Syria's new authorities have spent the past two years promising Lebanon a relationship built on sovereignty and non-interference. But Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani's July visit, and in particular the political and sectarian symbolism surrounding his stop in Tripoli, told a murkier story.
A Relationship Recast After Assad
The fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in late 2024 was bound to have local, regional and international repercussions. Lebanon, a neighboring country, was perhaps the most likely to feel these reverberations, whether negative or positive, before any other. Indeed, the collapse of Assad’s regime liberated Lebanon from the heavy burden of its relationship with an influential and domineering neighbor that continually intervened in its internal affairs and viewed it as a vulnerable 'soft underbelly'. However, Abu Mohammad al-Golani's ascension to power as leader of al Nusra Front and later Hay'at Tahrir al Sham (HTS), his reversion to his original name Ahmed al Sharaa, and the group's dissolution have raised new questions about the future of relations with Lebanon. The main concern is the identity and ideology of Syria's new authority, as well as the role played by the Shia Hezbollah alongside the fallen Assad regime.
The first unofficial Lebanese visit to Damascus following Assad’s fall took place on December 22, 2024, two weeks after the regime’s collapse, when Druze leader Walid Jumblatt arrived to visit al-Sharaa. The visit was intended to “test the waters,” open doors, and perhaps help Jumblatt gain internal political benefits in Lebanon. During the visit, al-Sharaa also affirmed that Syria would no longer exert negative influence in Lebanon and would respect its sovereignty. Jumblatt visited Syria twice more, in May 2025 and April 2026.
The second visit by former Lebanese caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati came on 11 January 2025 following a Syrian invitation, just two days before the designation of Nawaf Salam to form the new cabinet after the election of President Joseph Aoun.
In turn, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam made two visits to Damascus: the first on April 14, 2025, which included consultations on security, border, and economic issues; and the second on May 9, 2026, which included consultations on energy, border crossings, refugees, and economic issues.
In addition, the two countries held several ministerial meetings in 2025 and 2026, including meetings between the two countries’ foreign ministers in Beirut in October 2025, a meeting between the two countries’ agriculture ministers in January 2026, and a meeting between the two countries’ justice ministers in February 2026. These diverse meetings provided an opportunity to launch a new phase in Lebanese-Syrian relations, in a spirit that differs, so far, from that of the long period that preceded it. During these meetings, the Syrian side affirmed its unwillingness to interfere in Lebanese affairs, and progress was made on issues related to security, borders, refugees, Syrian prisoners in Lebanon, and other matters.
A Different Kind of Visit
In Beirut, al-Shibani met with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and Speaker of the Parliament Nabih Berri. The visit took on a special symbolic significance, as it was the first with the leader of the Shia Amal Movement, an ally of Hezbollah, which has a long history of supporting the Assad regime and fighting alongside it against the Syrian people, who have suffered a large number of casualties as a result, in combination with the siege, forced displacement, and the escalation of sectarian conflict in Syria.
Beyond these official calls, al-Shaibani met his Lebanese counterpart Youssef Raji, Maronite Patriarch Bechara al-Rai, and Sunni Mufti Abdel Latif Derian, without meeting a single Shia religious figure. He also sat down with Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, and Kataeb leader Sami Gemayel. A planned meeting with Bahia Hariri, representing the Future Movement's Sunni constituency, was abruptly canceled, fueling unverified rumors of Saudi pressure tied to Riyadh's cooling relationship with the Future Movement. Meanwhile, these visits took on an official, perhaps even ceremonial, character, reflecting Syria’s desire to engage with various Lebanese factions, particularly those in open conflict with the Assad regime, such as Jumblatt, Geagea, and Gemayel. Yet their selectivity and the last-minute decision to avoid meeting Hariri sent mixed messages about Syria’s conduct and may have signaled a lack of clarity in its relations with Lebanon.
Tripoli: Where the Message Broke Down
The most contentious visit was not to the capital, Beirut, but to Tripoli, the capital of the north and a Sunni-majority governorate, where al-Shibani arrived in a motorcade amid a popular reception organized in his honor. He visited the Al-Taqwa Mosque, which the Syrian regime had targeted with a bombing in August 2013, killing dozens and wounding hundreds. He then met with the Sunni Mufti of Tripoli and Northern Lebanon, as well as several of the city’s dignitaries and political and religious figures.
Banners welcoming al-Shaibani went up across Sunni areas of the Bekaa and the north, some addressing him as "Abu Aisha," his old nom de guerre from his HTS days. al-Shaibani cast the Tripoli stop as loyalty "to those who stood by the Syrian revolution"; a framing that Lebanese analysts critical of Hezbollah read as interference dressed up as solidarity.
The problem wasn't the visit to Tripoli itself, but how it was staged. These factors gave the visit a localized Sunni character, rather than that of a state official visiting a Lebanese city, as if its defining nature were sectarian rather than national. It was as though the Sunni authority in Syria was visiting a region where some residents and political forces portray themselves as a Sunni model akin to, and closely aligned with, the ruling Sunni model in Syria. Furthermore, al-Sheibani's visit, marked by a public reception, banners addressing him as “Abu Aisha,” and the selection of personalities he met, contradicts Syria's repeated official rhetoric of engaging with Lebanon on a state-to-state basis without interfering in its internal affairs.
A Vacuum Syria Didn't Create, But May Be Filling
The nature of the visit and the warm welcome extended to the Syrian guest by certain Sunni groups in Tripoli and the Bekaa cannot be separated from the triumph of an Islamist movement in the process of transitioning from a jihadist militia to a form of ruling political Islam, particularly in the absence of strong Lebanese Sunni leadership; especially with the absence or marginalization of the Hariri leadership, with all its strengths and weaknesses in Lebanon. Furthermore, there is the ongoing suffering in northern Lebanon resulting from years of neglect, underdevelopment, and repression under the pretexts of combating terrorism and supporting the Syrian revolution.
Whether the visit reflects deliberate duplicity, official reassurance in Beirut, sectarian signaling in Tripoli, or simple inexperience and poor judgment, the effect for Lebanon is the same. A powerful, victorious Sunni Islamist movement next door, arriving just as Hezbollah's influence recedes, offers local religious and political actors something they haven't had in years: a model, a patron, and a future to aspire to.
Translated by Mohamed El Sadat.