As the US-Israeli war on Iran plunges West Asia into new chaos and turns the region into an arena of global power rivalry, Turkey is pursuing a cautious policy: pushing the parties toward negotiations, hedging against all sides, and using Israel's growing isolation and the rift between Washington and Europe to strengthen its standing in the West. For Ankara, Iran is neither an enemy nor an ally. It wants Iran weak enough to withdraw from Syria and Iraq, but strong enough to prevent Israel from dominating the region.
Not a Surprise but a Mixed Predicament
On February 28, 2026, the US and Israel's attacks on Iran dragged West Asian and even world politics into new chaos. Alongside Iran itself, many countries with Israeli and American bases were also directly affected by the destruction of the war. The global economic shock caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and the indirect involvement of actors such as EU member states, China, Pakistan, and Russia, showed that this conflict sits at the center of a power struggle between global poles. Each party’s record, from the US’s interventionism and Israel's crimes against humanity to Iran's own interventionism and repressive governance, has allowed the others to frame the war in ways that obscure its destructive and illegitimate nature, while the peoples of West Asia bear its violence.
To begin with, this war was not unforeseeable for Turkey. In fact, through certain steps in domestic and foreign policy, it had already responded to the conditions this war would create.
A New Regional Power
In recent years, Turkey has been conducting a multi-actor foreign policy affecting a wider geography, expanding its political, economic, and military hinterland. This is visible on several fronts, including a rapidly growing trade in war technologies with countries ranging from Ukraine to Somalia, and the UAE, providing Turkey with both material returns and political leverage.
On the other hand, Ankara re-establishes relations with more actors in the region. The Development Road project, which aims to connect Iraq’s Al-Faw port and Gulf and Asian trade routes to Europe through Turkey, is one of the clearest examples of Ankara’s effort to position itself as a regional transport and economic hub.
Moreover, Turkey takes steps, including signing joint defense agreements with Pakistan and the UAE, signaling closer cooperation with the EU on migration, energy, and defense, and resolving border and internal conflicts in its favor, bringing both stability and a safeguard against Israeli and regional instability. Normalization with Armenia, instrumentalizing reconstruction in Syria through its own military and political interventions, and gaining new political and economic advantages amid political uncertainties in Iraq and the Kurdistan region seem to be tangible examples.
Power Consolidation at Home, Recalculation Abroad
Turkey's shift in foreign policy has coincided with domestic political impasses within the ruling government. In particular, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has exploited regional conflicts and crises to justify its anti-democratic practices at home. At the same time, the perceived scale of the Israeli threat has contributed to a broader strategic recalculation in Ankara, including with regard to the Kurdish question. The renewed dialogue with the Kurdish movement can therefore also be understood in the context of these changes in the region. Regional tensions between Iran and Israel appear to have reinforced this recalculation. Öcalan has warned against Israeli attempts to exploit the Kurdish issue to increase their regional influence, and analyses of the peace process have also highlighted Ankara's concerns about Israel's growing presence in the region.
A similar perspective can be observed in policies on Syria. The AKP expects both domestic and foreign stability from Syria's reconstruction, beyond its economic value. Turkey's own economic crisis and rising anti-migrant sentiment pushed the government to accelerate Syrian refugee returns, while the overlap between its Kurdish peace process and Israel's ambitions in the new Syrian government is pushing Ankara to seek a stable, Turkish-aligned Syria.
That said, Turkey is not fully prepared for a potential regional crisis, especially the threats that Israel could pose. Though this is not yet critical, Ankara is strengthening its position through new alliances and negotiations. In particular, the course the war has taken, above all, Israel and the US's failure to achieve the victory they claimed, is pushing Turkey toward a long-term strategic shift.
Rivalry with Israel, Amity with Its Allies
Turkey and Israel are increasingly emerging as regional rivals, particularly as their strategic interests collide in Syria and the wider region. This quiet rivalry is complicated by an overlap: Ankara seeks closer ties with the US and the EU, neither of which has scaled back its support for Israel despite the genocide in Gaza and war crimes in Lebanon. Turkey’s relations with both have always been volatile and conditional, and whatever the other causes, Turkey has never mattered to them as much as Israel has. Today, two strategic openings suggest the balance might be shifting.
First, Turkey currently holds potential for the EU as never before. The Trump administration's isolation of the EU, Europe's unresolved energy crisis since the attacks on Ukraine, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have all raised the value of Turkey's arms industry, labor force, and significance as an energy corridor and geopolitical actor. This combined strength has brought Turkey closer to the EU, the US, and NATO alike. In particular, Trump's fondness for authoritarian regimes and Erdoğan's growing transformation into an authoritarian leader who increasingly heeds Trump's word, on top of Turkey being NATO's largest border outpost and its strong war-technology industry, are core factors shaping this relationship.
