Syria’s 2025 Parliamentary Elections: An Authoritarian Reset?
Over the course of the past eight months, Syria’s political landscape has been characterized by complex dynamics, sudden changes of course, and multifaceted and in some cases contradictory processes. Escalations have been interspersed with periods of fragile stability, and all the while a range of different stakeholders have been pursuing their respective interests.
On 27 July 2025, in a move that elicited mixed reactions from the international community, the interim government announced parliamentary elections scheduled to be held between 15 and 20 September. The elections in question are due to take place during a period of escalating tensions between the ruling government forces — backed by their predominantly Sunni supporters — and their mainly Alawite, Kurdish, and Druze opponents, and at a time when the members of these groups who are in favour of genuine political change and who oppose the prevailing sectarian and violent dynamics are being increasingly marginalized.
Officially, the elections have been touted as a crucial and pragmatic step towards achieving political stability, renewal, and national reconciliation. However, it is debatable just how representative of the current balance of power in Syria the upcoming elections will be and how beneficial they will be for the extremely delicate transition towards an inclusive and pluralistic political system.
Establishing a Formal Framework for the Elections
The People’s Assembly, which is granted certain legislative powers, is set to be composed of some 210 parliamentary representatives, 140 of whom will be indirectly elected, and 70 of whom will be directly appointed by President Ahmed al-Sharaa. A two-stage electoral process has been introduced for the upcoming elections: first, provincial subcommittees are to be formed at province level, comprising representatives of local elites. Each subcommittee is tasked with selecting the members of a district’s electoral body, comprising some 30–50 candidates per seat, who in turn are expected to conduct an internal vote to elect the future parliamentary representative for that district. The electoral bodies should consist of academics, experts, and local elites, with women comprising at least 20 percent of all members. On 23 August, the authorities also announced their decision to exclude for the time being the provinces of Al-Hasakah and Raqqa, which are under the control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as well as Suweida, a Druze-majority city that has been seeking self-governance. The decision to exclude these provinces was justified on the basis of alleged security concerns.
The chairman of the Higher Committee for People’s Assembly Elections is Mohammed Taha al-Ahmed. Al-Ahmed worked as an agricultural engineer in the HTS-controlled city of Idlib and assumed the role of Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in the Syrian caretaker government following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. Since May 2025, he has been the country’s Assistant Foreign Minister for Arab Affairs.
In his role as chairman of the Higher Committee for People’s Assembly Elections, al-Ahmed has now also assumed a powerful position in the process: he is responsible for designing and implementing the provisional electoral system — which includes increasing the total number of parliamentary seats from the initial 150 to 210, establishing a system of indirect electoral procedures involving subcommittees and electoral bodies, and ensuring that everything runs to schedule.
The Rushed Election Announcement: A Haphazard Bid to Consolidate Power?
The sudden and unexpected election announcement following the brutal conflict that had erupted in Suweida, in light of which certain government groups are being held responsible for large-scale human rights violations, raises the question of what the provisional government intends to achieve by taking this abrupt step. The overall impression here is one of an impulsive and poorly thought-out endeavour to secure control and consolidate political interests in an increasingly volatile context. While President Ahmed al-Sharaa is attempting to project an image of himself as a mediator both domestically and on the international stage, he is nevertheless faced with tremendous domestic tensions and the erosion of government control, all while he is steadily losing credibility outside of his own base of supporters. Conducting elections in this climate would seem to indicate an intention to consolidate the waning influence of the central government in an increasingly sectarian society.
These symbolic elections are intended to bring together the disparate interests and profound divisions of those representing Syria’s various groups (Alawites, Sunnis, Kurds, Druze, and others), even though the elections neither facilitate a genuine democratic process nor establish the necessary conditions for true national unity.
The chairman of the Higher Committee for People’s Assembly Elections, Taha al-Ahmed, is currently championing a purportedly technocratic administrative structure that is nevertheless still heavily intertwined with the provisional government regime under President al-Sharaa. Al-Ahmed’s mission to design electoral systems and implement administrative structures represents a crude attempt to exploit official proceedings in order to force through authoritarianism under the guise of legitimacy — without any real democratic oversight or the participation and representation of the relevant sections of the population.
Considering the overall situation, the election announcement can be interpreted as an authoritarian tactical manoeuvre intended to enforce national unity and make the continued transition process a fait accompli, thereby cementing the destructive and violent sectarian dynamic that plagues the country.
Failed Dialogue and Political Division
As part of the Syrian National Dialogue Convention, the elections are meant to constitute one step within the broader process of transition and political transformation. From the very outset, President Al-Sharaa failed to meet the expectations set out within the National Dialogue, which had been launched at the beginning of the year. He has been accused of restricting political participation to those loyal to the provisional caretaker government and of rarely involving representatives of the Kurdish opposition, independent trade unions, or civil society groups, and of failing to take their concerns into account. This lack of genuine inclusion and the absence of an open and unbiased democratic dialogue already hinted at an unwillingness by the country’s political establishment to represent Syria’s diversity and to embrace an inclusive and pluralistic political process.
In light of the devastating incidents of sectarian violence that had transpired in Suweida, the SDF held a conference in Al-Hasakah in August 2025, which was attended by political factions external to al-Sharaa’s system of government, including the controversial Druze leader Hikmat al-Hijri. The conference explicitly criticized the centralist political orientation and policies of the provisional government and opened up space for opposition movements — and as such was immediately perceived by the government as posing a serious threat and undermining national unity.
