. The youth of Iraq and the legacy of the 2019 “Tishreen” protest movement had a complex, ambivalent relationship with this election. Overall, youth turnout remained relatively low, and the protest movement’s direct political influence was limited—many young activists chose to boycott or found themselves without viable candidates—but their underlying demands still shaped the discourse.
With Iraq’s population youth bulge, joblessness – especially among young men – remains extremely high (estimates range from 20% to 40% youth unemployment). Voters consistently rank jobs and the economy as critical issues. In 2025, oil prices have been relatively high, and Sudani’s government hired thousands of contract workers, but sustainable employment is lacking outside the bloated public sector. Many young voters viewed the election as irrelevant to their economic prospects: “Years of corruption, high unemployment… have delivered little [for us],” as one Reuters piece summarized. However, youth engagement was not zero. Some first-time voters did turn out, driven either by a sliver of hope or pressure from family/tribe.
In Kurdish areas, youth turnout was actually quite robust – the KDP’s million-vote campaign heavily targeted Kurdish young people with nationalist messaging and job promises, and in Sunni areas too, anecdotal evidence suggests youth turnout increased compared to 2021 – partly because many young Sunnis boycotted in 2018 and 2021 out of apathy or ISIS displacement aftermath. Still, this time saw an opportunity to assert their voice as security improved.
While some former protest candidates ran on party lists, they made little impact. Independent victories dropped sharply from 43 in 2021 to fewer than 20 in 2025. Urban youth in Baghdad, Nasiriyah, and Basra appeared especially disillusioned. Many polling stations in working-class areas remained empty.
The gap between political institutions and Iraq’s next generation continues to grow. Without structural reforms, the post-election calm may prove temporary.
Conclusion: A Fragile Stability
The 2025 elections delivered procedural success without resolving Iraq’s structural crises. While turnout improved, it was primarily due to state-backed mobilization, vote-buying, and special voting coercion. Traditional parties remain entrenched through patronage, intimidation, and control over state institutions.
Iran continues to shape coalition-making from behind the scenes, while Sunni and Kurdish actors struggle with internal fragmentation. Protest-born forces have been marginalized, and youth disillusionment remains high.
For now, Iraq’s ruling elites have reproduced themselves. But the underlying legitimacy crisis remains. Without electoral reform, anti-corruption enforcement, and credible paths for new political entrants, the 2025 vote may be remembered not for what it changed, but for what it reinforced.