On 19 March 2025, Ekrem İmamoğlu, mayor of İstanbul, was arrested, and a new wave of arrests and appointment of trustees to the opposition municipalities began across Turkey. It echoed nationally and internationally, reaching the European Council and other major institutions. Crowded protests were organized, and thousands experienced disproportionate violence from security forces. A similar arrest had occurred months earlier, in October 2024, when another CHP (Republican People's Party[1]) mayor, Ahmet Özer, was detained due to his connections to the Kurdish movement. Still, it did not spark much debate in the mainstream public sphere. It was İmamoğlu’s arrest, however, that triggered massive reactions from Turkey’s secular and predominantly nationalist communities. This was mainly because İmamoğlu emerged as a figure who could potentially defeat Erdoğan in the upcoming presidential elections. But, how did the political situation in Turkey reach a point where a state, alleged to be democratic, can punish its possible next president?
Hypocrisy of the Turkish opposition
First, understanding the problem requires examining Turkey's recent history. Specifically, oppression against the opposition and political violence are not new concepts for Turkish citizens. This is evident in violence targeting feminist, leftist, queer, migrant, or Kurdish political movements, which are deeply rooted in the characteristics of the Turkish state and internalized by Turkish society, reflecting structural barriers to democracy and basic freedoms. This section shows not only that the AKP (Justice and Development Party) is not solely responsible for the current situation but also that there is considerable hypocrisy within the broader Turkish opposition.
Hundreds of thousands of activists from feminist, leftist, or pro-Kurdish circles are still imprisoned for political activities that constitute their fundamental rights, protected by the constitution and international law. The arrest waves and trustee appointments actually started in 2016, which was dominantly seen as legitimate and legal by the national Turkish opposition, including CHP, the oppressed of today. DEM Party (People’s Equality and Democracy Party)[2] mayors were detained more than a hundred times since the city battles in Kurdish regions (2015), and trustees were appointed to their municipalities that were elected with the votes of millions of people. At this point, the very first criticism should be directed not only to the current government but also to the CHP and its supporters, namely, Kemalist and white Turks, as they enabled this political aggression through their silence and, at times, even with their open support. From 2015 to the present, Turkish nationalists viewed the appointment of government trustees over Kurdish municipalities as justified, due to alleged ties to “terrorism”.
The rise of anti-gender movements
Since 2015, the LGBTI+ movement has been increasingly portrayed as a public enemy, with anti-democratic practices and police violence, intensifying at Pride Marches. The oppression against LGBTI+ and feminist movements in Turkey is not only another outcome of a shrinking democratic space. Still, it has evolved into a hate campaign, as the government’s anti-gender agenda threatens fundamental freedoms, such as the right to life and bodily autonomy, or anti-discrimination regulations. Amid daily femicides and violence against LGBTI+ people, political Islamic ideology is imposed as a lifestyle through campaigns such as “at least three children”, “gender justice”, and now the declaration of 2025 as “the year of the family”, normalizing state control over gender roles and defining what is considered “normal” for women and non-heterosexuals. Meanwhile, the silence of left movements, including the pro-Kurdish party, on LGBTI+ freedoms can be criticized, as it appears rooted in a fear of further exclusion from the public sphere.
Demanding democratization while enforcing anti-migrant policies
Another issue shaping today’s Turkey is the influx of migrants, first from Syria beginning in 2011 and more recently from Afghanistan. Although refugee and migrant rights are protected by core principles in both international and national regulations, the people of Turkey have blamed migrants for the economic and political turmoil of the past decade. Certainly, this is not an innate response, but rather the outcome and catalyst for a polarized society that is devoid of prosperity. In fact, rising nationalist propaganda, fueled by both secular (CHP) and Islamist (AKP) movements, as well as their allied parties, has given rise to new right-wing populist movements such as the Victory Party or the IYI Party. Indeed, Victory Party, which is gaining popularity among young people, offers nothing politically but hatred against migrants.
As seen during the protests following Imamoğlu’s arrest, a new form of secular fascist ideology has emerged among young people. Although many ironically present themselves as leftists, they express hatred against refugees, Kurdish people, and LGBTI+ people. This new populism combines anti-AKP sentiment with criticism of the CHP for failing to effectively oppose the government. Undoubtedly, the political crackdown of the past decade and the opposition’s inability to adequately respond to this repression created an impasse that fueled this new wave of politicization. However, this trend cannot be expected to advance democracy in Turkey. On the contrary, it would further polarize society, shift the monopoly of violence to another form of fascism, and strengthen hatred.