Al-Hijri’s participation in the conference was among the excuses Ahmed al-Sharaa cited as pretexts for calling off the talks that had been scheduled to take place with the SDF in Paris. The talks in question had been organized as part of the agreement reached in March between the SDF and the caretaker government, an agreement whose provisions included all civilian and military facilities in the northeast of the country being integrated into Syrian state institutions, as well as ensuring the equal political participation and official recognition of Syrian Kurds. The agreement appeared to be on shaky ground from the outset and should therefore be taken with a grain of salt, given al-Sharaa’s hitherto close relationship with Türkiye. Nonetheless, it gave rise to a mood of cautious optimism and hopes that Damascus might actually begin to open itself up to Kurdish interests.
Al-Sharaa’s disproportionate reaction to the conference — cancelling the follow-up talks in Paris — had far-reaching consequences for the goals of the original March agreement and led to a renewed escalation of tensions between the SDF and al-Sharaa’s government.
The Role of the Diaspora
In addition to hosting a broad support base for al-Sharaa, Germany is also home to a growing number of Syrian — and among them Kurdish — voices that have either expressed criticism and opposition from the outset, or are increasingly distancing themselves from the centralist tendencies and dubious practices of the provisional government and its supporters. These voices are calling for a pluralistic democratic process and are endeavouring to contribute to Syria’s progressive transformation. Boosting and incorporating their perspectives and alternative demands may prove crucial in the current situation. Many of these people once risked their lives in the name of a free Syrian society; as far as they are concerned, the apparent instrumentalization of democratic processes by a government that is unwilling to guarantee the principles of inclusion and pluralism represents a bitter disappointment.
At the same time, for many members of Germany’s Syrian diaspora, the news of the parliamentary elections coincides with a complex situation that is made even more complicated by the many challenges they face living in Germany.
In the wake of an incredibly racist election campaign, the electoral successes enjoyed by the AfD and CDU in the country’s most recent federal elections, and the decision to suspend family reunification legislation (to name but a handful of factors), members of Germany’s Syrian diaspora are currently forced to grapple with an antagonistic and in some cases even openly hostile German society. Not to mention a federal government that is constantly instilling a sense of uncertainty, unwilling to grant them any scope for self-determination or political participation.
Despite a high rate of naturalization, the vast majority of Syrians living in Germany have yet to obtain German citizenship and, as such, find themselves trapped in a situation that makes it virtually impossible for them to enjoy equal participation in political processes in both Germany and Syria. Germany continues to deny them the opportunity even to make short trips to Syria — for example, to see relatives again following years of war, to gain an impression of what life is like on the ground, or to renew documents — at least not without jeopardizing their residency status in Germany.
At the same time, Syrian President Al-Sharaa has not publicly indicated an intention to advocate in the interest of Germany’s Syrian community in the numerous meetings he has attended with German government representatives.
For individuals in Germany’s Syrian diaspora, hypothetical participation in Syria’s already incredibly restrictive electoral process would require meeting all manner of criteria and, at this point, would be limited to those who have managed to obtain German citizenship and are therefore able to travel, while also needing to have valid Syrian papers.
Authoritarian Manoeuvring Rather than Pluralism and Genuine Understanding
For Syrians both at home and abroad who harboured high hopes for change, the recent months have been marked by widespread violence and anxiety about the future. They have been forced to watch on in stunned silence as their fellow Syrians kill one another and the nightmare of sectarianism and blood feuds becomes reality. At this juncture, it would be imperative for al-Sharaa to implement measures that would ensure the safety and security of all groups and people living in Syria, and to protect them from brutal vigilantism and human rights violations. At the moment, however, this does not appear to be his intention. Ultimately, the displays of respectability, the calls for national unity that seem vaguely threatening, and even the commemoration of the crimes of the Assad regime and prosecution of the perpetrators feel performative overall and are geared towards convincing Western governments that Syria has undergone a political renewal. This approach has been a resounding success.
When it comes to the upcoming elections, efforts are being made to establish a sense of legitimacy, for example, by inviting international election observers to monitor proceedings. However, other core demands such as transparency, inclusive participation, and inclusion of the Syrian diaspora have largely been overlooked.
Against this backdrop, the rushed and shambolic election process, which excludes three of Syria’s provinces, seems like a deliberate show of strength that is intended to undermine pluralistic and diverse political parliamentary representation. This is nothing but a feeble attempt to legitimize the interim regime, which continues to reproduce undemocratic structures. Those regions with structures of self-governance or separatist leanings remain politically marginalized, and the people’s distrust of the government is only increased.
The actions of the central government can be likened to an authoritarian reset and undermine the original objectives of the Syrian revolution, which championed the principles of dignity, freedom, and justice.
The process of political transition in Syria requires a fundamental transformation that is based on the recognition and participation of all the country’s political, ethnic, and religious groups in order to provide the necessary framework and conditions for ensuring the success of democratic elections. An inclusive, transparent, and de-escalatory participation process involving all the relevant parties and stakeholders would constitute a crucial first step here. Unless there is a genuine political openness that balances the sovereignty of the state with the principles of democracy and human rights, the upcoming parliamentary elections will represent a step towards authoritarian rule, which will only lead to further sectarian violence and political division.
Translated by Louise Pain & Rowan Coupland for Gegensatz Translation Collective