Hope Rekindled: The Struggle for Lebanon’s Government and the Challenges Ahead

The election of Joseph Aoun as president and Nawaf Salam as prime minister[1] in January 2025 sparked the first glimmers of hope for the building of a better future for Lebanon since the 17 October uprising in 2019. Yet, it remains to be seen whether their appointments will constitute a political breakthrough and new beginning toward what millions of Lebanese hope for, such as the restoration of peace, security, and the rule of law; economic reform and stability; the rebuilding of the state, its sovereignty and institutions; and the reformation of the corrupt political system of sectarianism. These urgent and tremendous challenges await the newly formed government headed by Salam. So, what lies ahead for the process of government formation, the country at large, and the hopes of the Lebanese?

The cautious rekindling of hopes over the new appointees came at the heels of over five years of ever-deepening and multiplying crises and seismic geopolitical shifts from the financial, banking, and economic collapse that devalued over 90 percent of the Lebanese pound’s value and led to nearly three-quarters of the population to experience multidimensional poverty, to the devastating explosion in Beirut’s port in August 2020; and the paralyzing of all attempts at political, economic, and judicial reforms by the corrupt sectarian political establishment, which resulted in over two years of presidential vacuum as country and state institutions disintegrated further. Then followed October 7, 2023, and the war between Hezbollah and Israel, which the latter escalated in the fall of 2024, wreaking havoc on the South, Bekaa, and Beirut’s Dahiyeh, Lebanon’s Shiite-majority areas, killing some 4,000 people, and massively weakening Hezbollah’s strategic deterrence, military capabilities, leadership, and political influence. Shortly after Hezbollah agreed to a truce, Bashar al-Assad’s government in neighboring Syria was toppled. Turkey and Israel (re-)asserted their military power and regional ambitions, and the latter drew nearer to the long-awaited neoconservative and imperial project of “redrawing” the map of the Middle East from Palestine to Lebanon, Syria, and possibly Iran. 

In this moment of cataclysmic change and given the dominance of billionaires and corrupt elites among Lebanese politicians, progressive voices could not have asked for better-suited candidates for the monumental tasks ahead than the politically independent, integral, and highly respected Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam. As chief commander of the Lebanese army, Aoun successfully marshaled this diverse and largest Lebanese institution through years of crisis. In the process, he secured backing and financial support from diverse international powers, including the US. Nawaf Salam, progeny of an influential Beiruti family of politicians, a former professor of political science, and Lebanon’s long-term ambassador to the UN in New York, left his post as head judge of the International Criminal Court to become Lebanon’s prime minister. 

In recent years, government formation had mainly entailed the admittedly elaborate task of getting most, if not all, established sectarian parties to agree to share the state’s resources amongst themselves by allotting variously promising ministerial portfolios and accepting, albeit grudgingly, that the allied Shiite parties of Amal and Hezbollah secure a blocking third of cabinet posts. Now, this is exponentially more complicated, as it is happening under unprecedented external and internal pressures, and as much more is at stake, namely the successful redressing of Lebanon’s four most significant and most urgent challenges: 1) securing international funding to stabilize the economy and finance the war-torn areas’ reconstruction; 2) ensuring both Israel’s withdrawal from occupied South Lebanon and the implementation of United Nation’s Security Council Resolution 1701 and thus Hezbollah’s pullback from southern Lebanon; 3) rebuilding the state, its institutions, and implementing equitable reforms in the banking sector; and 4) paving the way for reforms ahead of the 2026 general elections.

Salam's main challenges in forming the government lie in treading the line of deciding whom to include and whom to exclude from the government under pressures from inside and outside Lebanon. To receive parliament’s confidence, he needs to include independent ministers or those based solely on merit and representants of the traditional sectarian political establishment, even though they would impede fundamental reforms that would go against their narrow class interests. But the central conundrum resides regarding Hezbollah’s post-war role and that of its ally Amal: Israel, the US, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon’s internal opposition to Hezbollah by parties like the Lebanese Forces (LF), which constitutes the largest parliamentary bloc, want to see the influence of the party and the “Axis of Resistance” more broadly diminished. And just like the Saudis and Americans’ support was vital to the election of President Aoun, their sway over the international financial support promised to save Lebanon can just as quickly be withdrawn. Hezbollah and Amal, on the other hand, might accept losing their blocking third but would struggle to accept their total marginalization, particularly regarding fiercely contested portfolios like the ministry of finance, as they strive to spearhead the costly reconstruction of their constituencies most damaged during the war to rebuild inner communal trust that might otherwise dwindle.

Salam and Aoun must carefully navigate this uneasy terrain, making concessions, brokering deals, and giving assurances without antagonizing major parties or tarnishing their own reputation amongst civil society and the broader population if they want to have any shot, against all odds, at laying the groundwork for the implementation of “sweeping reforms.” Both Trump’s entry to the White House, rendering US foreign policy much less predictable, and the full-blown Western support for every and all of Israel’s military operations and occupations across Gaza, the Westbank, Syria, and Lebanon, international law or ceasefires notwithstanding, render Salam and Aoun’s mission even more difficult. 

And yet, the prospect alone of a possibility for profound and lasting change in a country at times believed to be irretrievably corrupt and beyond recovery is enough to fan the flames of hope. Thus, now might be the time to (re-)formulate politics that represent and address the hopes and demands of the majority of Lebanon’s population. Achieving this requires centering accountability, the rule and application of (international) law, redistributive approaches to mitigate severe socio-economic inequalities, particularly in the banking sector, and shifting away from political sectarianism towards a more just, equitable, and diverse society.

[1] According to the Lebanese constitution, the prime minister technically remains “prime minister-designate” until the government has officially been formed.