As for becoming entangled and slipping into the proposed negotiating traps, this would only bring more gains that serve the Israeli enemy.
Hezbollah Rejects Negotiations
"As for becoming entangled and slipping into the proposed negotiating traps, this would only bring more gains that serve the Israeli enemy." In an open letter to Lebanon’s three presidents on November 6, 2025, Hezbollah rejected any potential Lebanese involvement in political negotiations with Israel. The letter describes Israel’s efforts to force Lebanon into talks as ''aggressive blackmail'' and an ''existential danger'' to Lebanon’s very survival and sovereignty.
This letter comes amid reports from Israel of an Israeli military escalation against Lebanon in response to what it alleges is Hezbollah’s rebuilding of its capabilities, and days after Lebanese President Joseph Aoun announced the country’s readiness for ''negotiations to end the Israeli occupation,'' noting that ''any talks cannot be one-sided — they require mutual will, which is still lacking.''
Israeli War(s) on Lebanon (2024–25)
Since the ceasefire agreement between Lebanon and Israel took effect on November 26, 2024, Israel has continued to illegally occupy at least five Lebanese positions while targeting and bombing areas across South Lebanon, the Beqaa, and the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, killing and injuring hundreds.
In August 2025, the Lebanese government declared its plan, in response to an American request, to disarm Hezbollah and confine all weapons to the state.
Recently, Israel has threatened to escalate its ongoing assault on Lebanon, claiming that the Lebanese government is not implementing its disarmament plan, an attempt to pressure Lebanon into direct negotiations. However, the idea of negotiations with Israel, or joining its Abraham Accords alongside several Arab countries, has either been forced upon Lebanon or has been circulating in unofficial circles.
Previous Negotiations with Israel
Lebanon has previously engaged in direct negotiations in 1983, leading to what was labeled by the Lebanese opposition at the time as ''the Shameful Agreement'', a deal Lebanon eventually annulled just 10 months later. The atmosphere in Lebanon today, although different from that of 1983, mirrors the circumstances of that earlier period — not because Israel and the US are, as always, pressuring Lebanon to negotiate, but because Lebanon continues to perceive its state and Israel in much the same way. Calls for ‘peace’ or 'normalization' either stem from a deep sense of defeat before this powerful force supported by the US and its European allies, or from the belief that Lebanon’s problem with Israel is ''not our own'' but rather the result of ''other people’s wars'' fought on Lebanese soil.
Aoun has reiterated Lebanon's willingness to negotiate, stating clearly that the country has ‘no other option’, a position similar to that of President Amin Gemayel back in 1983, when he entered negotiations with Israel. However, while today’s events unfold differently on the ground, one is prompted to look back at the context, discussions, and circumstances of that period to better understand the current situation.
May 17 Agreement: Key Terms
The agreement between Lebanon and Israel was signed on May 17, 1983, following 34 rounds of US-mediated negotiations that began in December 1982. At that time, Israeli forces were still occupyingnearly half of Lebanon and continuing assaults in the South, the Beqaa region, and Mount Lebanon. Months earlier, in June 1982, Israel had invaded the country, reaching its capital, Beirut, and occupying large parts of Lebanon, while committing massacres and repeated assaults. Under pressure, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) withdrew from Lebanon, and Bashir Gemayel was elected president. After his assassination, his brother Amine was elected president, and within a few months, agreed to enter direct negotiations with Israel.
The agreement stipulated the creation of a security zone, as outlined in Article 3, obligating the Lebanese government to implement specified security arrangements, and take security measures to detect and prevent hostile activities. Israel determined which weapons could be used by the Lebanese army in the zone while restricting the deployment of certain weapons, including prohibiting air defense systems on Mount Barouk in Mount Lebanon. This expansive security zone extended from a line south of the Awali River and south of Mount Barouk to Deir al-Ashayer in eastern Lebanon near Rachaya. Ground radar installations were also to be deployed within 10 kilometers of the Lebanese-Israeli border.
Within this ‘security zone’, Lebanese authorities were also required to take ''special security measures to detect and prevent the entry or movement of unauthorized armed individuals.'' Other forms of negotiations were set to take place after implementing the agreement, which mentioned:
During the six months after the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanon… the Parties shall initiate, within the Joint Liaison Committee, bona fide negotiations in order to conclude agreements on the movement of goods, products and persons and their implementation on a non-discriminatory basis.
