Lebanon’s Struggle for Stability and Sovereignty Amid Hezbollah’s Decline

Hezbollah has been weakened due to Israeli attacks on its facilities and the assassination of the party’s leader Hassan Nasrallah and other prominent figures. The downfall of the Syrian regime under the reign of Bashar al Assad is another big blow for Hezbollah, as the “Party of God” loses one of its most significant longtime supporters and allies. With the 60-day-long ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel in place, the Shiite militia needs to withdraw from South Lebanon and the Lebanese army will assume control of the country’s national defense in its place. Will these events mark a new political beginning for Lebanon?

The Lebanese could finally take a deep breath of relief after a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon had been reached, coming into effect at 4 a.m. on 27 November 2024, after more than one year of war. The preceding night witnessed the heaviest bombardments of central Beirut, its Southern suburbs and South Lebanon by the Israeli air force. Inhabitants of central Beirut feared for their lives, as they felt “the ground shaking” due to the heavy bombardment, with no shelters in place to seek refuge.

When the fighting finally stopped, thousands of internally displaced persons packed their few belongings, returning to their homes in the South and the Southern suburbs of Beirut – or to what they hoped had remained after two months of war. Almost 40 villages along the border areas in South Lebanon had been flattened during the Israeli invasion, as well as entire neighborhoods located in Dahieh, the Southern suburbs of Beirut, where many Shi’a Lebanese live. The strength of the once so powerful party with a military wing stronger than the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) had vanished within weeks.

The violence between Hezbollah and Israel culminated in the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on 27 September 2024: The Israeli air force dropped dozens of bunker-busting 1000kg bombs on Hezbollah’s headquarters in Dahieh, ultimately bringing about Nasrallah’s demise. Israel escalated its war all over Lebanon, including central Beirut, starting on 23 September 2024, followed by a ground invasion on 1^st October 2024. Over more than a year of war, around 4,000 people were killed and approximately 16,000 were injured.

So far, the ceasefire is fragile, but seems to hold. What does the current situation mean for Lebanon, a small country on the shores of the Mediterranean, which has lurched from one crisis to the next for years and is now struggling to remain on its feet? And how will it affect the internal sectarian balance, especially the Shi’a sect, on which Hezbollah based its support?

A Fifth of the Population Is Internally Displaced

A total of 1.2 million people were displaced within a matter of days in the wake of the latest escalation — a figure corresponding to approximately 20 percent of Lebanon’s total population. For the two months that followed the Israeli invasion, Beirut had been forced to provide shelter to a population almost twice the size it was before the war began. It was not managing at all well, with people sleeping in schools, mosques, churches, in cars, on the beach, and the street. Therefore, after the announcement of the ceasefire, many displaced people – most of them Shiites - packed their belongings, returning to their homes – or to what has been left. Entire neighborhoods and villages have been levelled and it will take years to rebuild. In the absence of a concrete plan for these 1.2 million refugees, they will ultimately be vulnerable to poverty and marginalization, thus creating a potential social and political time bomb.

Instrumentalizing Vulnerable Social Groups

Several political movements have taken advantage of the marginalization and impoverishment of Lebanon’s Shiite community throughout the country’s history — both the Communist Party and the Shiite Amal Movement during the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) as well as Hezbollah from the early 1980s onwards. [1] By building up basic (social) infrastructure in areas inhabited by Shiites, Hezbollah has been able to win over the local population and militarize certain sections of it.

Hezbollah was formed as a resistance movement in 1982 in the wake of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon; the organization waged a guerrilla-style war against the Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon until the Israeli army ultimately withdrew from Lebanese territory in May 2000. Hezbollah declared this withdrawal a victory over Israel, which greatly bolstered its reputation both domestically and in the wider region. Ever since its inception, Syria and Iran have supported the new Shiite movement with weapons and a great deal of money, as well as religious and ideological guidance. During Hassan Nasrallah’s 30-year leadership, Hezbollah was able to attain a certain status and a considerable degree of influence in Lebanon — not only as a major military organization but also as a social and political power. An expansive system of social and educational institutions, media networks, and companies provided the once poverty-stricken Shiite population with a flow of revenue and esteem. Hezbollah’s military supremacy provided strength to those who were previously marginalized. With Hezbollah as a political party in the Lebanese parliament, the Shiites were able to acquire an entirely new position within Lebanon’s precarious power balance, which is still structured around the influence of long-standing family clans and the 18 different religious communities represented in the country. Ultimately, Hezbollah assumed the mantle of kingmaker in the Lebanese parliament by either approving the election of a new president or — as was the case in the last two years — blocking it, as its right of veto precluded the possibility of achieving the necessary majority without them. This fragile system is now on the verge of collapse.

