The show of Democracy in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Elections

Elections in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq sustain a democratic facade, concealing a power-sharing pact between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) that prioritizes control over progress. With each election, the same elites divide positions and resources, sidelining genuine reform. True change demands that the opposition abandon accommodation and push for a democratic vision that challenges this entrenched system.

 

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) held its parliamentary election on October 20, 2024, after two years of postponement. These elections occurred amid critical times in the Middle East, with economic, political, and geopolitical anxieties swirling, compounded by the broader regional tensions, particularly the war in Gaza and Lebanon that have affected Iraq and the Kurdistan Region and their populations. However, despite the excitement around the election campaigns, where political parties left no stone unturned in attacking one another, this excitement was seen as an illusion due to the absence of credible democratic changes in the current political system. 

Since establishing the KRI in 1992, elections have become an increasingly paradoxical ritual. On the surface, they present themselves as a legitimate democratic process, much like in any liberal representative democracy. Yet, in reality, they serve as a tool for legitimizing an authoritarian political system. For the past three decades, the KDP and PUK have used elections to reinforce their hold on power. But the question remains: Could the 2024 election results break this vicious cycle?

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s Reality

Contrary to the widespread perception among outside observers that the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is a model of democracy and stability compared to central Iraq, the reality is far from democratic.  Two ruling families dominate the region: the Barzani family, which leads the conservative Kurdistan Democratic Party, and the Talabani family, heading the more socially liberal Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Theoretically, the region has been united since 2003, but in practice, it remains divided along the borders drawn by the post-civil war period (1994–1998). The KDP controls the provinces of Erbil and Duhok, while the PUK holds sway over Sulaymaniyah and Halabja. In these territories, the two parties control everything from mosques to natural resources. The economic system is deeply clientelist, benefiting the ruling elites, especially the KDP, which uses its financial clout to control the population on a massive scale.

The Peshmerga militias and security forces (Asayish) remain under the command of party leaders. While they are formally integrated within the Ministry of Defense, in practice, these forces operate under the direct control of the KDP and PUK leadership, with allegiance primarily to party interests rather than national oversight. Particularly in the KDP-controlled areas, a hegemonic discourse is enforced, promoting fear, division, and punishment against anyone who questions the foundations of the current narrative. Dissenters risk losing their jobs simply for questioning the nationalist narrative or setting their lives under threat, including imprisonment. Under such conditions, elections become nothing more than a ritual where the KDP and PUK secure their power and reinstate their post-2003 power-sharing arrangement.

In 2015 when the opposition party Goran (The Change Party), then considered a likely alternative to the two ruling parties, wanted to amend the presidential law, the KDP denied entry to the speaker of parliament for two years, and the parliament remained closed during those two years. This holds even truer for the KDP, whose grip on power, economic resources, and state institutions is much stronger. Expecting genuine change from elections under these circumstances is at most an illusion.

The oppositional groups have also perpetuated this illusion. Over the past two decades, opposition parties have participated in this flawed system, hoping to enact social and economic reforms. Instead, their participation has only served to legitimize the existing power structures rather than foster a genuine democratic process that could establish the rule of law and promote good governance.

In a functioning democracy, elections are meaningful only when voters and political parties accept the possibility of losing. In the KRI, however, neither the KDP nor the PUK has embraced the idea of being in opposition. Instead, they manipulate the election process to ensure their continued dominance at the expense of political stability and democratic progress.

Voter Suppression of Minorities

The Kurdistan Parliament had 111 seats since 2005, with 11 reserved for Turkomen and Christians. However, these seats were often exploited by the KDP, which imposed its candidates and secured their loyalty through manipulation and enforcement. The Peshmerga militias, loyal to the KDP, were used to control minority votes, ensuring that these seats went to candidates affiliated with the KDP. The PUK objected to this and took the issue to the Iraqi Supreme Court in 2023, which eventually reduced the minority seats to five. These were then divided between Duhok (one seat), Erbil (two seats), and Sulaymaniyah (two seats). The overall number of parliamentary seats was also reduced to 100. Unsurprisingly, the minorities’ quota was not left to the minorities to democratically elect their representatives. 