Government Justifications
Lebanese officials insisted on framing the agreement as security arrangements rather than a peace treaty, as voiced by the head of the Lebanese negotiating delegation, Antoine Fattal, during the signing: "The agreement we are signing today is not a peace treaty, but rather a step towards a permanent and just peace (this expression is borrowed from the Disengagement Agreement between Syria and Israel signed in 1974)."
His Israeli counterpart, David Kimche, celebrated the signing, saying, "Israel welcomes you with the word 'peace.' So, this is the peace we desire."
Peace was also mentioned in the preamble to the agreement, which states that Lebanon and Israel both recognize "their right and duty to live in peace with all states and with each other," and agree to "declare the termination of the state of war between them." Completed Israeli from Lebanon was scheduled to occur within eight to twelve weeks after the agreement entered into force.
Lebanon knew in advance that Israel would condition its own withdrawal on the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. Israel also demanded the complete withdrawal of Palestinian fighters present in Lebanon, as well as the handover of Israeli prisoners held by Palestinian and Syrian groups. Syria opposed the Lebanese negotiations and the subsequent agreement, refusing to withdraw, with then Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam stating:
Any Israeli gain imposed on Lebanon will result in the continued presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon until that gain is removed.
Syria further viewed the agreement as constituting ''an imminent threat to its security'' (Assafir, May 13).
The positions of Lebanese officials and the opposition on the matter reflect the broad spectrum of views on Lebanon’s relationship with Israel and Israel’s regional objectives.
One day before the agreement’s signing, Lebanese Foreign Minister Elie Salem addressed parliament, highlighting the government’s stance 'that “negotiations would continue until Lebanon regains, through wisdom and diplomacy, what was lost through recklessness, chaos, and indifference,'' referring to the armed resistance against Israel by the PLO and some Lebanese groups. This persistent view has influenced both international and local narratives regarding Israeli wars in Lebanon and Palestine, in which the victims of assaults are often recognized as the reason for the attacks, and the occupied people as the cause of their occupation. Salem also invoked this justification when commenting that ''wars between the Arabs and Israel have only led to the occupation of more Arab territories.''
‘War of Others’
(All following Quotes are from the Parliamentary session minutes, of which a transcript can be found in the appendix to this article.)
In the parliamentary session that ratified the agreement on June 13, 1983, with a majority vote (opposed by only two MPs while four others abstained), MP Louis Abou Charaf accused the ''mischief-makers, saboteurs, and terrorists'' of costing Lebanon ''its sovereignty and independence… and its civilization,'' referring to the Palestinians and arguing that, under the pretext of combating them, Israel invaded Lebanon, its capital, and occupied the South.
In its attempt to mask itself as concern, this stance on resistance against Israeli occupation shifts to a ''technical'' issue regarding resistance and its consequences, yet still falls under the normalization and ''naturalization'' of the occupier’s actions while blaming the occupied. Abou Charaf's comment summarizes this:
Armed popular resistance only harms Lebanon in human, economic, and developmental terms… and every instance of armed popular resistance was followed by displacement, humiliation, and disturbance. Is this what those who reject the agreement want?
Such statements emerge in a political context, not from the perspective and personal experience of those directly affected, but from a refusal to accept the very idea of resisting the occupier or attacker.
The notion of choosing the ‘lesser of two evils’ was another justification for pursuing negotiations, whether voluntarily or under pressure from Israel or its allies. Minister Salem mentioned this when presenting the government’s presentation to parliament, a point later reiterated by MPs during the ratification session:
The choice is between having 50,000 Israeli occupying soldiers and thus losing the South, and having 50 observers from them working alongside 50 Lebanese observers under Lebanese leadership and for only two years.
The Lebanese government presented the agreement as a mean of securing Lebanon’s sovereignty because it would end the occupation, even as it agreed to a large security zone that entrenched Israeli control and dictated which weapons could be used by the Lebanese armed forces.
The ‘Necessary’ Defeat
This rhetoric, characterized by a defeated tone, views Israel as the stronger power that sets the terms of rule, leaving no room for Lebanon to navigate alternatives. This normalization of Israel’s control frames resistance as futile. At the time, Lebanese Prime Minister Shafiq Al-Wazzan responded to several MPs who rejected the agreement and propose resistance:
We wish we had all the conditions that would honor us as defenders who shed blood to liberate every inch of our land.