After the ceasefire: Lebanon’s Power Vacuum

Since 8 October 2023, Israel has gradually weakened Hezbollah through targeted strikes that eliminated nearly all of its top and middle leadership, including the leader and his designated successors. Israel has also heavily bombarded Hezbollah's headquarters, weapons storage facilities, and civilian infrastructure, including hospitals in southern Lebanon and Hezbollah-controlled suburbs in Beirut. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon further intensified the conflict, significantly weakening Hezbollah's military wing. The Shiite organization no longer exists as the unified, powerful entity it once was. With the downfall of the Assad regime in Syria, a key Hezbollah ally, the group faces an even greater threat to its military and political significance. This shift is particularly alarming for many Shiites, especially Hezbollah supporters, as the group has long claimed to be the legitimate representative of Lebanon’s Shiite population. However, this role has now been severely diminished. Should the IDF succeed in dismantling Hezbollah's political wing, the organization could collapse entirely.

The ceasefire agreement leans towards the same UN Security Council Resolution 1701 which once put an end to fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. In essence, the agreement states that Israel pulls out its soldiers from South Lebanon within 60 days and Hezbollah fighters withdraw North of the Litani River. The Lebanese army aims to send 10,000 troops to South Lebanon to secure the border. Together with UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, the Lebanese army needs to make sure that the agreement is implemented. A task force comprised of Israel’s military, Lebanon’s army, UNIFIL, France, and the USA is supposed to monitor progress or violations of the UNSCR1701. The question remains whether the Lebanese army, which lacks funding, equipment and soldiers, will be able to defend Lebanon’s borders and whether it will be willing to stand up against Hezbollah in case it breaches the ceasefire agreement. Potential fights between the Lebanese army and Hezbollah fighters could fuel internal tensions in a country where sectarian divisions run deep. 

Changed political landscape 

Hezbollah had always been receiving its weapons through Syria, and in return, sent elite troops to the neighboring country in support of Syrian dictator Bashar al Assad. Now that the regime in Damascus has fallen, two things will be harder, if not impossible for the “Party of God”: First, to maintain the supply of weaponry from Iran, which ran through the land route via Iraq and Syria. Second, to have a safe space to reorganize itself and reconstitute its original strength and significance.

On the level of interior politics, the sheer intensity of Israeli attacks on Lebanon’s villages, neighborhoods and infrastructure and the unimaginable scope of destruction in an already crisis-ridden country led to a shift in the political discourse, both in the political establishment and civil society. While Hezbollah and its supporters continue to claim the mantle of defending Lebanon’s southern border from Israeli aggression, even long-time political allies are now calling for the full implementation of UNSCR 1701, which envisions a demilitarized zone in southern Lebanon. Before the escalation of this war, most political leaders and activists refrained from openly advocating for Hezbollah’s disarmament. Now, however, the discourse has shifted: a growing number of political leaders from across different parties and sectarian groups are demanding Lebanon's full sovereignty, including in the south. They are calling for the Lebanese army to replace Hezbollah's militias, insisting that the defense of Lebanon should rest solely with legitimate state entities, not non-state actors.

On the political level, leaders from different political and sectarian backgrounds, scholars and activists are calling for building a real, sovereign state free of outside influences, meaning in particular to curtail Iran’s influence over Lebanese politics. There are a growing number of voices expressing support for Hezbollah’s continued presence as a political force in Lebanon’s political landscape — albeit as a Lebanese party, and not as a party whose leadership is based in Iran. 

What does Hezbollah’s future in Lebanon look like?

With Hezbollah weakened both militarily and politically, the Shi’a party could shift its positions, giving room for a wide support base for the election of a new president. This could be the first step in gradually rebuilding the state. With this important position filled, and the convening of the parliament, the Lebanese state would at least be in a position to reassume its fundamental duties, for example, applying for urgently needed international aid to respond to rebuilding homes, neighborhoods, and infrastructure. 

The question of disarming Hezbollah will be a lengthy and delicate process. However, the same things that have been implemented in other countries formerly ravaged by civil war should also be implemented in Lebanon: the disarmament of Hezbollah and the integration of the organization’s remaining combatants and cadres into the Lebanese army. In its capacity as the nation’s sole legitimate military power, the army should defend Lebanon from external threats and ensure domestic security, as the current ceasefire agreement foresees. This would, however, require not only that the army be adequately resourced — in terms of personnel, finances, and military equipment — so that it can effectively perform these functions, but also that UN Security Council Resolution 1701 be properly implemented, meaning the establishment of a demilitarized zone in southern Lebanon. Compliance would need to be ensured by the Lebanese army in cooperation with the UN peacekeeping force UNIFIL, and demilitarization would have to be adhered to on both sides — by both Lebanon and Israel.

[Translated by Louise Pain and Ryan Eyers for Gegensatz Translation Collective]

IMAGO / ABACAPRESS