In 1926, a French High Commissioner signed a decree that would reshape the political destiny of the newly established country. The order officially recognized Twelver Shiʿism as one of Lebanon's official sects, granting the community judicial autonomy over personal status law and representation in the emerging parliamentary system after years of neglect under Ottoman rule.
For the Shia of Jabal Amil, this institutional visibility resulted from their pragmatic relationship with the mandate power following the defeat of the Arab unity project. However, the concessions made fixed their status as a minority within a state built around Christian-Maronite primacy. The recognition, paired with subordination, created a contradiction that would shape the community's political trajectory over the following decades.
This third installment concludes a trilogy on Jabal Amil, tracing the region's transformation from a semi-autonomous intellectual center in the Early Ottoman era to its marginalization and incorporation in Greater Lebanon. Part 1 examined the rise of local autonomy and its violent dismantling during the late 1700s; Part 2 explored the community's failed bid for Arab unity and its forced integration into the French Mandate state; and Part 3 turns to the post-independence era. During this period, Jabal Amil was no longer an isolated region as it had been under the Ottoman Empire. It maintained connections with other parts of Lebanon, particularly with the Shia communities in Beka'a and those who migrated to Beirut. Therefore, we cannot discuss the history of Jabal Amil after 1943 without also considering the history of the Shia community.
From 1943 to the present, Jabal Amil, increasingly referred to as South Lebanon, has been a geopolitical frontline that has shaped modern Shia political identity. In less than eighty years, the community moved from near-total political invisibility in the National Pact of 1943, to becoming arguably the strongest Lebanese political faction and a regional paramilitary actor in the 2000s, to a new cycle of destruction and displacement. The new cycle of destruction is not a break from history but a recurrence of patterns that have sought to subordinate the region through extreme power.
The 1943 National Pact: Excluded by Design
The political architecture of the Lebanese state after independence in 1943 remained as designed under the French mandate. The National Pact of 1943 divided power among religious communities according to the 1932 census, the only official census ever conducted, which showed the Maronites to be the largest group, and concentrated power in the hands of Maronite and Sunni elites. The allocation of Shia parliamentary seats was based on population, while the traditional feudal leaders of the al Asa'ad clan held South Lebanon's representation.
For Jabal Amil, political marginalization was coupled with a deeper economic reality stemming from the systematic weakening of the region under Ottoman and French rule. The establishment of Greater Lebanon completed the process of weakening the region by reorienting the economy toward Beirut, while the creation of Israel cut off remaining cross-border movements entirely.
Along with the 1948 Nakba, Zionist militias attacked Lebanese border villages, committing several massacres before withdrawing under the 1949 Armistice agreement. However, among the attacked villages were those now known as the "seven villages", located in the Upper Galilee, historically part of Jabal Amil, which were transferred from the French Mandate of Greater Lebanon to the British Mandate of Palestine under the 1923 Paulet-Newcombe Agreement. During the 1948 war, Zionist and Israeli military forces ethnically cleansed the villages, and the displaced residents fled northward into Lebanon, along with over 100,000 Palestinian refugees.
Migration and New Rivalries
The consequences were demographic. The Nakba, economic poverty, and underdevelopment pushed young men from Jabal Amil and the Bekaa to migrate to Beirut's suburbs and industrial zones in search of employment. The internal displacement created a new urban proletariat living in newly established informal settlements in Nabaa and Dahieh (Beirut’s Southern Suburbs). The geographic fragmentation established in the Mandate era was being reproduced socially through a population dispersed across the country, weakened yet sharpened by its shared grievances.
Into this fragmented landscape stepped new actors who saw opportunity in the rural exodus. While the traditional feudal networks were limited to rural areas, urban elites and intellectuals seized the opportunity to gain the support of the newly emerging proletariat through social spending and modern institution-building. Among those elites were figures like Rachid Baydoun, who built ties with Amili families in Beirut, established schools and charity institutions named after Jabal Amil, and used his influence to challenge the Al-Asa'ad clan politically in Beirut and South Lebanon.