Another major shift in this arena is Israel's changing position. Israel's aggression, starting with Palestine, then Lebanon, and now Iran, has generated a large counterpublic opinion across the world, even in countries like Germany where support for Israel is a matter of state discourse. During the attacks on Iran, Israel came to look like an ally not fully aligned with Trump: he publicly clashed with Netanyahu over Lebanon, and at the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7–8 he praised Erdoğan and pledged to lift sanctions on Turkey despite Israeli lobbying against F-35 sales. Accordingly, Turkey is moving into the space opened by Israel’s slipping standing. Israel will remain Washington’s privileged ally, but Ankara is carving out a larger share of Western favor and, with it, a stronger hand against Israel. Nor is its room for maneuver limited to the West: its long-cultivated image as a defender of a multipolar world, the tough but strong state standing by the underdog, lets it play on a far larger stage.
Iran: Neither an Enemy nor an Ally
Iran is neither an enemy nor an ally for Turkey. Iran's possession of a nuclear program, or its Shia-aligned politics in countries like Iraq and Syria before the Assad fall, does not align with Turkey's foreign policy; in fact, the two countries' policies in Syria and Iraq have been colliding with one another for some time. However, until now these conflicts have not become open and heated; solutions have mostly been sought on diplomatic ground. There appear to be two main reasons for this.
First, Israel is the main rival for both countries. Israel has long been its chief enemy, acting as Washington’s proxy in the region and using the specter of an Iranian threat to rally Western support. Since its rise as a regional power, Turkey has seen Israel as its biggest rival, and it is equally clear today that Turkey is Israel's next biggest threat after Iran. Turkey's populist domestic politics and anti-Israel sentiment provide common public support, just as in many other Muslim-majority countries.
Second, without Iran, Israel would be pursuing a completely dominant policy, so Turkey needs Iran to keep at least limited power. Even after Assad’s fall and Hezbollah’s weakening, Iran’s diminished network across Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Yemen gave Turkey a balanced region with room to maneuver.
What does Turkey want?
The war launched by Israel and the US was not a surprise for Turkey, but neither was it desired. Since Turkey can neither prevent the attacks on Iran nor prevent Iran's retaliation in the region, it is pursuing a policy along three separate dimensions.
First, Turkey wants a peace arrangement as quickly as possible, repeatedly attempting this through statements and actions, including participating alongside its ally Pakistan in facilitating peace talks. Second, Turkey also wants to pursue a policy without taking anyone's side, while turning the war's outcomes to its own advantage. A regional order in which both Iran and Israel are weakened would be Turkey’s favorite, though it does not want Iran or the region to become unstable, since regional disorder would harm the economic relations Ankara has been building with the Gulf states, relations that Iran's attacks today appear to threaten. Third, Turkey wants Iran to weaken enough to withdraw from Syria and Iraq, where Turkey seeks dominance, while still remaining a threat to Israel. The case in which Israel and the US do not succeed as expected could work in Turkey's favor, revealing that Israel, long deemed undefeatable, can in fact be challenged.
On the other hand, two further consequences of Iran suffering major destruction are not among Turkey's preferences. The first is a rising Kurdish movement inside Iran, a possibility that has even caused Turkey to slow down its peace process with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), though this threat has been shelved since Kurdish actors have not wanted to act in accordance with the U.S. and Israel. The other is that the AKP and Erdoğan are under serious domestic political pressure over migration policy, and Turkey is not prepared for a strong wave of migration that could come from Iran alongside Syria's reconstruction process.
At the current point the war has reached, Turkey appears pleased that Israel has not achieved the success it expected. Yet the resumption of the war and highly uncertain conditions remain a major threat to Turkey. Iran's stronger-than-expected position looks like a new risk for the Gulf states, one Turkey will not accept in the long run either, since Iran shaking the Gulf states' economies would also weaken the strong economic line Turkey builds in the region.
In summary, it appears that Turkey will continue to have three fundamental objectives moving forward during this war: to establish regional stability and peace as soon as possible; while failing to achieve this, to take steps to strengthen its own position; and to influence the course of the war in such a way that Iran suffers as little damage as possible and Israel suffers as much damage as possible. The U.S., meanwhile, will be perceived as an off-the-radar actor in this war for Turkey and will continue to exist as an ally in different contexts.
On Another Alternative
Before closing, it is worth pointing out another alternative, a third way. That Turkey, while wars rise across the region, has opened a peace process with the Kurds, the exact opposite of Israel's trajectory, is admirable but not sufficient. The only way for peace with the Kurds to produce long-term results is through democratization in domestic politics. A reordering of the AKP's and Erdoğan's interests, which today conflict with the country's overall fate that is, the AKP competing for leadership within a democratic Turkey, could make Turkey legitimate across many domains, the EU especially, and could bring reconciliation with Turkey's Kurdish citizens, an estimated 20 to 25 percent of the population, as well as positive relations with Iraq, Iran, and Syria.
If Turkey wants to be the rising power of West Asia today, it should demonstrate its difference from Israel and Iran, and become the leading force for human rights, peace, and equality in West Asia. In a world of war, economic collapse, and climate crisis, the next era will belong to those who solve these crises, not those who create them.
