Lebanon: Risen from the Ruins?

This article was originally published in nd.Aktuell on March 25, 2025.    

Lebanon has long been considered a “failed state”. The current reality of war, crisis, corruption and catastrophe would appear to confirm this view.

But in recent months, after years of gridlock, a ceasefire agreement with Israel in late November and the election of a new president and prime minister have given Lebanon’s war-weary society some cause for hope. This small multi-confessional country now finds itself on the brink — but of political failure or renewal?

From Independence to Confessional Representation

Lebanon became a state under French colonial rule. When it achieved independence in 1943, influential leaders of the Maronites (a Christian denomination given favourable treatment by France) secured the political hegemony of their own group in a National Pact made with the leaders of the various Islamic confessions. This agreement provided for the allocation of political representation and power along confessional lines according to the tendentious results of the one census ever to be carried out in Lebanon, securing a parliamentary majority for the Christian population. The president would always be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of parliament a Shia Muslim. This system of confessional representation continues to define the country to this day.

 

After achieving independence, Lebanon pursued an ultra-liberal economic policy. Beirut attracted billions in petrodollars and expanded to become the leading centre for banking, trade, and services in the region. But quasi-feudal political conditions persisted with nearly all economic sectors being dominated by a small oligarchy of close-knit families. 

Improved living standards were limited to the upper and middle classes in Beirut and the neighbouring Christian-dominated mountain regions, while the Shia population — constituting around a third of all citizens — remained overwhelmingly poor and marginalized. These inequalities culminated in a three-month civil war in 1958 which was also associated with conflicts over Lebanon’s geopolitical loyalties. It ended with General Fouad Chehab being named president following the first US military intervention in the Arab world.

Chehab strengthened state institutions and introduced comprehensive reforms aimed at reducing socio-economic inequalities, especially with infrastructure projects in outlying districts. But these efforts at reform were crushed by the established elites who were successful in defending their sinecures and nepotistic structures.

The public was further politicized and radicalized by the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War in 1967, especially in Beirut, which at the time was a hub for political activists, dissidents and artists from around the Arab world. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were living in refugee camps in Lebanon and progressive movements expressed solidarity with their struggle for liberation. Meanwhile, conservative Christian groups viewed these refugees — as well as the Palestinian guerrillas whose armed operations undermined Israel’s monopoly on force — as a threat to the political system from which they themselves benefited.

Civil War and the Post-War Order

Growing political polarization culminated in another civil war in 1975. Both the old elites and the new warlords managed to assert the dominance of their own confessions, not least by massacring civilians belonging to other religious groups. It was during this time that Syria and Israel would begin their decades-long occupations of extensive tracts of land.

The Lebanese Civil War only ended in 1990 with the Taif Agreement mediated by Saudi Arabia. Over the course of fifteen years, the war had cost 100,000 lives and displaced 900,000 people. The agreement entailed parity for Christian and Muslim members of parliament, a vague intention to gradually abolish political confessionalism, and the disarmament of all militias except Hezbollah, which continued to fight the ongoing Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.

The 2026 parliamentary election could be key to fulfilling the long-held desire for change. The people of Lebanon are just as weary of the obstacles presented by domestic politics as they are of the continual interventions from abroad. And they are highly politicized and prepared to take action.  

The political elites introduced an amnesty law to ensure a smooth transition into the post-war era without facing repercussions. But they never intended to truly abolish confessionalism. On the contrary, they used the neoliberal agenda pursued by Rafic al-Hariri — the multi-billionaire businessman who became prime minister — to loot the state and cement the confessional and neo-feudal system.

Hezbollah’s armed resistance compelled Israel to end the occupation of southern Lebanon in 2000, resulting in a surge of popularity and influence for this Shia party and paramilitary group with connections to Syria and Iran.

The murder of Rafic al-Hariri in 2005 prompted a mass uprising known as the Cedar Revolution, which ultimately ended the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. But the revolution also split the political class into pro-Western and pro-Iranian factions (the latter known as the “Axis of Resistance”), plunging the consensus-based political system into a state of paralysis. As a result, corrupt self-enrichment became the lowest common denominator uniting Lebanon’s elites, while the general population suffered the ever-worsening effects of economic mismanagement.