The competition between Baydoun and Al-Asa'ad laid the groundwork for the modern political evolution of Lebanon's Shiite community, shifting it from decentralized rural fiefdoms to active, organized participation in national politics, with both sides forming their own political parties.
However, by the 1960s, the political competition between Baydoun and Al-Asa'ad was inconclusive, leaving the Shia community fragmented and politically weak. Baydoun's urban network remained concentrated in Beirut and failed to achieve nationwide unity or infiltrate the rural areas in south Lebanon; meanwhile, the growing migration to urban areas weakened Al-Asa'ad's feudal leadership. The fragmentation and political limitations of existing feudal networks and emerging urban movements drove growing numbers of educated and marginalized communities to drift away toward secular, pan-Arab, and communist leftist movements. The rise of the opposition under the Lebanese National Movement, led by leftist and pan-Arab parties and mobilizing around Palestinian resistance, motivated the poor and rural Shia class to join the opposition, seeking an inclusive and more equal political system.
Mousa al-Sadr and the Movement of the Deprived
In 1959, Imam Musa al-Sadr, a Lebanese-Iranian cleric, came to Lebanon to succeed Sayyed Sharafeddine as leader of the Shia community in the southern coastal city of Tyre. He soon emerged as a figure seeking to address the political fragmentation of the Shia community. His approach did not reject the Lebanese sectarian system but sought to unify the Shia as a coherent political bloc capable of exercising influence within it and to pursue reforms that redistribute power among Lebanese sects.
Sadr understood that integrating the Shia community within the system required more than parliamentary representation; it demanded an institutional foundation that connects the urban classes with their rural counterparts. Sadr established the Supreme Islamic Shia Council in 1967 as an administrative body for Shia political and social affairs. Al-Sadr also established his political movement "Harakat al-Mahrumin" (The Movement of the Deprived) to bring together rural villagers, the urban proletariat, and disaffected intellectuals under a single organizational umbrella that addresses inequality while strengthening the Shia communal identity.
The movement of Musa al-Sadr sought to transform the Shia community from a passive demographic category into an active political force. He sought to do so by reactivating the confessional foundation of Shia identity as a modern political community, capable of mobilizing villagers, urban workers, and intellectuals in Lebanon and abroad, and by drawing on the extended regional Shia network to strengthen their local position.
Sadr's positioning gave his movement a calculated distance from all existing political counterparts. He found common ground with the Leftist and Pan-Arab movements over political reform and supporting the Palestinian cause as an Arab and Islamic cause long embraced by the community, even as he resisted their secularist ideologies and armed tactics in the South. Simultaneously, Sadr adopted a Lebanese patriotic discourse, describing Lebanon as the "final nation" for its people and keeping channels open with right-wing Lebanese nationalists.
His diplomatic balance allowed him to speak to all sides while being captive to none. However, the situation was so fragile that his diplomacy failed to prevent the eruption of the civil war in 1975, amid extreme polarization between the left and right wings. Al-Sadr opposed the war and broke away from the national movement before leaving on an international trip to gather support to end the war, when he mysteriously disappeared in 1978.
Al-Sadr's era was particularly sensitive for both the nation and the Shia community in Jabal Amil. The Arab conflict with Israel had escalated significantly, and the Palestinian Liberation Movement (PLO) was authorized under the Cairo 1969 agreement, to carry out military operations from southern Lebanon. This development brought the region back to the forefront of the war.
On the other hand, Al-Sadr was successful in bringing the community back together, from Jabal Amil to Beirut and Beka'a, and in re-establishing a unified leadership through modern political institutions, while filling the gap left by the government through social spending and philanthropy.
However, his disappearance left the community again in a leadership crisis, this time while facing a civil war and growing Israeli aggression. Jabal Amil was rapidly transforming into a regional battleground, and the Shia community was once again split, but this time over regional campaigns.
