On 26 June 2026, Lebanon and Israel signed a 14-point framework agreement that has the goal of establishing lasting peace and security. The agreement has been largely criticized by several political actors in Lebanon, and particular rejection has been lent to its 13th article. Article 13 entails that Israel and Lebanon agree to stop “all hostile or negative acts in international political or legal forums, as well as working towards the search for and return of remains and the release of detainees”.
Peace and Security at the Expense of Justice and Accountability
Following the September-November 2024 escalation, many rounds of indirect negotiations were held, and a ceasefire went into effect in November 2024. The agreement reinstated the implementation of Resolution 1701, with a particular focus on the disarmament of all non-state armed groups. Israel violated the agreement at least 15,400 times as recorded by the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) throughout a 15-month period before the renewal of the war on 2 March 2026.
In January 2025, a key milestone in the Lebanon-Israel talks was achieved by appointing a civilian to join the negotiating committee, alongside military representatives, thus paving the way for direct political-level talks that go beyond mere security arrangements. Later in August, the cabinet passed a decree tasking the Lebanese Army Forces with drawing up an implementation plan for Hezbollah’s disarmament. In April 2026, during the second full-scale aggression, a deal was reached announcing a 10-day temporary ceasefire that was later extended for 3 weeks, and then for 45 days, in parallel with the US-Iran negotiations.
Further talks took place at the end of May and throughout June, culminating in the signing of the 14-point framework agreement on 26 June. Although Lebanon had limited political and military leverage when entering the negotiations, this alone does not justify an agreement that largely fails to achieve its stated objectives of ending the war, ensuring the return of southern displaced residents, and securing the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the 68 villages newly occupied in southern Lebanon. Instead, the agreement places significantly more obligations on Lebanon than on Israel. While it provides Israel with commitments regarding its security and protection from hostile actions, it offers Lebanon few comparable guarantees concerning Israeli withdrawal, the protection of its sovereignty, or accountability for violations committed during the conflict. The Lebanese cabinet discussed the document at its weekly meeting. No consensus was reached on its passage or its submission before the Parliament due to divisions between Lebanon’s government actors over the pathway to the end of the war.
Political Choices over Justice
Since 13 October 2023, 16 journalists, more than 270 emergency medical staff and first responders and at least 30 Lebanese army soldiers were directly targeted by Israeli strikes while on duty, some of whom were targeted through double-tap strikes, documented on camera. Israel has also targeted heritage and religious sites in southern Lebanon, and it used internationally banned white phosphorus and glyphosate across agricultural land in southern Lebanon.
Civil society actors such as the Union of Lebanese Journalists, the popular committee for the freedom of detainees and abductees “Call for Freedom”, and Amnesty International, along with others, denounced the framework agreement, stating that it betrays the victims of the war.
Back in 2024, local human rights groups officially called on the Lebanese government to grant jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate war crimes committed by Israel. On 26 April 2024, the then-cabinet issued a decision instructing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to file a declaration with the ICC to investigate and prosecute documented war crimes. This decision was backtracked by the caretaker government, reportedly because investigations would likely subject Hezbollah leaders to questioning as well, fearing arrest warrants, similar to ones issued against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and some Hamas leaders, following the 7th of October events.
The government’s backtracking in 2024 and its acceptance of Article 13 of the 2026 framework agreement jeopardize justice-seeking efforts for the victims of Israeli war crimes committed in Lebanon. These actions also undermine domestic and independent efforts to align Lebanese law with international criminal law through the adoption of a domestic war crimes law. It reflects Lebanon's deep political fragmentation and the absence of a unified national approach to justice and accountability. As the historical examples discussed above demonstrate, successive governments have consistently favored political compromise and the maintenance of domestic power balances over accountability, thereby perpetuating a long-standing culture of impunity. Regardless of whether the alleged perpetrators are Lebanese actors, foreign states, or non-state armed groups, justice is all too often delayed, obstructed, or abandoned.
These developments are not exceptional. Rather, they represent the latest episode in a long history of political decisions that have repeatedly subordinated accountability to political compromise.
