The United States' funding in Lebanon is a facet of the two countries’ diplomatic relations, shaped by and varying according to internal and regional geopolitical developments and interests. Foreign funding is one of the most widely used forms of soft power and a diplomatic tactic for hegemons to attract and influence partner states without resorting to military confrontation to force compliance. Following the 1983 Marine Barracks bombing, the U.S. military's direct presence in Lebanon was tried and failed. Since then, Washington's approach has relied on funding and diplomacy instead.
American funding strategy and objectives changed abruptly in January 2025, when the USAID freeze and dissolution marked a turning point in the United States’ global foreign policy. In Lebanon, a weakened Hezbollah, following the 2023-2024 destructive Israeli escalation that killed many of its high-ranking operatives, presented an opportunity for the Trump administration to review its financial support strategies and scope.
Working towards a more positive image of the U.S. in Lebanon
Today, after signing the US-brokered framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel in June 2026, the United States is interested in establishing a more positive image of itself in Lebanon.
In July 2026, the U.S. Department of State announced a notice of funding opportunity (NOFO) for Lebanese non-profit civil society organizations and think tanks, under its Public Diplomacy Program. The grant aims to “strengthen local public understanding of U.S-led peace and stabilization efforts in Lebanon, and its role as a partner committed to security, economic opportunity, and responsible regional leadership”.
The project’s priority areas are advancing digital literacy and the use of artificial intelligence tools to identify and counter adversarial narratives and claims. The objectives clearly state that organizations receiving the grant should promote the U.S. as a credible partner and strategic enabler in their projects, especially amid ongoing direct peace negotiations. By increasing the knowledge and awareness of the Lebanese public of the United States’ role, agenda, and priorities in Lebanon, an image of the U.S. as a trusted, committed, and responsible partner is to be fostered and publicized.
The intention to improve its image in the eyes of the Lebanese public, and more specifically the pro-Hezbollah Shia community in Lebanon, is not unprecedented. A geopolitical and strategic goal, southern Lebanon, viewed by the US as a Hezbollah stronghold, has long benefited from US humanitarian and development funding, compensating for deficiencies in government-led services and infrastructure maintenance.
Hezbollah's Disarmament as Washington's Primary Condition
The grant opportunity was followed by the announcement of the 2026 fiscal year budget in August 2026 that introduced a $1.2 billion Lebanon aid bill provided over 5 years, largely conditional on Hezbollah’s disarmament. At about $240 million per year, the aid package supports the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in its disarmament process, in addition to standard counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, and mine-clearance efforts. The budget includes salaries for both the LAF and the Internal Security Forces (ISF), as well as an allocation for post-war reconstruction to rebuild damaged government services and infrastructure. Reconstruction money is conditional upon advancements in disarmament and the establishment of a state monopoly over weapons, and it stipulates that Hezbollah-adjacent parties and actors are prohibited from benefiting from this support. Notably, under this bill, the U.S. can impose sanctions if this stipulation is violated.
While Hezbollah’s disarmament is central to the core of security and military objectives of the ongoing negotiations process, it has social and economic ramifications for southern Lebanon’s social and infrastructural fabrics that could leave a gap in influence and power in the war-torn and disaster-stricken southern cities and villages. Therefore, the terminology used in the grant description, such as “counter-adversarial narratives”, “credible partner”, and “enabler,” tethers US support to good faith and steers away from inflammatory rhetoric. Consistent with the premise of good intentions in the trilateral framework agreement signed earlier in June, the goal is therefore the enactment of soft power, not through the assimilation of a territory and population with now-disrupted governance, but rather as a symbolic act of generosity and a gift-giving pledge.
A timeline of US-Lebanon Relations
Prior to the merging of the USAID under the U.S. Department of State in 2025, the agency funded multi-sectoral development projects in Lebanon since the 1950s. It focused on education, local development, governance, and economic development.