The War of Brothers: Amal vs. Hezbollah
The disappearance of Musa Al-Sadr in Libya in August 1978, and the outbreak of the civil war, triggered the Shia community's inherited tension once again and fractured it into two distinct political formations, both claiming to be an extension of the Sadr movement.
The Amal movement emerged as the heir to Sadr's institutional integration project. It prioritized integration within the Lebanese state. Allied initially with the national movement and the Palestinian resistance, it later was drawn into the sectarian struggle, seeking to represent the Shia community through state representation and negotiating power deals. Meanwhile, Hezbollah, the other side of the division, was formed amid the Israeli invasion as an armed resistance, with close connections to the Islamic Revolution of Iran under Khomeini leadership. Hezbollah served as the transnational path and became the Islamic Republic of Iran's faction in Lebanon. Hezbollah initially rejected the premise of integrating the Shia into the Lebanese state and explicitly announced its loyalty to the Islamic Revolution.
The emergence of Hezbollah in 1982 challenged the Amal movement over the representation of Shia, while tensions broke in 1988 into an armed conflict over the control of South Lebanon, Jabal Amil and Beirut's southern suburbs. While Iran backed Hezbollah as its ideological project to export revolution, Hafez Al-Assad's Syria supported the Amal movement to limit radical Islamism from spreading near its borders, turning the conflict into a proxy war between foreign competing visions.
The conflict known as the "war of brothers" was not simply about tactics; it reflected the unresolved duality. Despite being foreign-backed, both visions emerged from debates over history, identity, and how to achieve dignity under structural constraints. While the two parties were fighting over influence and control, families and brothers split over identity and over which orientation must secure the community's presence and freedom.
The Calm Before the Storm
Following the end of the civil war, the Shia community entered a period of reconciliation and cooperation between the Amal Movement and Hezbollah, which later grew into a political coalition. The liberation of South Lebanon strengthened this partnership, where the two parties had distinct roles and an undeclared division of labor that continues to dictate their politics until today: the Amal Movement, after disarmament, transitioned entirely to state politics while securing a near-monopoly over public sector quotas and civil services allocated to the Shiite community (before Hezbollah joined the government for the first time in 2005), meanwhile, Hezbollah, given that the Taif Agreement indirectly granted the party a unique right to retain weapons as an armed resistance against Israeli occupation, took care of the military capacity and regional alliances.
The alliance reached a peak of power following the 2006 war and the 2008 internal conflict, when the two parties known as the Shiite Tandem secured stronger representation and greater influence for the Shia within the Lebanese political system. However, this power was growing in the other direction as well. The Shiite community was able to integrate more fully into the Lebanese sectarian system, while Hezbollah was expanding its influence as a regional actor through its regional alliances. The growth led to its intervention in the Syrian civil war in 2013, where it continued to have an actual presence until the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.
The Return of Devastation: 2023 to Today
Today, Jabal Amil is experiencing another cycle of devastation since the beginning of the war in October 2023, which, unlike previous rounds of war with Israel, has resulted in the total wipeout of tens of villages, bringing back collective traumas and resurfacing historical debates that long defined the region.
The community of Jabal Amil finds itself once again caught between two competing orientations: pursuing integration with the local state and the pull of transnational alliances. Yet none offers a conceivable escape from the crisis; the gamble of connecting Jabal Amil’s front to regional war has resulted in catastrophic destruction, while the alternative path of unconditional disarmament and negotiating terms through a weak central government does not appeal to a population that fears the return of neglect and marginalization the community long experienced from the central state.
Ending the war is undeniably the most urgent issue for the region today. But the quest to solve the deep, underlying issues that repeatedly drive this cycle of destruction is becoming more critical. Without structural changes that redefine national belonging and build a truly sovereign, inclusive state, any ceasefire will merely be a pause before the next inevitable tragedy.