Keeping his comments brief, he asked members not to interpret each article of the agreement individually and instead rely on Minister Salem’s May presentation.
Opposing the agreement, MP Zaher Al-Khatib argued that it was neither legally nor internationally valid, stressing that international law and modern jurisprudence ''consider agreements concluded under occupation as void or voidable by the vanquished state.'' He continued, ''Because it is natural for the vanquished state to be deprived of freedom, its will is diminished, coerced, and vitiated. This coercion—whether material, moral, or military—forces this will and thus nullifies consent.''
Others viewed this as a natural consequence of defeat, framing it as a necessary evil that people should accept. In the June session, MP Nasri El Maalouf stated:
Civilizations before us have lived through days like ours. We are not the only ones who were invaded in their own homes, overpowered, had their land occupied, and their houses struck and demolished. War has existed since humans existed, and war is nothing but what you have known and experienced… We are not the first to suffer its calamities or pay the price of its disasters.
Opposition Voices
The Lebanese opposition to the negotiations and the agreement—similar to the current opposition in Lebanon and the region—was expressed on multiple occasions during the Lebanese civil war that began in 1975. The Progressive Socialist Party, led by Walid Jumblatt, considered the most effective way to reach an understanding with the occupiers was resistance that would force their withdrawal..
Days before the signing, on May 14, an opposition front convened in Zgharta, North Lebanon, bringing together various parties and groups, including the Al-Marada Party, the Progressive Socialist Party, the Lebanese Communist Party, and former Prime Minister Rashid Karami. They issued a statement calling for ''thwarting all these disastrous results that place Lebanon under the domination of Zionism and colonialism.'' Warning of the dangers of signing the agreement, Karami argued on May 14, 1983, that the alternative solution was to strengthen Lebanon’s stance and adhere to UN Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509 (1982), which demand that ''Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon.''
After the signing, Nabih Berri, leader of the Amal Movement, announced their refusal of the agreement ''since negotiations took place while the enemy occupies Lebanese territory.'' Meanwhile, the Al Kataeb Party leader and the president’s father, Pierre Gemayel, remarked: "Let them bring us a better solution."
The US Factor
Despite its imperial project in the region and in Lebanon, the US was welcomed by various parties and Lebanese officials as a strong ally that would act in Lebanon’s interest. This stance has persisted strongly and resurfaced during negotiations following Israel’s full-scale war on Lebanon in September 2024. In his 1983 speech, Louis Abou Charaf noted how Europe, which various right-wing Christian parties during the Lebanese civil war viewed as an ally and savior, had ''advised turning towards America, because we found no other capable helper.'' The US thus became seen as the sole savior. Abou Charaf believed that the US, despite the bombing of its embassy in Beirut on April 19 of the same year, ''stood by us and pledged to evacuate all foreign forces from Lebanon, including Israeli forces.''
However, MP Najah Wakim, leader of the People’s Party, questioned the Lebanese perception of the US as an ally: ''We all know America's credibility towards Lebanon, how many times America stood against Lebanon, and how many times it claimed to stand with Lebanon,'' referring to Washington’s role in enabling Israel’s 1982 invasion of Beirut while promising multinational forces wouldn’t be deployed. American policy towards Israel, and towards other countries in the region—especially during the latest wars on Gaza and Lebanon—exposes this reality: its envoy to Lebanon, Tom Barrack, humiliatedLebanese journalists, while recently claiming that ''the United States has tried to usher Lebanon toward a peaceful solution with Israel, through incentives rather than imposition,'' yet simultaneously continuing to threaten Lebanon with another full-on war by Israel.
Lebanon’s Identity and Occupation
The Lebanese ''problem'' at the heart of the civil war, reflected in differing visions of the country by various factions, also demonstrates Lebanon’s perception of its surroundings: Arabs, Palestinians, and Israel. One crucial view, adopted by the political powers at the time of the agreement, considered the Lebanese problem as primarily that of the Christian minorities of the East, portraying Lebanon as separate from its Arab surroundings, and often invoking the Phoenicians as Lebanese ancestors and identity. Such rhetoric was also echoed by Israeli officials in their attempts to appeal to potential Lebanese allies and negotiators, often praising Lebanon’s supposed ancient lineage and “forward-looking character” rooted in its Phoenician heritage—framing Lebanon as culturally closer to the West than to its regional surroundings.
