No analysis can yet say whether Turkish-Israeli relations have reached a point of no return. The irony is that the escalation that has been ongoing for nearly three years began after Erdoğan and Netanyahu met in New York two weeks before October 7, 2023. At the time, the meeting was described as “historic,” whereas that same meeting today is beginning to look more like a farewell than the new chapter in relations that newspapers described back then.
Israel’s latest escalation involved Greece, Ankara’s bitter neighbour. Israeli newspapers analyzed the escalation as having “come in response to tensions with Turkey,” with Tel Aviv signing a massive $33.48 billion defense export deal, the largest in the history of military cooperation between the two countries.
Under the agreement, Israel will construct a multilayered air defense system for Greece known as the “Achilles Shield,” incorporating advanced interceptor systems such as “David’s Sling,” “SPYDER,” and “Barak MX,” while also providing Athens with the “Drone Dome” system, designed to protect strategic sites from drone attacks. Before this, Israel struck Syria’s Abu al-Duhur military airbase on August 18, under the pretext that Turkish activity was taking place there, prompting a statement of condemnation from Turkey.
Each side accuses the other of expansionism, and Syria is caught in the middle, with its sovereignty at stake
Who will replace Iran in Syria?
Turkey considers Israel’s repeated strikes on Syria part of an “expansionist and confrontational approach,” and does not consider itself exempt from Israel’s potential targets.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan expressed this position clearly, arguing that “Israel’s expansionist and hostile policies are not a problem for Turkey alone, but a problem facing the international community and international justice as a whole.” He also stressed that Ankara will confront this destructive behavior through coordination with regional and international partners.
Meanwhile, according to the Emirates Policy Center, the rise of Ankara’s influence in Syria is one of Tel Aviv’s “key strategic concerns.” Its active support for Syria’s new government and the signing of regional security and defense agreements could reshape Syria’s military posture and limit Israel’s influence in southern Syria. The establishment of Turkish military bases, particularly air bases, could also “restrict Israel’s freedom of action in Syrian airspace and pose a direct threat to Israeli aircraft” in future conflicts with Iran. This comes alongside Israeli accusations that Ankara is seeking to replace Iran in Syria.
Researcher on Turkish affairs Saeed Al-Hajjtold Raseef22 that the message has three dimensions: “it is directed at Syria, Turkey, and Iran. This stems from the new Israeli security doctrine that emerged after October 7, which is based not on waiting for a threat to emerge before containing it, but on preventing it from emerging in the first place.”
The same approach applies to Turkey, he adds. “Israel does not want Iran to leave Syria only to be replaced by Turkey, particularly as relations with Turkey have recently become strained over Ankara’s position on Israel’s genocide in Gaza, its opposition to Israel, its statements against Netanyahu, and the alliances that have emerged in the region: Israel with Greece and Cyprus, and Turkey with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.”
Meanwhile, Muaz Al Abdullah, Middle East Research Manager at the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), believes that the strike on Abu al-Duhur Airbase was intended to prevent Turkey from “utilizing the airbase to anchor” its influence. He explained that the “attack occurred just hours after a Turkish military delegation visited the airfield to inspect plans for rehabilitating the runways, suggesting Israel may have used the strike as a direct geopolitical warning to Ankara.
According to Al Abdullah, this was not the first such strike in which “Israeli forces targeted military positions Turkey showed interest in.” Ankara had previously planned to establish three military bases in central Syria, but halted those plans after Israel struck the designated sites. The two sides subsequently agreed, through Azerbaijani mediation, on a military mechanism to prevent clashes and/or conflict.
Nevertheless, according to Turkish officials, Israel did not use the hotline established between the two countries last year, suggesting an intent to provoke Turkey.
Competition began with the fall of the Ba’ath
Amidst such hostility, the United States finds itself caught between its two allies in West Asia, acting as a mediator in the hope that the situation will not escalate and force it to choose sides. According to a previous statement by US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack, “Ankara was not aware that the Israeli aircraft were en route to that specific Syrian base, nor of their intended purpose, and therefore could potentially have been inclined to scramble their own jets in the belief that they themselves were under attack, which could have carried a real risk of rapid escalation into a direct military confrontation.”
There are two different visions: the Turkish vision, based on the need to support Damascus, backed by Gulf states and Washington, and the Israeli vision, which rejects Syria possessing any military force or capability.
Washington’s efforts to establish a deconfliction mechanism between the two sides suggest an acknowledgment that even a minor incident could have consequences far beyond its original objective.
The post-Assad transition in Syria is, in fact, a clash between competing regional visions. If the two countries are unable to establish reliable channels for managing their military activities, Syria could become a new and increasingly dangerous flashpoint between two of Washington’s partners.