The need for a common rights-based politics
It is necessary to understand how intertwined the above-mentioned issues are from both a political and legal perspective. From a legal standpoint, the core principle uniting fundamental rights is that they must apply to everyone without exception. However, in Turkey, many political groups perceive only the crackdowns imposed on themselves as rights violations, while considering practices that deny others as legitimate. Therefore, the real protection of these freedoms will involve defending them for everyone at all times, based on a principled stance. Likewise, the concept of the rule of law and democratic opposition exists to support this; to regularly monitor the government through legal means and maintain the balance of power between the government and the citizens. As seen in today’s Turkey, actively or passively supporting injustices committed against one group paves the way for injustices to be committed against another group in the future. When the government is allowed to commit violations for an extended period, the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers becomes unenforceable, and violations become the norm.
From a political or philosophical perspective, in such deeply and comprehensively anti-democratic times, becoming part of the ruling power's racist and discriminatory discourse, and failing to stop the surging right-wing populist wave, rather than standing together against the ruling power that owns these practices, only benefits those in power. This is because, in Turkey, the language of political discourse is determined by the ruling power, and any political group can be affected depending on whom it strategically chooses to target. Therefore, it is necessary to gain the power to shape public discourse, and insistent, resilient politics grounded in principles will be one of the most fundamental methods to achieve this.
It's never too late
to pursue democratization and restore political rights. The first step is establishing a common, rights-based political understanding. This requires establishing close contact with all democratic political forces as soon as possible.
The opposition must also regain its ability to influence public discourse. The political narrative cannot be built solely on opposition to the AKP. For too long, opposition politics have been limited to refuting the government's discourse, with the exception of the DEM Party. Instead, it is crucial to rebuild strength in parliament and on the streets by changing voters' perception that they only unite on the basis of opposing the AKP. This requires rejecting right-wing populist racist movements, even when they present themselves as anti-AKP, and developing new campaigns against them. Then, distinct masses of voters excluded from democratic political rights can succeed in standing together and creating a bridging narrative.
The current process unfolding in Turkey may open space for greater opposition unity and the reestablishment of political freedoms. During this time, the government may be forced into a position it has not faced in a long time, moving toward overall democratization. This moment provides an opportunity for movements that can consolidate nationalist-leaning groups, such as the CHP and the TIP (Workers’ Party of Turkey)[3], to both recognize the Kurds and join the DEM Party in demanding democratization from the government. It is essential to prevent these nationalist segments from drifting into more racist and fascist formations. Instead, they must be drawn to fundamental rights and freedoms against authoritarian rule.
Resisting Authoritarianism, Reclaiming Freedom
In modern politics, problems and solutions are rarely confined to a single nation. The Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights, and United Nations regulations all play a role in shrinking democratic space. However, these international mechanisms have often acted hypocritically and failed to pressure the Turkish government sufficiently. Therefore, it is necessary for local opposition groups, oppressed political groups, and citizens of countries that can influence Turkish politics to increase pressure on these institutions and demand that Turkey comply with the universal human rights system.
Above all, achieving an inclusive and enduring democratic society is a long, multi-layered process. History has shown that progress in the struggle for rights is not linear but achieved through broad-based, collective gains. Today's challenge is to build a resilient society capable of sustaining collective solidarity in the face of authoritarian rule.
[1] The Republican People's Party is essentially a Kemalist social democratic party pursuing a secular nationalist policy. Although it has pursued a relatively left-leaning policy in its recent history, the CHP, which traditionally maintains strong ties with right-wing politics, has been the main opposition party for a long time.
[2] The People's Equality and Democracy Party is the latest iteration of a pro-Kurdish political movement that has existed in Turkey since 1990 and has been shut down seven times. Fundamentally pursuing a pluralistic democratic policy, DEM is Turkey's second-largest opposition party, representing feminists, ecologists, socialists, Kurds, and numerous minority movements.
[3] The Turkish Workers' Party is a left-wing populist political party founded in 2017 that generally pursues socialist policies. Although it has been in coalition with the DEM Party to date, it received support mainly from white Turkish electorates detached from the CHP but unwilling to fully align with the DEM Party.