Mass Demonstrations and State Collapse

In 2019, the regime was again confronted by mass demonstrations that transcended confessional differences. But the elites were once more able to delay reforms and break the momentum of the protests. At the same time, their corrupt financial practices sparked a huge economic crisis. The resulting inflation pulverized the middle class and the bankrupt state could no longer provide basic services. Three quarters of the population slipped below the poverty line and Beirut experienced even more devastation with the 2020 port explosion.

The recent war between Hezbollah and Israel has escalated the situation further. Shortly after the Hamas-led massacre on 7 October 2023, Hezbollah opened a second front with limited shelling of northern Israel. This conflict was predominantly limited to the border region until September 2024, when Israel’s pager attacks, the ensuing airstrikes, and another Israeli invasion escalated the war across the entire country. It cost the lives of most of the leaders of Hezbollah, including the Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, as well as hundreds of civilians. Having been weakened considerably, Hezbollah agreed to a ceasefire in November 2024.

The ceasefire agreement is based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and involves establishing a buffer zone from which Hezbollah must withdraw, as well as the withdrawal of Israeli forces. The Lebanese army and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFL) are tasked with ensuring that the ceasefire is maintained and an international committee is to monitor its implementation. The urgently needed international financial aid is contingent upon the restoration of Lebanon’s monopoly on force and the disarmament of Hezbollah.

Despite the ceasefire agreement, Israel continues to attack targets in Lebanon every day. The Netanyahu government has also refused to bring a complete end to the occupation of southern Lebanon.

Political Failure or Renewal?

Since the agreement, a sense of optimism has nevertheless been coursing through large sections of Lebanese society. It was sparked by the unified front shown by parliamentary representatives in electing former army general Joseph Aoun as President and former president of the International Court of Justice Nawaf Salam as Prime Minister of Lebanon after years of political impasse.

The new government must now gather all the support it can to implement comprehensive reforms. It was only thanks to pressure from Saudi Arabia and the US that the presidential election was able to take place at all. Lebanon is financially dependent on both these countries and they — like Israel — are pushing Lebanon to turn its back on Iran and Hezbollah. But as the largest representative of the Shia population, Hezbollah and the associated Amal Movement are too politically significant to be simply isolated or ignored. At the same time, the need for reinvention following Hezbollah’s military defeat has prompted much more open discussion of its role and responsibility, including within its own ranks.

Meanwhile, civil society is calling for an end to the Israeli occupation, nationwide reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, a fairer distribution of the burden of the financial crisis, and an official inquest into the port explosion. There are also calls for confessionalism in politics to be replaced with a secular model based on equal suffrage and civil rights, an independent judiciary, and action against political nepotism. In the face of growing disregard for international law around the world, cuts to development aid, and the resistance of local elites, implementing these demands will presumably be no easy matter for Salam’s government. 

Lebanon is therefore at a crossroads once more. In the past, the implementation of a fairer social order has consistently failed to clear four structural hurdles: the stubborn defence of the interests of the elite, the marginalization of significant sections of the population, the influence of foreign powers, and the persistence of confessionalism as a political system. The extent to which civil society and the new government will manage to untangle this Gordian Knot remains to be seen — just like the outcome of the parliamentary election scheduled for May 2026.

But this election could be key to fulfilling the long-held desire for change. The people of Lebanon are just as weary of domestic obstacles as they are of continual interventions from abroad. And they are highly politicized and prepared to take action — now is the time to use this momentum to implement convincing reforms and dismantle the confessional system.

Successfully implementing these steps is dependent on two conditions. On the one hand, the international community must finally put an end to external interference in Lebanese politics and guarantee the country’s territorial integrity. On the other, the Lebanese government must develop a realistic programme of reforms supported by the majority of the population. Only then will political change in Lebanon succeed.

Translated by Catriona Corke & Marc Hiatt for Gegensatz Translation Collective