During the first official visit of Syrian Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa to Germany at the end of March 2026, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz declared that "about 80% of the Syrians currently living in Germany should return to their homeland" over the next three years — more than 720,000 people.
After his statement was criticized, Merz clarified that he was merely expressing the stated wish of interim President al-Sharaa, and that those "who wish to remain in Germany and are well integrated will be able to remain in Germany." Al-Sharaa rejected Merz's claim, characterizing it as "somewhat exaggerated", and insisted that returns would depend on economic reconstruction and improved living conditions. Meanwhile, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul endorsed Merz's statement, while pointing out that "what the Chancellor says is, of course, the goal of the federal government."
Setting aside the "clarifications" of the German chancellor, and the practical impossibility of such a plan, these declarations reflect a wider political trend in Europe towards calls for the return and deportation of Syrians. The European Parliament's support of the Return Regulation in March 2026, which expands "the EU's punitive and restrictive detention and deportation plans", demonstrated the ongoing hostility towards migrants and collaboration between conservatives and the far right.
This contributes to the growing atmosphere of racism and Islamophobia in Europe. But the plans of mass returns must not be rejected only for the racism that underpins it. These attempts are directed against the interests of Syrian working classes, both in Germany and in Syria.
Return to Syria?
A large majority of Syrians in Germany and Europe do not want to return to Syria under the current conditions of wartime destruction, political instability, economic crisis and ongoing human rights violations. The Syrian labor market remains disrupted, and unemployment is high, particularly among the youth. While there are no clear figures for the rate of unemployment in Syria due to the absence of periodic and regular labor force surveys, estimates for 2025 range from 14% to 69% youth unemployment. In addition, 83% of the Syrian labor market is reportedly informal, meaning workers are not guaranteed access to social security and legal protection, leaving millions vulnerable to exploitation or sudden income loss.
The return of Syrians has further strained the labor market, which does not have the capacity to absorb them. Most of the estimated 1.6 million Syrians who returned since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 had taken refuge in neighboring countries, especially Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. In addition, an estimated 1.9 million internally displaced people (IDPs) returned to their areas of origin, while approximately 5.54 million IDPs remained displaced nationwide.
According to the UNHCR, "these movements continued to place pressure on already overstretched services and infrastructure, particularly in areas hosting displaced populations and high numbers of returnees." According to the UN, only 57% of public hospitals are fully functional, and only around a third of the primary health care centers are operational, while more than a third of the schools are damaged or destroyed. The International Organization for Migration in May 2025 underlined that the "lack of economic opportunities and essential services pose the greatest challenge for Syrians returning to their communities."
Syria's needs are acute: the cost of reconstruction is estimated at $216 billion by the World Bank, equivalent roughly to ten times Syria's current estimated GDP. More than half of Syrians remain displaced, either internally or abroad. Nine out of ten live below the poverty line, nearly 17 million require urgent assistance to survive and more than nine million face acute food insecurity.
Although the Syrian ruling authorities raised public-sector salaries and pensions by 200% in July 2025 and 50% in March 2026, most of the population, whether employed in the public or private sector, still cannot cover their monthly expenses with their salaries. Though the minimum wage was increased to 1,256 million Syrian pounds (SYP) per month (around $94)*, it is far from enough to sustain an average person's livelihood. The average cost of living for a five-person family was almost ten times higher than the minimum wage at the beginning of 2026.
Under these conditions, the mass return of Syrian refugees would increase the pressure on the labour market, which is already characterised by low salaries and a very low level of social protection. In addition, it would cut the flow of remittances to the country.
Remittances for Survival
Large segments of society rely on money transfers from relatives abroad amounting to around $4 billion annually, according to estimates from earlier this year, with Europe and Gulf countries the main sources since 2011. Germany is the main source for remittances from Europe, between €300 and €400 million annually, due to the progressive and ongoing integration of Syrians in the German labor market.
Remittances in Syria evolved in the past decade from a supplemental resource into a primary structural requirement for household survival. These flows have played an increasingly critical role in sustaining livelihoods, often becoming the main source of income for many households as their purchasing power was reduced as a result of the depreciation of the national currency and rising inflation.
In certain cases, and particularly since the fall of the Assad regime, remittances have been used by families to rebuild their households, and collective initiatives in some areas have emerged, benefiting from diaspora remittances that rehabilitate specific infrastructure or buildings. These examples remain quite rare, however.
Real Estate Projects in a Housing Crisis
The country continues to suffer a deep and combined housing and infrastructure shortfall. According to the 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP), "one-third of the country's housing stock has been damaged or destroyed, while critical infrastructure, including roads, water networks, electricity and sanitation systems, remains largely non-functional."
In this context, and in the absence of any reconstruction plan, several local communities have protested against real estate projects prioritising profit over housing for people in need. In Homs, residents of the Qarabis neighbourhood pressured the Kuwait-based al-Omran Real Estate Development Company to drop parts of its "Boulevard of Victory" plan, which would have threatened their properties and displaced them from their homes.
