The last escalation of March 2026 marked a departure between Hezbollah and the Lebanese state, with each choosing a different and contradictory diplomatic path. While Hezbollah chose to link Lebanon’s fate to Iran's regional leverage, the Lebanese state chose to go to direct talks with Israel, ultimately surrendering some of its territorial sovereignty in order to safeguard its independence in foreign policy.
A War on Two Fronts
On June 18, while the Iranians and Americans were announcing that they reached a ceasefire deal that included halting the war on all fronts, including Lebanon, Israel was trying desperately to take over Ali Taher ridge on the outskirts of Nabatieh city in South Lebanon. The ridge, known to have one of Hezbollah’s most important command centers, wasn’t important to Israel merely for its military value, but to prove to the U.S. that its military campaign is capable of achieving more progress against Hezbollah. However, to Hezbollah, the battle over Ali Taher was to prove to the world that it is still capable of resisting Israel despite all the damage it received during almost three years of war.
After several failed attempts to advance at the Ali Taher ridge, Israel ceased fire, and Hezbollah celebrated the MOU as a victory for the Party and its allies in Iran. Meanwhile, Israel continued to refuse to be bound by the Iran deal, rejecting the idea of linking the Lebanese front to Iran’s. In parallel, Israel has continued direct negotiations with the Lebanese government, sponsored by Washington. The two sides held another round of direct talks and signed a Trilateral Framework Agreement aimed at establishing the foundations for lasting peace and arranging the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon separately from the Iran deal.
The convergence between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government’s views reflects not only the crisis of both agreements but also the reality of the war over Lebanon. A war not only fought by weapons but also in diplomacy.
ِA Fragile Ceasefire and Growing Local Tensions
Following the September-November 2024 escalation, Hezbollah was perceived as defeated both by Israel and its local opponents. Israel did not adhere to the ceasefire agreement and continued attacking Hezbollah’s sites and personnel, while establishing a buffer zone on the Lebanese side of the border. Hezbollah’s local opponents seized the opportunity to form a new cabinet that excluded Hezbollah and its allies, thereby removing their veto power, which had been guaranteed by the Doha agreement of 2008.
Hezbollah's weaponry became one of the central issues discussed by the newly formed government. Since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war and called for the disarmament of armed groups operating outside the authority of the Lebanese state, the debate over bringing Hezbollah's military arsenal under state control has remained unresolved. Tensions escalated when President Aoun and the cabinet ordered the Lebanese Armed Forces to devise a plan to place all weapons under the state's sole control. Hezbollah rejected this plan, arguing that it would leave Lebanon without its primary deterrent against Israel. At the same time, Israel accused the Lebanese government of failing to take sufficient steps to disarm Hezbollah, threatening to resume military operations.
Hezbollah’s Strategic Gamble
The war broke out again in February 2026, when Israel and the United States initiated a military operation against Iran, killing its Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was also the spiritual leader of Hezbollah. After enduring 16 months of Israeli attacks, Hezbollah seized the opportunity presented by the regional situation and the American/Israeli–Iranian conflict to align itself with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In response to the killing of Khamenei and the continuous Israeli offensive in Lebanon, Hezbollah launched a barrage of rockets towards northern Israeli settlements, provoking a heavy response from Israel that killed tens of people in southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut.
By re-entering the war, Hezbollah saw an opportunity to reset the narrative, following the 2024 defeat. Aware of Lebanon's centrality to regional geopolitics, Hezbollah understood that Iran would never abandon the Party in any post-war settlement. Simultaneously, key countries in the region, despite having issues with Iran, were concluding that Israel is posing a threat to regional stability. Hezbollah's strategy was to elevate its local situation to a regional level and gamble on another war, in order to prove itself to be a crucial part of the new regional security order that would emerge following an American/Israeli war against Iran.
A Breaking Point
The government responded swiftly by announcing a ban on Hezbollah's military activities and restricting its role to the political sphere. Lebanon’s prime minister stated the government's commitment to the cessation of hostilities and negotiations. The banning of Hezbollah's military wing marked the end of an era when its arm was legitimized by successive cabinets following the Taif Agreement that ended the civil war.
However, the confrontation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government continued. Hezbollah rejected the government's decree to ban its military activities and the government's decision to enter direct talks with Israel. For Hezbollah and a large proportion of the Lebanese population, this is considered a mistake, particularly during an ongoing war. Meanwhile, Israel continues to occupy Lebanese territories in the South and bomb civilians.
The moment of the direct talks between the Lebanese state and Israel marked the departure between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah, who each counted on a different path to end the war and restore state sovereignty.
One war, two tables
Hezbollah's plan eventually bore fruit: Iran continued to block traffic at the Hormuz Strait when the April ceasefire failed to stop Israel's attacks on Lebanon. This eventually forced the MOU to include a condition that ended the war on the Lebanese front. Hezbollah was counting on the Iran-American negotiations that followed the MOU to arrange Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon. However, Hezbollah was using this path to force a new de facto arrangement at the local level, where Iran became the proxy representative.
Despite the ceasefire in Lebanon being a core topic of the negotiations, the Lebanese government was not officially invited to join the Islamabad talks. Conversely, the government was trying to separate its ceasefire process from the U.S.-Iran talks. This desire coincided with Israeli interests, which rejected being bound by the deal. Ultimately, the two sides reached a Trilateral Framework Agreement with the U.S., which was present at both negotiation tables.
However, the Lebanese state has been criticized for undermining its sovereignty over its territory in order to regain control over war and peace. While the Taif Agreement has linked sovereignty to the ending of the Israeli occupation, the framework agreement links it to disarming Hezbollah. Furthermore, the agreement imposed obligations on the Lebanese state that were not reciprocated, particularly with regard to the withdrawal, which was dependent on the state's success in disarming Hezbollah, with no clear timeframe set for the Israeli withdrawal.
Lebanon’s Existential Rift
The contrasting views revealed more than a geopolitical contest over Lebanon’s position; they exposed a fundamental disagreement about the nature of the Lebanese state and identity. The dual negotiation tracks represent a battle over who has the legitimate right to determine Lebanon’s future: Hezbollah, which relies on its own power and on Iran’s regional leverage; and the Lebanese state, which relies on state-to-state diplomacy.
For the Lebanese state, the Trilateral Framework Agreement was an attempt to restore the traditional role of a sovereign state, namely a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, recognition of its borders, and control over foreign policy. Yet for Hezbollah, sovereignty does not derive from international treaties or state institutions, but rather from its deterrence power and regional alliances.
This diplomatic disagreement has exacerbated local tensions, bringing Lebanon’s fragile sectarian balance to the brink. For many, Hezbollah’s regional gamble was seen as a reckless venture that resulted in further damage and loss of life for civilians and villages in southern Lebanon and Beirut. However, Hezbollah’s supporters and allies believe that the government has ignored Israeli violations of the ceasefire since November 2024. Instead of using diplomacy to force Israel to abide by the ceasefire, the government is accused of betraying the resistance movement by engaging in direct talks with Lebanon’s long-time enemy.
Although Hezbollah lost territory, it could be argued that it has emerged from this round stronger, both structurally and militarily. Meanwhile, the Lebanese state managed to separate its fate from the U.S.-Iran negotiations, although it effectively relinquished a great deal of sovereignty in the process. Once again, Lebanon faces two options: an internal explosion or mediation that readjusts the sectarian power balance.