The peace process in Turkey has been going on since October 2024. For the first time, PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) is very close to dissolving itself. At the same time, there is relatively persistent and widespread support not only from the pro-Kurdish DEM Party (Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party), but also from a broader spectrum of Turkish parties, including the government and the main opposition. This means, unprecedentedly, a peace process in Turkey is welcomed by the state, not only by the government.
However, the process presents several shortcomings from the transitional justice perspective, such as a lack of a legal framework, completely transparent mechanisms, political and sociological policies for dealing with the past, or, from another perspective, democratization. Certainly, it is very normal to have turbulence or backlashes in these kinds of contexts. Indeed, as all cases of reconciliation differ due to numerous socio-political factors, there is no clearly defined pathway to a solution. On the other hand, the process and the people should be resilient to challenges and critiques to enhance their sustainability.
Uncertainties and Logginess
The current struggle of the process is logginess. Namely, from August until now, several demands from the DEM Party, such as the release of Selahattin Demirtaş[1], have not been realized, or the Parliamentary Commission’s visit to Öcalan has been delayed. One interpretation is that the government does not want to take risks amid current uncertainties in domestic politics and in Syria, as Kurds still demand decentralization. However, peace with Kurds means deconstructing and reconstructing all the constituent ideologies, which requires momentum. Therefore, logginess in this context doesn't mean avoiding risk, but rather risking the future of the process.
Indeed, this doesn’t suggest implementation of quick steps with strict deadlines. On the contrary, such transitions need flexibility, patience, and persistence. Here, momentum can be interpreted as the adaptation of generic policies that would boost hope and trust, such as using the political language of commonality or small political gestures between the government and the opposition. This also asserts that politics should be consistent. For example, without democratization, the Turkish government cannot convince the public that peace is possible. So, to create a process that citizens can rely on, the oppression against the Republican People’s Party (CHP) should stop.
The Balance of Demands and Compromises
For a transition to be credible, both sides would need to confront the denial of equal citizenship as the root cause and commit to democratization as the guiding framework. However, a common fact in other global cases of reconciliation is that all sides have their own vision of post-conflict conditions. It is very natural to see that the state's demands do not align with others' needs. That is to say, the Kurdish and Turkish sides have different objectives and expectations from the process. For instance, while the Kurdish side reads it as a process of democratization and recognition of fundamental rights, the state approaches it as a security and stabilization issue by calling it “terror-free Turkey process”. Therefore, it involves bargaining on the characteristics and extent of the transition.
Here, the key point is that both sides must compromise to the extent necessary to ensure continuity in transition. This would not only strengthen the grounds for the gains but also create space to understand the strong relation between dealing with the past and the disarmament of the PKK.
One Challenge
Each case has its own unique characteristics, primarily due to realpolitik conditions, the scope, duration, and the parties involved. Therefore, resolution also has its own particularities. In other words, even if there are generally accepted methods for building peace or establishing justice, there is no definitive correct answer as to which steps of the process should be taken and when. Indeed, providing space for the stakeholders' priorities is crucial for progress.
Today in Turkey, dissolution of the PKK is seen as the first step because all parties aim to achieve stability in the region as soon as possible. At this stage, it is important to remember that the PKK is not the cause of the conflict, but rather a result. Eliminating it would thus require transforming the political and social conditions that produced it. Even if it is still too early for such an assessment, viewing the process in a DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) context would also point to this. Disarmed guerrillas must participate in ordinary life as legitimate parties, primarily in legal, political, and social terms. Establishing such an “ordinary” life is possible by addressing the root causes and overcoming the polarization.
This nonetheless constitutes a significant challenge, as prevailing narratives continue to deny the root causes of the Kurdish issue. Although these narratives are subject to change, such change is contingent on prolonged effort, adequate resources, and time, as well as the political capacity to generate public support and sustain consistency. Against this backdrop, the government's hesitant steps and its political pressure on the main opposition party, CHP, coupled with the CHP's refusal to attend the meeting with Öcalan, risk a renewed wave of nationalism and are overshadowing the necessary strength and intent for the process.