Election Results

According to the final results, the division of seats based on voter counts from the four KRI governorates of Sulaymaniyah, Halabja, Erbil and Duhok provide the KDP (39 seats), PUK (23 seats), New Generation Movement (NGM) (15 seats), and Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) (7 seats). These parties have now emerged as the major forces in the elections, securing the most seats across the four local provinces. The seats of the New Generation Movement, a populist liberal political party led by media mogul and businessperson Shaswar Abdul Wahid increased. Yet, the Kurdistan Democratic Party could be considered as the significant winner as the majority of the political entities were aiming at the KDP, for the KDP has been the main ruler of the KRG post-2003.

The results of the KRI parliamentary elections (October 20, 2024)

The Consequences of Power-Sharing

The previous power-sharing arrangements between the KDP and PUK have not led to better governance, social and economic justice, or the expansion of freedom and democracy. People in the KRI still do not have access to good electricity, drinking water, or jobs, while the economy relies mainly on revenues from oil exports. Meanwhile, since the mid-2000s the KRI has become a consuming society, importing almost everything from tomatoes to advanced technology abroad with very minor exports. Additionally, the ruling parties have entrenched a form of Cronyism that even party leaders PUK President Bafel Talabani and KRI Prime Minister Masrour Barzani have publicly criticized. At the heart of the KRI’s democratic facade is this power-sharing practice, where every election ends in an agreement to divide key government positions and resources between the two parties. Currently, strong oppositional groups are lacking, with the main oppositional party Gorran incorporated into the ruling government since 2013, and the Islamists and the NGM remain outside. 

This arrangement is not based on ideological or policy differences but on a shared understanding that maintaining power is more beneficial than risking instability through a competitive political system.

What Will Happen Next?

If the same power-sharing mechanisms are applied again, which is most likely, the results will remain the same. If, however, there is a shift toward a majority government—forcing the PUK into opposition—the PUK will likely push for a return to a two-administration system. The KDP, benefiting from the current arrangements, is unlikely to support change. While both sides will eventually reach an agreement—this catch-22 situation can only be resolved through the traditional power-sharing arrangements, and it may take time, especially with the 2025 Iraqi elections looming. In the past three days, the KDP and PUK have issued very conflicting statements. The PUK insists that they will not accept a KDP dominant government and instead ask for credible power sharing mechanisms. In response, the KDP issued a public statement reiterating that they want a majoritarian government. As a first in response to the KDP, the PUK has taken the issue of biometric registration of public employees to the Iraqi Supreme Court. They ask for direct payment of employees by the Iraqi Government instead of the Kurdistan Regional Government. The 2025 Iraqi elections will likely determine what will happen next. 

Beyond the Illusion

This election is likely to legitimize the continued dual rule of the KRI by the PUK and KDP, a system born out of the civil war. My hope is that the election results will encourage the opposition to reflect on how genuine change can only come through a democratic vision that offers an alternative to the entrenched power structures—not through half-hearted attempts to fit into the existing system. The PUK’s duplicity—acting like the KDP in some ways in its controlled zone while opposing it in discourse—and the narcissism of opposition figures whose only goal is to oppose without offering meaningful alternatives, will not bring about the change Kurdistan needs.

For the Kurdistan Region to escape this vicious cycle there must be a fundamental shift in its political culture and the opposition should be able to come up with an alternative paradigm to the current monopolized economic and tribal political system. The illusion of elections must be shattered, and the region must move toward a system where political power is genuinely accountable to the people. This will require not just electoral reform but a transformation in how the KDP and PUK operate. Only when they are willing to accept the possibility of opposition and relinquish their monopoly on militias, economy, and natural resources can the KRI move toward a future where democracy is more than just a facade.