International relations researcher and media expert Taha Ouda Oglu warns that Turkish-Israeli rivalry has reached a dangerous stage. He points out that after October 7, Turkish-Israeli disputes remained in the political and media spheres, given the poor relationship between Netanyahu and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
But the recent rivalry between the two is different: it has shifted from mere messaging to the military-security arena, involving competition over territory, influence, and military bases in Syria.
“There are two different visions. The first is a Turkish vision based on the need to support the new Syrian leadership, which is strongly backed by regional and Gulf countries, and even by the United States, given the existing Turkish-American track aimed at supporting the political process in Syria,” Oglu told Raseef22. “The Israeli vision is in complete opposition to this. Israel’s position has been clear from the first day of the fall of the Assad regime: it destroyed the Syrian army and now rejects the new Syrian army possessing any military strength or capability, to keep Syria weak. Israel, particularly Netanyahu, also wants the criteria for the building and politicization of this army to be dictated by its own security calculations, while seeking to set limits on Turkish influence.”
According to Oglu, this is unacceptable to Turkey, especially after Ankara linked its own security to that of Syria. It therefore seeks to avoid turning Syria into a conflict hotspot and aims to keep it out of the conflicts unfolding in the region.
Although Israel’s 2010 attack on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara triggered a major diplomatic crisis between the two countries, the real deterioration in relations began with Israel’s war on Gaza, its interventions in the new Syria, Tel Aviv’s recognition of Somaliland, and the deepening of its alliance with the Greek Cypriot side.
But according to the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, it was the collapse of the Ba’ath regime in Syria that ignited the competition. Tel Aviv sought to obstruct the “emergence of a consolidated central authority” to preserve maximum freedom of action. Ankara, by contrast, has “prioritized the restoration of a functioning Syrian state capable of stabilizing the country and limiting the spread of conflict.”
Evidently, Syria has become the main arena for their escalating rivalry, with both sides also working to shape US policy to serve their own goals.
Beyond Syria
Although tensions have eased recently due to mediators, the dispute between Ankara and Tel Aviv has not ended, Oglu says. Israel has recognized the difficulty of a confrontation with Ankara, with no guarantee of the outcome, which he does not rule out being linked to Netanyahu’s electoral calculations. But contacts with the US side have disrupted Israel's plan, keeping the Syrian arena out of political disputes.
For this reason, Oglu believes the battle is likely to be postponed, particularly given Israel’s awareness of Turkey’s growing regional power, the recent agreement between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and the possibility of Egypt joining the alliance. He believes this could constitute an agreement of “terror” for Israel and Netanyahu in the coming period.
The attack on Syria’s Abu al-Duhur airbase demonstrates Israel’s readiness to use military force to prevent developments it considers threatening.
Ankara, meanwhile, views attacks on Syria as a challenge to its regional interests. The strategic challenge, therefore, is to prevent their competing approaches to Syria from turning into a direct military confrontation. According to the Middle East Council, Turkey suspects that Israel’s access to military bases in Cyprus and Greece is intended to provide advanced launch sites in the event of war. It is also wary of Israeli efforts that at times seek to complicate Turkey’s position within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Amid the deterioration in relations between the two countries, Turkey imposed an economic embargo on Israel in spring 2024, suspended Turkish Airlines flights to Tel Aviv, joined South Africa’s case against Israel before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which accuses Israel of committing genocide in Gaza, and continued to host leaders of the Hamas movement and facilitate their meetings with President Erdoğan.
The Turkish Chief Public Prosecutor also issued arrest warrants for 37 Israeli figures, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz, on charges related to genocide in Gaza and the interception of the humanitarian Sumud Flotilla heading to Gaza. More recently, Ankara said it intends to request that Interpol issue a Red Notice for Netanyahu’s arrest.
Meanwhile, parallel moves have emerged in Israel, such as the recent recognition of the Armenian genocide committed by the Ottoman Empire, something Tel Aviv had refrained from doing for decades to preserve a delicate balance in its relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, a close ally of both Turkey and Israel.
Al-Hajj believes that a military clash or military friction between the two sides is inevitable, but not necessarily in the form of an open war. Rather, it will take the form of military friction involving sporadic retaliatory actions. Israel is setting red lines and imposing a new reality that Turkey cannot remain silent about, particularly now that the messages have become so direct.
While noting the existence of constraints, such as the roles of the United States and NATO, among others, he believes that Israel’s security doctrine and the expansion it is planning, coupled with its failure to recognize the red lines of others, as well as the context of the Israeli elections, in which Netanyahu appears to require more propaganda, wars, and escalation, will make a military clash inevitable. He expects Syria to be the main arena, while the Eastern Mediterranean, specifically along the Greek front, could be a secondary arena.
This report was published in collaboration with Raseef22.