A history of Inconsequential Legal Pursuits
Article 13 is not an unprecedented event where justice for international crimes committed in Lebanon is obstructed due to external or internal factors. In addition to foreign influence, Lebanon has a complex political composition and a lack of unity among political factions over key political and security issues. The obstruction of justice is systemic and extends over decades of Lebanon’s tumultuous history, marked by civil war and conflict with Israel.
In 1991, a General Amnesty Law was signed by all Lebanese factions and official institutions as a national pardon for all war crimes committed during the 1975- 1990 Lebanese civil war. This law prevented any investigation of crimes and delayed efforts to uncover the fate of the missing and disappeared. After a decades-long battle by civil society, namely the Committee of the families of the kidnapped, Law 105 on the Missing and Forcibly Disappeared Persons was passed in 2018. No mechanism was determined for its enforcement, and it remains paralyzed to this day.
In 1998, Lebanon neither signed nor ratified the Rome Statute due to the absence of a unified national stance and fears of the prosecution of armed factions.
In 2006, during the 33-day war, Israel struck the Jiyyeh power plant, causing a massive oil spill. At the request of the Lebanese government, the UN General Assembly passed non-binding resolutions demanding that Israel pay Lebanon $856 million in retribution for immediate and long-term damages, which it has not.
In 2007, following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, a Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was established. It investigated the assassination under a hybrid combination of Lebanese criminal law and international law. The investigation was closed in 2023, and the perpetrators, who are high-level operatives linked to Hezbollah, were charged in absentia and received multiple life sentences. Due to its high-level political nature, the assassination was considered both a domestic and international crime, and was maneuvered carefully to obtain a level of justice while preventing internal conflict.
In 2020, following the 4-August Beirut explosion, domestic legal efforts were undertaken against the alleged perpetrators. High-ranking government and security officials were implicated for knowing of the presence of the explosives, and used their power and influence to stall the investigation.
Since October 2023, Lebanon has filed more than 66 complaints against Israel to the UN Security Council for targeting civilians, journalists, healthcare workers and first responders, government security personnel, and for using internationally-banned chemical substances such as glyphosate and white phosphorus on agricultural land in southern Lebanon.
This timeline illustrates that Lebanon’s recourse to international law, especially when Israel is the aggressor, consists of symbolic and inconsequential actions limited to complaints under non-binding resolutions. On one hand, its pursuit of justice faces the obstacle of protecting the interests and power of internal political actors. On the other hand, Lebanon’s inability to litigate Israel’s crimes adds to the cycle of impunity that Israel has in the international community, which has historically failed to hold Israel accountable for war crimes in Lebanon. Israel’s impunity before international law is partially attributed to the structures of international courts and legal bodies that are vulnerable to geopolitical dynamics that dictate the behavior of the UN Security Council’s issuing of binding decisions.
Justice Sacrificed
Article 13 of the Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement is not just a diplomatic concession; it symbolizes Lebanon's ongoing retreat from seeking accountability for Israeli war crimes committed on its soil. By accepting restrictions on legal action against Israel, the Lebanese government has further undermined one of the few remaining ways in which victims can seek justice, and one of the few ways in which grave violations of international law can be documented, investigated, and prosecuted.
This outcome is not an isolated political decision. It is the latest manifestation of a longstanding pattern. In this pattern, justice has repeatedly been subordinated to political compromise. Lebanon's deep political fragmentation, its politically influenced judiciary, and its fear of internal confrontation continue to undermine meaningful accountability for both domestic and international crimes. By signing the agreement, Lebanon has deprived itself of important diplomatic and political leverage that could have been used to negotiate Israeli withdrawal, the return of detainees, and stronger sovereignty guarantees, instead limiting its role to implementing security obligations, particularly the disarmament of Hezbollah.
Ultimately, the main victims of this political and legal trajectory are those who have already suffered the consequences of war. They continue to live without truth, accountability or effective remedies, while Article 13 reinforces long-standing criticisms of the international legal system's inability to deliver justice when geopolitical interests prevail.