Due to Lebanon’s ambiguous Arab identity, it is consistently portrayed as a victim of regional influences, rather than of Western or Israeli interventions. Consequently, Lebanese or Palestinian resistance against Israel is often labeled as ''sabotage,'' and Israeli wars on Lebanon are framed as targeting Palestinians or Lebanese groups, not Lebanon as a state. Justifying the agreement, Louis Abou Charaf described Lebanon as ''the victim upon whom they (Arabs) agree, and upon everything else they disagree.''
Thus, Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty were seen as outcomes of the agreement, which not only demanded Israel’s withdrawal, but also required the withdrawal of Syrian and Palestinian forces under Israeli conditions. MP Mikhail Al-Daher dubbed Lebanon’s agreement with Israel as a “second independence for Lebanon'':
Forty years after the first independence... the battle of this era for this country's officials and leaders is the responsibility of liberating Lebanon from all foreign occupation.
Conversely, Najah Wakim warned that ''the most dangerous aspect of this agreement is the framework in which it is placed and the policy that led to it,'' noting that it emerged within the context of Lebanon’s internal conflict that sparked the civil war in 1975. He emphasized that the Israeli intervention—the invasion of Lebanon, the very reason behind the agreement—was conducted ''in agreement with a local faction and senior officials in authority at the time, as part of a comprehensive American policy.''
Before being elected president, Bachir Gemayel and his Phalanges party were in contact with Israel, particularly with then Defense Minister Ariel Sharon (later succeeded by Yitzhak Shamir during the negotiation period). New York Times reported that "much of the groundwork on the agreement was done last fall by Defense Minister Ariel Sharon...who met secretly with a still unidentified confidant of President Amin Gemayel and drew up a document outlining an accord," later publishing the document from which Israel adopted several points in its negotiations.
Movements and Resistance on the ground
On the ground, the South and parts of the Beqaa and Mount Lebanon remained under Israeli occupation. Israeli forces continued raiding homes, detaining residents, and conducting attacks in multiple locations. Consequently, people’s acts of resistance against Israel as an occupying power became nearly daily occurrences, primarily organized under the Lebanese National Resistance Front, created by communist parties and others, alongside the Islamic Resistance.
Dissent and opposition rose across Lebanon. In Beqaa, a day of national mourning and a general strike were declared. In Baalbeck, a massive march blocked roads and set tires ablaze. Students in northern Lebanon went on strike. In the Southern Suburbs of Beirut, a sit-in was followed by clashes with security forces that killed a young man and injured dozens.
On May 18, Lebanese detainees held by Israel in Ansar Prison, southern Lebanon, staged a mass sit-in protesting the government’s failure to address their fate under the agreement. This ended with a confrontation with Israeli soldiers, according to Assafir Newspaper, which quoted the Israeli Knesset stating that the number of detainees in Ansar was 4,700. Yet, on May 24, President Gemayel announced, according to the same newspaper, that ''the entire Lebanese people was united in solidarity with the government'' to liberate Lebanon.
Abrogation of the Agreement (1984)
On March 5, 1984, Lebanon, through President Amine Gemayel and his government, announced the abrogation of the May 17 Agreement with Israel, 10 months after its signing. However, nothing had been implemented, as Israel continued occupying the South and further isolated it in early 1984.
The annulment resulted from popular movements across Lebanon, including sit-ins, strikes, and protests against the agreement, dubbed the "Agreement of Shame." Political opposition, after consultations with Syria, also pressured President Gemayel to seek a way out of the agreement. Civilian and military resistance operations continued daily against Israeli occupation.
The decision to abrogate was announced following a series of meetings among Lebanese parties, who agreed to hold a national dialogue conference in exchange for its termination. Parliament ratified the decision in June 1984.
Participants in organized and popular armed resistance viewed this annulment as a direct result of their struggle. The Communist Party described it as a ''great historic victory achieved by the struggle of our Lebanese people and its national forces through the overthrow of the humiliating May 17 Agreement,'' while the Communist Labor Organization expressed that the choice of resistance prevailed ''over all the surrender options promoted after the invasion of Beirut.''
Today, as Israel intensifies its attacks and the prospect of political negotiations enter the Lebanese government, the country still faces the dilemma of its identity. Thus, debates over the US role, Israel’s goals, the feasibility and necessity of resistance, and the meaning of sovereignty, occupation, and foreign influence, remain central. They all demonstrate the enduring legacy of past perspectives in shaping contemporary policy and public opinion, even though present circumstances technically differ.