Similarly, Damascus residents successfully opposed a project that sought to transform Al-Jahiz Park – one of Damascus's last remaining public green spaces – into a commercial space with cafés and parking facilities. In the beginning of May 2026, a demonstration was organized in Damascus by residents of the Mezzeh, Kfar Souseh and Basateen al-Razi neighborhoods affected by Decree 66, which was enacted in 2012 and allows the "redesigning of unauthorized or illegal housing areas" and their replacement with "modern" real estate projects.
Much of the population, already suffering from declining living conditions and low purchasing power, face very high rents and property prices. Instead of building housing and infrastructure for the broader population, these real estate projects serve an elite class able to afford new and expensive housing and accumulate capital. These housing policies run parallel to a larger political-economic strategy, responding to a crisis-ridden economy with austerity measures.
Austerity measures as a response to economic challenges
Under Assad, household stability became increasingly dependent on remittances rather than local economic dynamics, particularly as the regime implemented austerity measures and cut social support for the population. The share of spending on public subsidies and other support programmes diminished significantly in the state's budget after 2011, representing 15.5% in 2010 compared to just 5.6% in 2024. In addition, rising inflation led to falling purchasing power for large sectors of the population.
The new Syrian ruling authorities' economic policies have not challenged this reality — quite the opposite. Following the declared reduction of state spending, the authorities quickly announced plans to dismiss up to one-third of the state workforce, targeting employees allegedly receiving salaries without fulfilling their duties. Dismissals have continued across multiple ministries in 2026. Damascus's austerity measures have had a significant impact on the population's purchasing power.
The price of subsidised bread was raised in December 2024 from 400 SYP (for 1,500 grams) to 4,000 SYP (for 1,200 grams and then 1,050 grams since May 2026), representing an increase of around 1365% and exacerbating food insecurity among the most vulnerable. At the same time, the government suspended subsidies on fuel and oil derivatives, increasing production costs across the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. In October 2025, the Syrian government announced a significant increase in electricity prices. In January 2026, tariffs increased from an average of $0.85-$4 per month to bills ranging from $50 and $169. Some families even saw their bills reach as high as $508. This has also severely affected key productive economic sectors, particularly manufacturing and agriculture.
The political-economic orientation of the new ruling authorities has entrenched the economic dynamics present under the former regime. Syria is facing structural economic challenges, including the instability of the Syrian pound, a weakened financial system, destroyed infrastructure, low purchasing power, high production costs, a dearth of skilled workers and more. Yet, the new government is pushing a commercial model based on short-term profit and focused primarily on the service sector to the detriment of Syria's productive sectors, which is not conducive to development.
Meanwhile, no protection against foreign competion has been provided to national industries, with manufacturing and agriculture particularly hard hit. Accelerated trade liberalisation is threatening production even more. In late January 2025, Damascus reduced customs duties on over 260 Turkish products, and by the end of 2025, Syria's trade deficit with Turkey reached an all-time high of $3.26 billion.
Ongoing labour and socio-economic struggles
Increasing frustration among workers in the public, private and informal sectors with the government's economic policies has led to rising protests and strikes since the beginning of the year. In January 2026, teachers in the Idlib and Aleppo rural governorates engaged in the large-scale "Strike for Dignity" demanding permanent employment, the swift reinstatement of those dismissed and salary increases that match the soaring cost of living. More than 1,700 schools closed in these areas during strike, in response to the authorities' failure to honour commitments regarding salary increases and improved working conditions. Other sectors have also mobilised – including transport workers, industrial workers, students, lawyers and bakery owners – demonstrating deepening grievances across the country over the continued erosion of purchasing power and the deterioration of public services. The protests were also directed against corruption, nepotism and a lack of transparency and participation in decision-making processes.
Multiple protests on various socio-economic issues are still ongoing throughout the country. New demonstrations erupted in mid-May, initially in Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zor and Daraa and spreading to other regions, after the Syrian Ministry of Economy and Industry set a new price for wheat widely considered too low, sparking widespread protests among farmers and peasants as the cost of production exceeds the official price.
Right to Stay and an Inclusive Reconstruction Process
Not only are the conditions for a safe and dignified return to Syria absent; without economic recovery and the reconstruction of critical state infrastructure, a mass return of refugees to Syria would only worsen socio-economic conditions and threaten large sectors of society that depend on remittances to survive.
While transfers of money by the Syrian diaspora remain essential for consumption of basic goods and services, they cannot sustain a recovery of the productive sectors of the economy. They fuel consumption rather than productive investment. In other words, they are a tool for survival, but no substitute for sustainable economic development.
Instead of threatening to return Syrians to Syria, Germany and the EU should consolidate the legal settlement of Syrian refugees. This would enable them to stabilize their living conditions and move freely between their host country and Syria. As a result, they could play a more active role in Syria's reconstruction and participate in its economic, social and political life.
Rather than making unfeasible announcements of mass returns, German and European officials should seek to support an inclusive reconstruction process and wider democratic participation within Syria. Otherwise, current challenges risk deepening authoritarian dynamics and entrenching forms of exclusion, both political and economic. This, in turn, would create new incentives for Syrians to seek better opportunities and living conditions abroad.