One Risk
The point reached signals a serious potential risk: insufficient socialization of the process. Socialization does not simply mean that all social segments in Turkey settle for the process. It goes much further than that; all segments of society must willingly and enthusiastically embrace, implement, and shape the process. In other words, all stakeholders, from nationalist secularists to Islamist nationalists, from socialists to women to Kurds, must believe in the institution of peace regardless of their political differences. So why is this risk even more relevant today?
Several fundamental issues underlying the process are very close to becoming clear. However, due to decades of war propaganda and the demonization of the Kurdish movement, these issues are also sore spots for the parties involved. In particular, discussions surrounding Öcalan and the possibility of gains for Kurds in Syria are being exploited for political gain by racist political lines such as the Victory Party.
Likewise, the CHP's recent rejection of the commission's (The Commission for National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy) visit to Öcalan could be seen as a historic mistake. Although CHP has been relatively left-leaning for some time, this step could negatively change Turkey's future. There is a danger that CHP might resort to its old nationalist populist rhetoric, especially when the Kurdish issue and peace are being discussed. Moreover, this could lead to right-wing, racist figures like Mansur Yavaş, the mayor of Ankara, gaining influence within the party and even running for the presidency, instead of figures like İmamoğlu, who are close to the Kurds and the process.
One Opportunity
The currently unfolding process may also offer valuable opportunities for Turkey’s democracy. In particular, the meeting with Öcalan on November 24 marked the crossing of another major threshold. There are several reasons why this is an important development. First, Öcalan has made contact with parliament, the primary structure representing the people in the democratic order, for the first time. Moreover, he has not only been recognized by parliament as a party to the process, but has also gained legitimacy within general politics.
Öcalan's attainment of such a position signifies two fundamental points. First, the current process could lead to the state recognizing the Kurdish movement and thus enable the inclusion of the political and cultural context to which Kurds have felt a sense of belonging. This would increase the trust Kurds have in the process and facilitate discussions on reckoning with the past and building justice, which will be carried out over a long period. On the other side, there is an opportunity for a change in public perception of the Kurdish movement, especially regarding the Turkish people. The PKK and its founders, who Turkish politics have dehumanized for many years, can be perceived as politicians who sit at the same table with the state and even gain benefits.
In a sociological and legal context, this could pave the way for long-term peace-building. This is because we are moving from the political idea that Kurds are an extension of Turks, to a time where Kurds are subjects demanding their own rights. Although it is still early, a Turkey where the right of Kurds to determine their own destiny, language, and culture is not met with absurdity comes much closer to a genuine culture of coexistence.
The Excitement for Peace
Inclusive and positive peace remains a difficult horizon to reach. Still, the desire for peace must retain its political voice. The Kurdish question is a long-standing, multi-layered issue that spans a vast region. Societies and politics, such as Turkey's, have been extremely polarized by war and hate speech. War policies around the world and in West Asia, and the collapse of human rights regimes in response. Against all this, even a one-year milestone in the process without collapse is an achievement worthy of admiration in itself.
A permanent peace and democratization in Turkey can not only be achieved by dissolving the PKK, but also through inclusive reconciliation, truth, reparation, and reconstruction processes. This depends on strengthening socialization of the process and paying attention to the demands of the people. Ultimately, peace in Turkey is a matter of how different communities perceive each other and how those who have suffered injustice feel they are treated fairly.
In this context, insisting on the process is far more legitimate than abandoning it, even when the steps taken remain insufficient. There is no historical example of transitional justice unfolding exactly as planned, and in addressing the Kurdish issue, interruptions and setbacks are both expected and unavoidable. Ultimately, peace is sustained not by perfection, but by collective commitment, enthusiasm, and persistence.
[1] The imprisoned former co-chair of the HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party)