Since 1951, when the United States and Lebanon signed the Technical Cooperation Agreement between the United States and Lebanon in Beirut, landmark events in Lebanon’s recent history have shaped relations between the global hegemon and the newly independent state.
The USAID Beirut office was formally established under the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961 under the John F. Kennedy Administration. USAID’s mandate in Lebanon focused on nation-building by supporting infrastructure, health, and services sectors. At the time, the then-President Fuad Chehab aligned himself with American interests in countering the pan-Arab appeal and communist influence in Lebanon and the region.
With the onset of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, and the several events that contributed to its onslaught in the early 1970s, American military presence in Lebanon was threatened following the 1983 U.S Marine Barracks Bombing in Beirut, against the backdrop of the Israeli occupation of Beirut. Although never officially claimed by the armed group, the attack is widely attributed to Hezbollah and led to the U.S. military withdrawing from Lebanon, limiting its involvement to a diplomatic role through humanitarian aid.
In 2006, following the 33-day war between Israel and Hezbollah that ended with the UNSC Resolution 1701, including Article 1559 on the disarmament of non-state armed factions, the U.S-LAF security assistance relationship was formalized. American money flowed into reconstruction and development, and the U.S. increased its efforts to build influence in southern Lebanon to challenge the post-war victorious Hezbollah.
The 2019 turning point in U.S. funding strategy
Until 2019, it became clear that U.S. funding strategies in southern Lebanon failed to solidify its image as a friendly, trustworthy partner. Meanwhile, during those years, Hezbollah demonstrated commitment to its community by competently providing essential social, medical, and educational services. Furthermore, the politicization of southern Lebanon and Beirut’s Southern Suburbs communities, as supporters of Hezbollah’s resistance project and religious ideology, outweighed the material benefits of US funding.
At that point, re-strategizing was necessary. The halt of funding to Hezbollah-affiliated areas went into effect in 2019 with the announcement of the 2019 fiscal year. Aid was withheld from Hezbollah-affiliated areas and regions that had Hezbollah operations offices. This strategy is seen by the U.S. administration as an expanded peaceful and diplomatic action to exert pressure on Hezbollah, along with the imposition of sanctions, also viewed as penalization of the population for their loyalty to Hezbollah.
Managing Perception Amid a Declining U.S. Image in the Region
Public approval is not essential to implementing projects that aim to change public opinion on a specific issue. However, already existing perceptions of the U.S. among the Lebanese public, and how likely they are to change, are essential to the desired impact of the grant’s intervention. Currently, the U.S. is interested in managing perceptions in its favor amid its current heavy involvement in Lebanese affairs. An article published in Foreign Affairs in April 2026 declares that “the U.S. has lost the Arab World”. Polling by the Arab Barometer in 2025 shows a significant Arab turn against the United States since 7 October 2023. In Lebanon, only 21% of the surveyed population holds a positive view of the Trump Administration’s foreign policy, and 47% view the Trump administration as worse than Biden’s. Moreover, 78% of the surveyed Lebanese population sees the U.S. as unconditionally siding with Israel, and only 12% favor the current American policy regarding the conflict. Interestingly, this data is consistent with a similar survey conducted 20 years prior by Gallup, a public opinion survey company, following the 33-day war in 2006, which found that two-thirds of Lebanese expressed negative opinions toward the United States.
What Comes Next for U.S. Influence in Lebanon
The United States’ intervention in Lebanon since 2023, and the turbulent years that followed, require a multi-faceted approach that uses funding as a tool of symbolic power to communicate directly with the population. Hezbollah’s disarmament process is proving lengthy, and reconstruction funding remains conditional on it. In this context, the United States is seeking to complement its high-level political involvement in negotiations with public diplomacy efforts with civil society entities that have direct access to communities. As it positions itself as the peace agreement broker in direct Lebanon-Israel negotiations, the United States is interested in fostering an environment that accepts its emerging multi-layered influence in Lebanon, with the clearly stated objective of attaining peace.